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SERIES PREFACE
Ron Iphofen (Series Editor)
This book series, Advances in Research Ethics and Integrity, grew out of founda-
tional work with a group of Fellows of the UK Academy of Social Sciences who 
were all concerned to ensure that lessons learned from previous work were built 
upon and improved in the interests of the production of robust research prac-
tices of high quality. Duplication or unnecessary repetitions of earlier research 
and ignorance of existing work were seen as hindrances to research progress. 
Individual researchers, research professions and society all suffer in having to 
pay the costs in time, energy and money of delayed progress and superfluous 
repetitions. There is little excuse for failure to build on existing knowledge and 
practice given modern search technologies unless selfish ‘domain protectionism’ 
leads researchers to ignore existing work and seek credit for innovations already 
accomplished. Our concern was to aid well-motivated researchers to quickly dis-
cover existing progress made in ethical research in terms of topic, method and/or 
discipline and to move on with their own work more productively and to discover 
the best, most effective means to disseminate their own findings so that other 
researchers could, in turn, contribute to research progress.
It is true that there is a plethora of ethics codes and guidelines with researchers 
left to themselves to judge those more appropriate to their proposed activity. The 
same questions are repeatedly asked on discussion forums about how to proceed 
when similar long-standing problems in the field are being confronted afresh by 
novice researchers. Researchers and members of ethics review boards alike are 
faced with selecting the most appropriate codes or guidelines for their current 
purpose, eliding differences and similarities in a labyrinth of uncertainty. It is 
no wonder that novice researchers can despair in their search for guidance and 
experienced researchers may be tempted by the ‘checklist mentality’ that appears 
to characterise a meeting of formalised ethics requirements and permit their con-
science-free pursuit of a cherished programme of research.
If  risks of harm to the public and to researchers are to be kept to a mini-
mum and if  professional standards in the conduct of scientific research are to be 
maintained, the more that fundamental understandings of ethical behaviour in 
research are shared the better. If  progress is made in one sphere everyone gains 
from it being generally acknowledged and understood. If  foundational work is 
conducted everyone gains from being able to build on and develop further that 
work.
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Nor can it be assumed that formal ethics review committees are able to resolve 
the dilemmas or meet the challenges involved. Enough has been written about 
such review bodies to make their limitations clear. Crucially, they cannot follow 
researchers into the field to monitor their every action; they cannot anticipate all 
of the emergent ethical dilemmas nor, even, follow through to the publication 
of findings. There is no adequate penalty for neglect through incompetence, nor 
worse, for conscious omissions of evidence. We have to rely upon the virtues of 
the individual researcher alongside the skills of journal reviewers and funding 
agency evaluators. We need to constantly monitor scientific integrity at the cor-
porate and at the individual level. These are issues of quality as well as morality.
Within the research ethics field new problems, issues and concerns and new 
ways of collecting data continue to emerge regularly. This should not be surpris-
ing as social, economic and technological change necessitate constant re-evalu-
ation of research conduct. Standard approaches to research ethics such as valid 
informed consent, inclusion/exclusion criteria, vulnerable subjects and covert 
studies need to be re-considered as developing social contexts and methodo-
logical innovation, interdisciplinary research and economic pressures pose new 
challenges to convention. Innovations in technology and method challenge our 
understanding of ‘the public’ and ‘the private’. Researchers need to think even 
more clearly about the balance of harm and benefit to their subjects, to them-
selves and to society. This series proposes to address such new and continuing 
challenges for both funders, research managers, research ethics committees and 
researchers in the field as they emerge. The concerns and interests are global and 
well recognised by researchers and commissioners alike around the world but 
with varying commitments at both the procedural and the practical levels. This 
series is designed to suggest realistic solutions to these challenges – this practical 
angle is the unique selling proposition for the series. Each volume will raise and 
address the key issues in the debates, but also strive to suggest ways forward that 
maintain the key ethical concerns of respect for human rights and dignity, while 
sustaining pragmatic guidance for future research developments. A series such 
as this aims to offer practical help and guidance in actual research engagements 
as well as meeting the often varied and challenging demands of research ethics 
review. The approach will not be one of abstract moral philosophy; instead it will 
seek to help researchers think through the potential harms and benefits of their 
work in the proposal stage and assist their reflection of the big ethical moments 
that they face in the field often when there may be no one to advise them in terms 
of their societal impact and acceptance.
While the research community can be highly imaginative both in the fields of 
study and methodological innovation, the structures of management and fund-
ing, and the pressure to publish to fulfil league table quotas can pressure research-
ers into errors of judgement that have personal and professional consequences. 
The series aims to adopt an approach that promotes good practice and sets prin-
ciples, values and standards that serve as models to aid successful research out-
comes. There is clear international appeal as commissioners and researchers alike 
share a vested interest in the global promotion of professional virtues that lead 
to the public acceptability of good research. In an increasingly global world in 
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research terms, there is little point in applying too localised a morality, nor one 
that implies a solely Western hegemony of values. If  standards ‘matter’, it seems 
evident that they should ‘matter’ to and for all. Only then can the growth of 
interdisciplinary and multi-national projects be accomplished effectively and with 
a shared concern for potential harms and benefits. While a diversity of experi-
ence and local interests is acknowledged, there are existing, proven models of 
good practice which can help research practitioners in emergent nations build 
their policies and processes to suit their own circumstances. We need to see that 
consensus positions effectively guide the work of scientists across the globe and 
secure minimal participant harm and maximum societal benefit – and, addition-
ally, that instances of fraudulence, corruption and dishonesty in science decrease 
as a consequence.
Perhaps some forms of truly independent formal ethics scrutiny can help 
maintain the integrity of research professions in an era of enhanced concerns 
over data security, privacy and human rights legislation. But it is essential to 
guard against rigid conformity to what can become administrative procedures. 
The consistency we seek to assist researchers in understanding what constitutes 
‘proper behaviour’ does not imply uniformity. Having principles does not lead 
inexorably to an adherence to principlism. Indeed, sincerely held principles can be 
in conflict in differing contexts. No one practice is necessarily the best approach 
in all circumstances. But if  researchers are aware of the range of possible ways 
in which their work can be accomplished ethically and with integrity, they can be 
free to apply the approach that works or is necessary in their setting. Guides to 
‘good’ ways of doing things should not be taken as the ‘only’ way of proceeding. 
A rigidity in outlook does no favours to methodological innovation, nor to the 
research subjects or participants that they are supposed to protect. If  there were 
to be any principles that should be rigidly adhered to they should include flex-
ibility, open-mindedness, the recognition of the range of challenging situations to 
be met in the field – principles that in essence amount to a sense of proportional-
ity. And these principles should apply equally to researchers and ethics reviewers 
alike. To accomplish that requires ethics reviewers to think afresh about each new 
research proposal, to detach from pre-formed opinions and prejudices, while still 
learning from and applying the lessons of the past. Principles such as these must 
also apply to funding and commissioning agencies, to research institutions and to 
professional associations and their learned societies. Our integrity as researchers 
demands that we recognise that the rights of our funders and research partici-
pants and/or subjects are to be valued alongside our cherished research goals and 
seek to embody such principles in the research process from the outset. This series 
will strive to seek just how that might be accomplished in the best interests of all.
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INTRODUCTION: ETHICAL ISSUES 
IN COVERT, SECURITY AND 
SURVEILLANCE RESEARCH
Ron Iphofen and Dónal O’Mathúna
ABSTRACT
In light of the many crises and catastrophes faced in the modern world, 
policymakers frequently make claims to be ‘following the science’ or being 
‘governed by the data’. Yet, conflict based on inequalities continue to fuel 
dissatisfaction with the decisions and actions of authorities. Research into 
public security may require surveillance and covert observations, all of 
which are subject to major ethical challenges. Any neat distinction between 
covert and overt research is difficult to maintain given the variety of defini-
tions used for all the terms addressed here. Covert research may be ethi-
cally justified and is not necessarily deceptive. In any case, deception may 
be ethical if  engaged in for the ‘right’ reasons. Modern research sites and 
innovative research methods may enhance opportunities for covert work. 
In all surveillance and covert work, care must be taken about how consent 
is managed, how observed subjects are protected and harm to all involved 
minimised in all situations.
Keywords: Ethical surveillance; covert research; participant observation; 
security research; dual use; research ethics review
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2 RON IPHOFEN AND DÓNAL O’MATHÚNA
INTRODUCTION
A series of  major significant events and catastrophes have stimulated the 
developed world to better realise the widely different interpretations of  what 
capitalist, liberal democracies see as progress: from 9/11, the Arab Spring, 
mass migrations from conflict-ridden regions of  the world, to the COVID-
19 pandemic, various events have led to growing pressure to make sense of 
their causes and consequences. Policymakers look to ‘science’ to supply the 
answers, and claim they are ‘following the science’ when making decisions 
and policies. However, sometimes complex issues are thought through hastily, 
the studies used to inform policies are not carefully evaluated in terms of  their 
methods or ethics, and policies are introduced with a degree of  confidence 
not justified by the ‘science.’ When such policies turn out to be ineffective, the 
blame gets diverted to the researchers.
The scientific method and its application to the understanding of humanity 
and our environment has improved the human living condition significantly, but 
such improvements are not enjoyed by all. Inequality creates conflict which can 
lead to everything from distrust to despair, or in the face of overwhelming mili-
tary dominance, can fuel radicalism and the continued development of terrorism 
by disaffected groups. Continuing research in the areas of defence, security and 
surveillance is critical to understand conflict, but carrying out such research raises 
distinct methodological and ethical challenges. Occasionally, the best research 
must be ‘covert’ or risk missing the key elements that account for events that are 
not willingly disclosed by those with malicious or nefarious intent, or by those 
who cannot risk becoming participants.
The notion of  covert research has long held challenges for ethics reviewers. 
Part of  the problem lies with precisely what is meant by ‘covert’. If  it simply 
refers to ‘hidden’ information relating to the research, then pretty much all 
research contains covert elements since only the active researcher, in the field 
or in the laboratory, knows everything that is going on and, in any case, it 
might not be in the interests of  funders, co-researchers or research subjects to 
be told everything that is contained in or required of  a research engagement. 
To do so might compromise the method and/or the research design without 
bringing any clear ethical advantage nor minimising any risks of  harm to all 
involved (Iphofen, 2011).
Amongst some observers, another view exists that some inherently unethi-
cal research procedures exist, and covert observation is one of  them. Such 
procedures can range from making observations of  human behaviour in pub-
lic places, or lurking on social media to observe how people manage their 
online relationships, to actively participating in a group or community with-
out identifying oneself  as a ‘researcher’. This view of  covert observation is 
seen by some as particularly problematic since it appears to necessarily imply 
deception since those being observed are not directly informed of  the obser-
vation. Part of  the problem here is with what one means by deception. We 
would argue that the term deception is used for a range of  activities, not just 
telling a lie. It can involve an act or statement which misleads, or hides the 
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truth, or promotes a belief, concept or an idea that is explicitly known not to 
be true (a lie). Deception can involve dissimulation, propaganda and sleight 
of  hand, as well as distraction, camouflage or concealment, and deception 
can occur without being viewed as ethically problematic. For example, most 
commercial advertising is understood to be deceptive in the sense of  manip-
ulating the attractiveness of  products and/or services in order to promote 
sales. We, the consumers, know that and vary in the ways in which we permit 
ourselves to be deceived by advertising. Yet, if  the advertising stated that the 
product was available for £100, and nowhere sold it for less than £1,000, we 
would feel deceived in a way in which we would say was wrong because clearly 
false information was provided.
In a similar way, forms of ‘deception’ are vital to achieving research goals 
even whilst other forms are unethical. The research ‘gold standard’ of the dou-
ble blind randomised controlled trial for drug therapies relies upon deliberate 
self-deception in terms of permitting the knowing concealment of the potentially 
‘active’ substance and the application of a placebo. It is well known that part 
of the efficacy of a placebo for some subjects relies on the participants ‘deceiv-
ing themselves’ into believing they are, in fact, receiving the active substance. In 
other research, letting people know they are being observed might result in an 
alteration of their behaviour and prevent their ‘true’, or authentic natural behav-
iour, from being studied. Some research can involve a component of deception 
where, for example, participants are told they will be interviewed about a certain 
topic and audio visually recorded to help analyse the interview. This topic is part 
of the research study, but during every interview, a second researcher regularly 
gets phone messages and replies to them. Participants are not informed that the 
research had a second aim to analyse people’s reactions to others responding to 
text messages during interviews. This is a form of deception, though the research-
ers do not explicitly lie to the participants.
If  a research proposal is subject to ethics appraisal of some sort (a research 
ethics committee (REC) or institutional review board (IRB)) it may be the case 
that some members regard covert observation or deception as inherently unethi-
cal. If  that were true, much of early social science would have been ruled out 
and many specific schools of thought (e.g. Chicago sociology and Stanford psy-
chology) would have been proscribed. Even if  no REC scrutiny is required of a 
research action, it remains the responsibility of the professional researcher to find 
the best way to protect their subjects, and themselves, when conducting research 
that has any degree of covert or deceptive elements within it.
Extensive opportunities for covert observation have emerged with the appear-
ance of online social media which have given rise to new forms of community and 
personal identity for people which pose real challenges to the key ethical research 
principles of consenting, voluntary participation and vulnerability. At the same 
time, such media have given rise to innovative methodological approaches for 
researchers – in terms of access to a massive range of both qualitative and quan-
titative data and, as a result, our understanding of public and private space has 
become more complicated.
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BEING COVERT
Being covert in essence means that some, if not all, information is withheld about 
the fact that some research or ‘evidence-gathering’ activity is occurring. Taking such 
an approach requires ensuring an appropriate balance exists and has been justified 
between methodological requirements and the ethical responsibility to protect the 
subject from undue interference. If there are really strong methodological reasons for 
covert observation, and a study would be worthless without it, it could be justified 
– as long as there are no undue consequences for those under observation. Several 
of the chapters in this collection offer suggestions and examples about when this 
might be justifiable. Typically, this is done by concealing the identities of those being 
observed and the site of the study. The subject may be protected by ensuring that it 
would be impossible for anyone to find out who the subject of study is and where the 
study is being conducted. If such ‘protection’ and the ‘value’ of the study (to society 
and, possibly, even to the individuals/group under study) outweighs any conceivable 
harm – the ethical justification is strengthened. But neither full protection nor full 
lack of intrusion can be guaranteed and the notion of what constitutes ‘harm’ can 
vary greatly between individuals. These justifications are complex, and people will 
differ in their overall assessments of the arguments.
For both covert and any form of surveillance research a conventional solution is to 
somehow signal to those who might be affected that the work is being carried out – such 
as notices in public venues or social media sites, or, for studies in workplaces, notices 
sent to all staff likely to be present. Inevitably, this compromises the research design to 
some degree: the subjects might behave differently as a consequence of knowing that 
they might be observed; the sample selection might be compromised as all the subjects 
might not have seen the research notices and may behave differently; the reliability of 
the evidence gathered might thus be interfered with; and, more problematically, this 
approach might not even secure valid informed consent. There would be no evidence, 
other than the notice, that the population/subjects were truly informed. People could 
say they had not seen the notice and, if they hear about it subsequently, could get upset 
about being observed. There would then have to be a grievance procedure for redress 
of any perceived harm – once again compromising the methodology.
One thing that is agreed upon is the need to secure the consent of the owners 
of the premises, site and/or organisation in which the study is to occur. Insurance 
indemnity issues will be involved for sure. This has become a particular bone 
of contention in social media studies where it is argued that ‘the expectation of 
privacy’ is illusory and by no means protected by any statements of terms and 
conditions (see Woodfield, 2018). Some suggest that there should be little concern 
about observations in public places for a range of reasons: people are observing 
each other anyway; we sit in café terraces and ‘watch the world go by’, and people 
do not complain. Whether we make notes about what we see, or write about and 
publish our observations, is of secondary concern. If  people are unhappy about 
how they are described, and their identities revealed, the only thing they can do 
is to take it to law. Journalists and novelists are less bothered about this sort of 
behaviour than professional researchers. One could argue that the researcher’s 
motives are likely to be more ‘pure’ – whatever that means!
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RESTRICTING INFORMED CONSENT
Situations occur when information about the full nature of a study may have to be 
restricted in order to comply with a specific research design. This is particularly likely 
to occur with covert participant observational studies or ethnographic field research 
in which the researcher’s role is not fully disclosed – also known as immersive field-
work. To seek consent from ‘subjects’ or site owners in such a situation would nullify 
the research method and the rationale for its adoption. But any exemptions to seeking 
consent must be detailed together with an explanation of why they have occurred. 
Thus, there may be broad methodological justifications and more specific, strategic 
reasons to do with the safety of researchers and/or research subjects quite apart from 
securing the research design. Incomplete disclosure may be justified if it entailed mini-
mal risks to the subjects, if some way of debriefing them could be made available, and, 
perhaps, if there were a way to provide for the appropriate dissemination of findings 
to subjects. In fact, it may be the case that subjects could suffer from ‘information 
overload’ if they are told too much. After all they are not the professionals whose 
careers are dependent upon satisfactory outcomes. Even some form of retrospective 
consent could be sought to allay fears.
Observational studies in which the participants are not and never will be made 
aware that they are being observed offer the best examples of exceptions to fully 
informed consent. There have been many such ‘classic’ ethnographic studies in the 
history of social science research and they usually cover the fringe areas of society – 
criminality, social deviance, the sex industry, terrorist groups and religious cults. In a 
classic text, Moser and Kalton (1971) described observation as ‘… the classic method 
of scientific enquiry’ (p. 244) and expressed surprise at the relatively infrequent use of 
observational methods by social scientists when one reflects that ‘… they are literally 
surrounded by their subject matter’. Their only ethical concern was that:
The method must be suitable for investigating the problem in which the social scientist is inter-
ested; it must be appropriate to the populations and samples he [sic.] wishes to study; and it 
should be reasonably reliable and objective. (Moser & Kalton, 1971, p. 244)
They do caution about the potential for bias since it depends upon the observer’s 
recording skills and their interpretations of the meanings or intentions behind 
the behaviour:
[…] observers are so much part of their subject matter that they may fail to see it objectively; 
… their vision may be distorted by what they are used to seeing or what they expect to see; and 
… they may find it hard to present a report in which observation is satisfactorily distinguished 
from inference and interpretation. (Moser & Kalton, 1971, p. 253)
COVERT STUDIES
Sidhir Venkatesh claims that he could not have conducted his research on hus-
tlers, prostitutes and drug dealers in any detail if  they had been aware of his sta-
tus as a researcher. His analysis of a drug dealing gang’s accounts demonstrated 
how it adopted a business model successfully employed by many other modern 
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businesses. He explains that conventional research instruments such as question-
naires and interview schedules would be entirely inappropriate and ineffective 
in such situations and would not help researchers trying to learn about the lives 
of poor and marginalised communities. He saw that just as his research subjects 
were ‘hustling’ for money, drugs, sexual favours and so on, he was also hustling 
for the data that he saw as vital to his research goals. He had to become imagina-
tive, devious and, therefore, covert in gaining information – otherwise he would 
be seen as an agent of the authorities and a threat to his respondents’ access to 
services (Venkatesh, 2008).
It is vital that during the ethics appraisal process – via RECs or IRBs – the 
use of  deception that is necessarily an element of  covert research and/or surveil-
lance should not be necessarily ruled out as inherently morally unacceptable. 
The question facing an ethics committee should not be: ‘Is deception wrong?’ 
To answer that in the affirmative would be to deny practices that are central to 
human civilisation – politics, economics and, indeed, normal social interaction. 
Rather the committee should ask: ‘Would the form of  deception proposed or 
implied here harm the research participants, the researchers and/or society in 
general in any way?’ This is not an easy question to answer since the harms 
would have to be balanced against the benefits accruing to all of  those constitu-
ent groups if  the research was conducted successfully. As Robert Rosenhal has 
pointed out:
[…] the … researcher whose study might reduce violence or racism or sexism, but who refuses 
to do the study because it involves deception, has not solved an ethical problem but only traded 
it in for another. (cited in Bok, 1979, p. 192)
Another key question about deception has to do with whether or not it dam-
ages the trust the general public (and so future potential research participants) 
have in researchers. If  deception leads to an undermining of trust, and so a reluc-
tance to participate in research, this is a risk to the success of future research 
projects (Bok, 1979, p. 205 et seq.). The benefits to society of future research are 
thereby jeopardised by the ‘contamination of the field’.
Thus, we are always confronted with a conflict of values. If  we regard the acquisition of knowl-
edge about human behaviour as a positive value, and if  an experiment using deception 
constitutes a significant contribution to such knowledge which could not be very well 
achieved by other means, then we cannot unequivocally rule out this experiment. The 
question for us is not simply whether it does or does not use deception, but whether the 
amount and types of  deception are justified by the significance of  the study and the una-
vailability of  alternative (that is, deception-free) procedures. (Kelman, 1967 in Bynner & 
Stribley, 1979, p. 190)
Another way of addressing this is to consider it alongside the issues of consent 
and vulnerability. Thus, if  the form of deception proposed in a research pro-
ject minimises the research subjects’ capacity to consent and makes them more 
vulnerable to harm without substantially contributing to societal benefit then it 
becomes harder to ethically justify it going ahead. It is a complex question – but 




Finally, ethics review committees often ask whether a piece of research is likely to 
be excessively intrusive and so ‘disturbing’ the subjects’ normal life routines. Of 
course, all research is to some extent intrusive, but that intrusiveness is variable 
– dependent upon how much of the respondents’ time, energy and so on it takes 
up and, not to be forgotten, how intrusive the subsequent reporting of findings 
might be. Intrusiveness also needs to be balanced against the concerns addressed 
above – thus, ironically, the more covert a piece of research, the less intrusive in 
ordinary lives it is likely to be. It might become more intrusive depending upon 
how and where research findings are published – but that merely raises another 
set of ethical concerns.
In practical terms, then, to maintain the dignity and personhood of research 
subjects one would have to anticipate the potential limitations to their participa-
tion in research and adjust methodologies accordingly. So, perhaps paradoxically, 
given the condemnation of covert research in some circles, it could be argued that 
observation could be the least intrusive way of researching aspects of the lives of 
vulnerable people since it is less likely to challenge them emotionally and physi-
cally. A range of naturalistic observation methods could be employed for which 
in some cases they need not be made aware and, in others, might be positively 
enjoyed (Clark, 2007). In qualitative research, in particular it may be impossi-
ble to maintain a neat distinction between covert and overt research. Again, as 
Murphy and Dingwall (2001, chapter 23) have explained, settings are often more 
complex and changeable than can be anticipated.
THIS VOLUME
Drawing on an international authorship, this volume strives to address these 
key and often overlapping issues that become entangled in so many contempo-
rary research ethics challenges. The volume begins with a general overview of 
the ethical issues with surveillance research, before considering the benefits and 
challenges of handling Big Data and how this affects concepts of privacy. This 
is seen as important to provide security in an increasingly insecure society, espe-
cially in relation to state intervention and monitoring, but such research must be 
conducted responsibly to avoid fuelling further distrust. The theme of privacy in 
civil society is considered in Chapter 3 in relation to the issues facing research-
ers seeking consent to conduct research using surveillance or covert or deceptive 
methods. Chapter 4 explores covert research in greater depth, exploring reasons 
for and against the use of various forms of covert methods. Chapter 5 examines 
a trend within research to explore correlation rather than causation, which raises 
a number of ethical issues, particularly in the context of Big Data, the focus of 
a number of subsequent chapters. Chapter 6 examines claims that ethical issues 
with Big Data are addressed through anonymisation, and points to the need for 
an ethical framework to ensure data are collected and used appropriately. Chapter 
7 switches focus to examine ethical concerns with state authorities using health-
related data for non-health purposes, and the implications of this for researchers 
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using such data. Chapter 8 turns to examine data protection in a German con-
text given its distinct historical experience with state authorities surveilling citi-
zens for the purposes of oppression. The ethical issues with dual use research 
are examined in Chapter 9, especially when research results have the potential 
to be used for military purposes. Chapter 10 explores ethical tensions between 
community-based and systems-based (or organisational) approaches to address 
security concerns amongst humanitarian workers. Chapter 11 continues the focus 
on security research and examines the challenges of collecting data using various 
research methods in ways that protect participants from security breaches. The 
final chapter provides two concise lists of recommendations for research involv-
ing surveillance, covert and deceptive methods. One set of guidance is provided 
for reviewers of such research, and another set for policymakers. We offer these as 
a concise summary of the in-depth discussions and analyses provided throughout 
the volume by this group of internationally esteemed and respected authors.
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This short chapter is an introduction to my 2018 book: The Ethics of 
Surveillance: An Introduction (Macnish, 2018). It is provided at the start of 
this PRO-RES collection of essays because it anticipates and supplements the 
range of issues covered in this collection and lays out some of the fundamental 
considerations necessary to ensure if surveillance must be conducted, it will be 
done as ethically as possible.
When is surveillance justified? We can largely agree that there are cases in 
which surveillance seems, at least prima facie, to be morally correct: police 
tracking a suspected mass murderer, domestic state security tracking a spy 
network, or a spouse uncovering partner’s infidelity. At the same time, there 
are other cases in which surveillance seems clearly not to be justified: the mass 
surveillance practices of the East German Stasi, an employer watching over an 
employee to ensure that they do not spend too long in the toilet, or a voyeur 
watching the subject of his lust undress night after night.
As an introductory text, my book does not seek to provide a list of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for ethical surveillance. What it does provide is an 
overview of the current thinking in surveillance ethics, looking at a range of 
proposed arguments about these questions, and how those arguments might 
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play out in a variety of applied settings. It hence provides a useful and accessi-
ble volume for policymakers wishing to rapidly get up to speed on developments 
in surveillance and the accompanying ethical discussions.
Keywords: Surveillance; ethics; privacy; espionage; security; public sector
INTRODUCTION
My book is divided into two parts. The first part provides an historical over-
view of  ethical engagement with practices of  surveillance, before turning to 
the more philosophical issues which serve as a foundation to discussions on 
surveillance ethics. The second part moves on to a survey of  different applied 
situations in which surveillance raises persistent challenges in the twenty-first 
century. Each chapter includes case studies throughout and ends with a bul-
leted summary and questions for discussion. I shall take each in turn in this 
introductory summary.
SECTION ONE
The opening chapter on the history of thought on surveillance ethics begins 
with reflecting on how to define the term. Several definitions have been pro-
posed, but most, such as those by David Lyon (2007) or the Surveillance Studies 
Network 2006 report for the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (Ball, Lyon, 
Murakami Wood, Norris, & Raab, 2006), contain a sense of purpose within the 
definition (such as care, control, and entitlement). This leads to the challenge that 
an act which appears to be surveillance would not in fact be such if  the purpose 
lay outside the list of purposes provided. Without denying the value of a defi-
nition, the preferred approach is to opt for a working definition which equates 
surveillance with monitoring but leaves it there. From here, the chapter progresses 
to consider discussions of surveillance in ancient, medieval, and modern times. 
This historical review ranges from biblical commands through the introduction 
of eavesdropping laws to the development of spy satellites in the Cold War. More 
recently still has been the radically transformative introductions of the internet 
and CCTV. Finally, the chapter considers contributions to ethical reflections on 
surveillance from both western and non-western traditions.
The second chapter turns to the wrongs of surveillance, most obviously wrongs 
related to privacy (which receives due attention) but also non-privacy wrongs 
which may be overlooked in public discourse. These include impacts on trust, 
chilling effects (the muting of democratically legitimate activities for fear of per-
secution, heightened by surveillance), power and control, bureaucratic error and 
false positives, and social sorting (the division of societal groups through surveil-
lance techniques). It closes with a philosophical reflection on the implications of 
so-called harmless surveillance. Here it picks up on a paper by Tony Doyle (2009), 
imagining an alien light years from Earth and hence unable to have an impact on 
Surveillance Ethics 11
our lives. This is brought into a more applied setting when considering historical 
research into the dead, such as exhuming the body of Richard III or breaking the 
cypher used by Samuel Pepys in writing his diary.
The final chapter of the first part outlines key ethical issues in surveillance. The 
first such issue surrounds questions of consent, noting that most ethical issues 
surrounding surveillance concern non-consensual surveillance. However, these 
are, importantly, not the only ethical issues, and the chapter looks in some depth 
at ethical problems which may arise from consensual surveillance, picking up on 
the work of Alan Wertheimer (1999, 2006) to look at questions of coercion and 
exploitation in apparently consensual acts of surveillance. The more substantial 
part of the chapter is dedicated to non-consensual surveillance, though. Here 
several issues are discussed, including the cause and context of the surveillance; 
the authority for the surveillance and attendant issues of paternalism; propor-
tionality and necessity; and discrimination and deterrence. The final section turns 
to two populist arguments and thoroughly dismisses both: the suggestion that, 
‘if  you have done nothing wrong then you should have nothing to hide’, and the 
politician’s canard that we need to make a trade-off  between privacy and security, 
which is always raised during times of heightened insecurity. Neither of these 
positions turns out to be convincing on reflection.
SECTION TWO
With the foundational theoretical work in place, the book moves to the applied 
section. This second section looks at ethical questions pertaining to a variety of 
contexts, starting with state surveillance (espionage, security, policing, and social 
welfare), before considering corporate practices (espionage, commerce, journal-
ism, private investigation, and workplace surveillance), and finally two broader 
topics: surveillance in public places and surveillance of the very old and the very 
young. Of the applied areas under consideration in the book, the ethics of espio-
nage has perhaps the greatest philosophical engagement, followed by policing. 
Areas, such as private investigation and surveillance of the young, have received 
comparatively little attention to date, making many of these chapters unique as 
introductions.
The ethics of espionage is one area, though, which does have a long history, 
and one which intertwines with that of surveillance for obvious reasons. That 
espionage is not tantamount to surveillance can be seen through tactics such 
as ‘turning’ agents or torturing suspects, neither of which could be considered 
monitoring (Macnish, 2016). However, a clear overlap exists between the prac-
tices which has only grown through the twentieth century boom in signals intel-
ligence, which is essentially a form of industrial-scale surveillance. This history 
provides an opportunity to reflect on different ethical approaches to the ethics 
of espionage, from deontological and consequentialist frameworks through to 
reciprocal approaches and those, including my own, which favour appeal to the 
just war tradition for guidance (see, e.g. Bellaby, 2014; Macnish, 2014; Omand, 
2012; Quinlan, 2007). Further issues which merit discussion include the so-called 
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Coventry Dilemma, in which a leader must decide whether to allow a city to be 
obliterated to mask the fact that they are reading the enemy’s communications, 
and the question as to whether it is acceptable to spy on allies and civilians.
The following chapter on state security picks up on the ethics of monitoring 
civilians, shifting the focus from the civilians in another state to those in one’s own 
state. Where this might be justified in cases where state security has evidence that 
a civilian is involved in acts which are seriously detrimental to the life of the state 
(e.g. terrorism), the question remains as to how to find this evidence in the first 
place. This turns the conversation to issues of mass surveillance and the poten-
tial justification which may be sought in the doctrine of double effect. Several 
problems are raised with this appeal, though, and so an alternative approach in 
appealing to apparently less privacy-invasive data analytics is brought into the 
spotlight. Again there are problems here, though, including the collection of data 
about those known to have done nothing to merit surveillance and the general 
bluntness of the approach. The chapter closes with a review of ethical chal-
lenges with encryption, which rarely seems far from the headlines, and corporate 
involvement in state security practices.
The chapter on policing follows naturally from that on state security, and also 
picks up on the challenges of uncovering the evidence necessary to justify target-
ing surveillance on a particular individual or group. One such solution is that of 
undercover policing, itself  a form of surveillance but one which is more targeted 
than mass surveillance. This, though, as has become apparent in the UK fol-
lowing a string of scandals, is also highly controversial as police have targeted 
groups of no apparent threat to the state and officers fathered children with 
activists before disappearing from their lives, an act seemingly condoned by their 
commanding officers (Nathan, 2017). The relatively recent introduction of body 
worn cameras is considered before a final, somewhat more philosophical debate 
is introduced as to whether total surveillance by the state ever could be justified, 
and if  so under what conditions. Would, for example, and notwithstanding the 
earlier challenge to a simplistic dichotomy between security and privacy, the guar-
antee of a genuinely crime-free society justify the surveillance of every aspect of 
our lives? I suspect not.
Social welfare is one of the subjects which traditionally receives far less atten-
tion from scholars than those of the preceding chapters. Yet it is an area steeped 
in surveillance practices, from the taking of censuses to the provision of health 
and social care at the expense of the state. Those who seek such care are subject 
to far greater levels of state surveillance than their more fortunate fellow citizens. 
This surveillance may be variously justified as care for the needy or detection of 
the greedy, depending on whom the appeal is made to. Whether either of these 
justifications really holds, though, is a different matter. What of public duties to 
share data for the general good? This has hit home particularly in the wake of 
COVID-19 where infection rates can be traced and people suspected of infection 
can be alerted to self-quarantine, thanks to surveillance through mobile phone 
applications. However, does one have a duty to download and use such an app 
(Klar & Lanzerath, 2020)? Is refusal to do so a civil right or a breaking of the 
social contract?
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Surveillance in the private, as opposed to the public, sphere tends to be far 
less regulated and, as a result, far more ethically complex in its execution. This is 
particularly so in the case of corporate espionage, which may range from stealing 
items from bins outside a company’s headquarters to paying for privately owned 
spy satellites taking images of competitors’ facilities to determine activities 
through the number of cars in the corporate parking lot (Javers, 2010). Whether 
any of these activities are necessary in themselves is contentious to say the least, 
but what of counter-espionage? When a company suspects that it is subject to 
espionage, is it justified then in engaging in surveillance to limit the damage of 
lost company secrets? A possibly less contentious area is the surveillance of 
potential senior hires, looking at those moving into salaried positions worth mil-
lions. Such people will generally know that they are going to be subject to some 
level of surveillance to ensure that they are not quietly taking drugs or sleeping 
with prostitutes, or other activities which might bring the hiring company into 
disrepute. But when should such surveillance end? Can it extend to a school soc-
cer fixture on a Saturday afternoon, or to family outings? Here there are clearly 
proportionality considerations to be borne in mind, but these will depend on the 
value placed on the wrongs visited on the innocent family members.
Not all private surveillance is as dubious as corporate espionage, but it may 
raise serious ethical questions, nonetheless. There are, for instance, commer-
cial uses of surveillance such as targeting advertising in order that the return 
on investment of an advertising campaign can be maximised. This has been the 
financial model of many social networks in the second and third decades of the 
twenty-first century, but has also led to the targeting (and micro-targeting) of 
political advertising, which would not have been possible in the twentieth cen-
tury (see various chapters in Macnish & Galliott, 2020). Even without the politi-
cal angle, is such advertising a welcome democratisation of the personal service 
once restricted to the elite, or is it a weak facsimile, seducing someone to serve 
the interests of the corporate world? As with questions of state security mass 
surveillance and public health concerns, the relatively new development of ‘big’ 
data analytics has introduced new challenges to our understanding of how our 
information is collected and used by corporations.
Journalism may seem a more obviously justified form of surveillance than 
corporate or commercial surveillance. However, the ethics of journalism is itself  
a richly contested field of discourse, and much of this touches on the surveil-
lance practices of journalists themselves. While political exposés such as that of 
Watergate seem clearly to be in the public interest, could this extend to journalists 
monitoring politicians ‘just in case’ they do something wrong, subjecting them to 
total surveillance (Lawlor & Macnish, 2019)? In such cases, who is it that gets to 
determine what is ‘wrong’? This would seem to have been the behaviour of the 
News of the World and other newspapers in the UK in the wake of the hacking 
scandal in 2011. Related to the hacking scandal was also the question of fishing 
expeditions, a claim that was raised throughout the subsequent enquiry without 
ever being clearly defined. This chapter provides an analytic breakdown of the 
different uses of the term ‘fishing expedition’ to understand what it means and 
why each differing instance may be wrong.
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Private investigators are subject to even less academic ethical reflection than 
corporate espionage, and yet, particularly in the USA, private investigation is a 
significant industry which supports the legal profession in investigating crimes, 
employers in identifying false claims of injury, and spouses suspicious of their 
partner’s fidelity. To classify all these together would be a blunt response to a 
legitimate profession, albeit one that is under-regulated and therefore prone to 
unethical practices by some. Here questions arise regarding honesty, and the 
temptation for the private investigator to pretend to be someone they are not, 
so as to elicit information, and the practice of entrapment. This last involves 
the investigator flirting with the subject under suspicion to determine whether he 
(and it is more often a man) is faithful to his partner. Many are sceptical of this 
approach, but the chapter digs into why this is an unethical practice.
The last chapter on private surveillance is one that has touched many in the 
year of COVID-19: surveillance in the workplace by employers. With multiple 
lockdowns and the increase in working from home, this has extended from the 
office or factory to the home study, spare bedroom, or any place where a lap-
top can be balanced. There are companies that can offer employers software to 
log keystrokes and even take pictures of employees at regular intervals to ensure 
that they are at their desk and focussed on the monitor. This seems to be clearly 
excessive, but what of employers’ duty of care for their staff ? Employers may 
argue that they can only help with health and safety conditions ‘at work’ through 
surveillance techniques when the work is being carried out in the home. Even in 
the office, though, or on the road for drivers being monitored, it does not follow 
that employees should have no expectation of privacy. If  they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in company toilets, then it does not follow that once off  
company property that expectation ceases. Instead, careful, and nuanced reflec-
tion is required to determine whether, where, and when such surveillance could 
be justified.
While the second, applied part of the book focusses on the public sector and 
the private sector, the last two chapters expand out to look at surveillance in pub-
lic spaces and surveillance in family and other care situations. As to the former, 
it may be asserted by some that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
public. However, this has not always been the view of the US Supreme Court, 
which has ruled that surveillance of public telephones and tracking devices 
placed on private vehicles driven on public roads are both breaches of the Fourth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, guaranteeing citizens’ freedom from search 
and seizure (Katz v. United States, 1967; United States v. Jones, 2012). Even 
without appeal to judicial authority, we would feel it wrong if  it transpired that 
someone had hidden a microphone in a park bench to record conversations. How 
much difference is there between that and the increasingly ubiquitous presence 
of CCTV and automated number plate recognition systems? What of cases in 
which communities (typically non-white) have been subject to so-called ‘rings of 
steel’ whereby no one can enter or leave the community on foot or by car with-
out being registered by a camera? Facial recognition systems have been a further 
development on these technologies, resulting in similarly discriminatory practices 
(Hill, 2020).
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The final chapter considers surveillance at the two ends of life, providing some 
further insight into why we may object so viscerally to surveillance in at least some 
contexts. As infants, we are subject to surveillance by our parents and communities 
and rightly so: to do otherwise would be negligent on their part. As we grow in inde-
pendence, so we expect to be subject to diminishing surveillance from our parents 
as a sign of trust and adulthood. Hence, a return to childhood levels of surveillance 
may feel infantilising to the extent that we may start to act in a less responsible man-
ner. This also makes it troubling when we age and enter end-of-life care, which may 
also employ surveillance practices, ostensibly for our care and benefit, but poten-
tially also for the security of staff and of residents. More than this, though, to what 
degree do those of us not yet at this stage of life tend to assume that age implies a 
decline in cognitive abilities and autonomy, thus justifying the very surveillance 
that we would reject in our own lives? There is a risk that we use age as a proxy for 
incapacity in a way that is demeaning and leads to harm to the elderly in society.
CONCLUSION
In summary, this work is an attempt to introduce the key ethical questions and 
discussions surrounding many areas of surveillance practice and theory. While 
not comprehensive, its goal is to be both accessible and rigorous. As with much 
philosophical writing, it tends to ask more questions than it answers. At the same 
time, it does provide a solid and balanced overview of those issues which should 
prove helpful for those seeking guidance and this introduction helps steer the 
chapters in the following collection towards addressing substantively a selection 
of these key concerns.
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CHAPTER 2
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND 
RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH – THE 
CASE OF SURVEILLANCE
Alfonso Alfonsi and Maresa Berliri
ABSTRACT
This chapter, based on a sociological approach, addresses the ethical issues of 
surveillance research from the perspective of the profound transformations that 
science and innovation are undergoing, as part of a broader shift from modern to 
post-modern society, affecting also other major social institutions (such as govern-
ment, religion, family, and public administration). The change occurring in the 
science and technology system is characterised by diminishing authority, uncer-
tainty about internal mechanisms and standards, and a declining and increasingly 
difficult access to resources. Such changes, also related to globalisation and new 
digital technologies, have transformed the way research is conducted and dissemi-
nated. Research is now more open and its results more easily accessible to citizens.
Scientific research is also put under increased public scrutiny, while, at the 
same time, public distrust and disaffection towards science is rising. In such a 
context, it is more important than ever to make sure that research activities are 
not compromised by fraudulent and unethical practices. The legitimate expec-
tations of citizens to enjoy their rights, including the ability to protect their 
private sphere, are growing. Scientific and technological development is deeply 
interrelated with the widespread awareness of these rights and the possibility 
of exercising them, but it produces also new risks, while a widespread sense 
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of insecurity increases. The digital revolution, while improving people’s qual-
ity of life, offers at the same time new opportunities for crime and terrorism, 
which in turn has produced a demand to strengthen security systems through 
increasingly advanced and intrusive surveillance technologies. Misconduct in 
the field of surveillance may not only undermine the quality of research, but 
also further impair society’s trust in research and science as well as in the State 
and its institutions.
Keywords: Surveillance; sousveillance; ethics; security; social sorting; 
surveillance creep; privacy; trust
INTRODUCTION
Following a sociological perspective, which accounts for the overarching shift 
from modern to post-modern society, this chapter focusses on the current 
efforts to find a balance between two equally compelling social demands: that 
of  security and that of  protection of  personal rights, including privacy. In 
particular, the social costs of  surveillance are addressed, together with efforts 
to minimise them. In this regard, the debate about contentious topics, such 
as social sorting, surveillance creep, data slippage, dual use and the like are 
examined to highlight the effects that inappropriate surveillance practices can 
have in harming individuals and social groups. In a broader perspective, the 
effect that such kinds of  improprieties can have in diminishing social trust 
are discussed with regard to the challenges to the authority of  both the State 
and scientific institutions. To this end, we will discuss the merit of  broad 
conceptualisations of  surveillance, such as the notion of  ‘surveillance society’ 
advanced by the Surveillance Studies Network, or David Lyon’s (2018) ‘sur-
veillance culture’. This broad view will be confronted with the more restricted 
definitions of  surveillance focussed on activities specifically targeted for law 
enforcement and crime prevention, with the massive use of  digital technolo-
gies (smart systems) and large amounts of  data, both ad hoc and for other 
purposes. On the other end of  the spectrum, we will also examine the implica-
tions of  the fact that new digital technologies allow more and more citizens 
to perform a ‘bottom up’ surveillance activity with regard to the behaviour of 
public officials, including law enforcement agents.
SURVEILLANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF  
POST-MODERN SOCIETY
Addressing the ethical issues of surveillance from a sociological point of view 
requires placing such reflection in the context of the profound transformation 
that science and innovation are undergoing as part of the shift from modern to 
post-modern society that is affecting all social institutions. In fact, at the core 
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of current surveillance activities is the massive use of different kinds of tech-
nologies, including ICTs,1 in fields where research and innovation are moving 
and evolving at an extremely fast pace. This ongoing transformation has been 
described and conceptualised in different ways by scholars and researchers, like 
the shift from Mode1 to Mode2 scientific production (Gibbons et al., 1994), post-
academic research (Ziman, 2000), or triple helix innovation model (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Leydesdorff  & Etzkowitz, 1998). Some of its features, how-
ever, tend to be highlighted in a similar way by many authors (d’Andrea, 2019; 
Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001).
•	 Science and innovation are becoming a multiactor process, involving a wide 
range of different actors, from scientists and researchers to citizens and the 
public.
•	 The increasing tendency towards political steering of scientific research and to 
implement competitive mechanisms of access to public funds.
•	 The increasing pressure to obtain faster social and economic benefits out of 
scientific research by favouring investments in applied research rather than in 
fundamental research.
•	 The increasing tendency towards trans-disciplinary research, on one side, and 
to more specialisation within the different scientific disciplines, on the other.
Another important transformation is the decreasing authority of and peo-
ple’s increasing distrust of science and scientific institutions, which is leading to a 
growing demand for accountability and public scrutiny of research processes and 
products, also seen as a way of preventing risks and undesirable impacts.
Similar changes, in the context of the transition to what is termed ‘late moder-
nity’ (or digital modernity, as David Lyon suggested), are occurring also in other 
social institutions, such as politics, economics, public administrations, with vari-
ous forms of diminishing authority and lack of public trust. These include de-
standardisation, fragmentation, and increasing social pressure on institutions to 
become more transparent, effective, productive, and sensitive to societal needs 
and expectations. Such processes of change are modifying the balance between 
social structures (including not only institutions, but also social norms, cultural 
views, behaviours, etc.) and the agency of individuals, that is, the capacity of indi-
viduals to more freely think and act as well as to ‘build up’ their own life, projects, 
and identity, even challenging the social structures. In late modernity, the agency 
or the subjectivity of people are weakening social institutions and are producing 
diversified configurations of social life which are facilitated thanks to other pro-
cesses such as digitalisation, increasing mobility, and easier access to resources 
(Archer, 2007; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Quaranta, 1986).
By and large there is an increasing pressure to close the gap between science and 
society promoting and deploying scientific and innovation ecosystems that are more 
open, transparent, and accessible. Science and research are challenged to be more 
open to citizens, allowing the possibility of public scrutiny of their activities and 
results (d’Andrea , Marta and only for Part Three Para 2.2. Kahma & Vase, 2017).
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As mentioned in the Introduction, this process of change in the internal and 
external mechanisms of science might also facilitate malpractices or, for our dis-
cussion, the design of surveillance technologies, which are risky from a societal 
point of view, and can produce economic and social costs.
SOCIAL SUBJECTIVITY AND THE EMERGING DEMANDS 
FOR SECURITY AND AUTONOMY
Considering what we have noted so far, we can say that science and innovation 
are undergoing a long transitional phase which is characterised at the same 
time by a weakening of the main social institutions and by an increase in ‘social 
subjectivity’.
With the term ‘social subjectivity’ we refer to the fact that contemporary socie-
ties – due to the processes discussed above – reflect a large-scale increase in the 
importance, complexity, and density of the cognitive, intellectual and emotional 
dimensions of individuals. The latter are also characterised by a high degree 
of uncertainty, since social structures are becoming weaker, more flexible, and 
more subject to change (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Quaranta, 1986). We can say 
that new forms of human agency are emerging, producing a ‘surplus’ of human 
energy, so that individuals are more and more ‘capable’ of generating new ideas, 
innovating and overcoming everyday life constraints, while their field of action is 
broader and less limited by territorial boundaries.
The digital ecosystem offers unprecedented opportunities to express such 
human agency, functioning as a multiplier of the social energy of groups and 
individuals, in cultural and social life as well as the economy. At the same time, 
it can jeopardise the identity and the personal security of individuals. Not least, 
the Internet offers increasing opportunities to criminal actors, both on-line and 
off-line (Mezzana & Krlic, 2013).
We can thus maintain that there is a connection between the scientific and tech-
nological developments and the increased assertiveness of individuals and groups, 
who can avail themselves of unprecedented opportunities for their expression and 
potency. The legitimate expectations of citizens to enjoy their rights, including the 
ability to protect their private sphere, are growing (Cannataci, 2015). Scientific 
and technological development is deeply interrelated with the widespread aware-
ness of these rights and the possibility of exercising them, but it produces also 
new risks, while a widespread sense of insecurity increases. The digital revolution, 
in fact, while improving people’s quality of life, offered at the same time, as said, 
new opportunities for various forms of crime and terrorism, which in turn pro-
duced the demand to strengthen security systems through increasingly advanced 
and intrusive surveillance technologies which themselves produce anxiety about 
intrusive State control or exploitation from over-the-top private companies.
In such a context, the problem becomes balancing two equally compelling 
social demands: that of security and that of protection of personal rights, includ-
ing privacy (Alfonsi, Declich, & Berliri, 2019; Charitidis, Spyrakou, Markakis 
& Iphofen, 2019; Iphofen, 2014, chapter 5). The question of what is actually 
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unethical is going beyond well-known issues such as fabrication, falsification, 
and plagiarism. Referring to surveillance, phenomena such as social profiling 
through the data science process, or the opacity in the use of advanced technolo-
gies for recording and analysing personal behaviour and inclinations challenge 
all concerned actors to take measures to avoid being involved in practices that 
could harm the rights of citizens. In fact, misconduct in the field of surveillance 
can harm not only individual citizens’ rights, but can, in a broader perspective, 
further impair societal trust in science, and in the State and its institutions.
UNDERSTANDINGS OF SURVEILLANCE
To discuss the impact of issues related to surveillance on public trust and social 
interaction, we should consider how the application of this notion has broadened in 
recent times. At a first level, we have the more restricted and traditional definition, 
what can be termed ‘State surveillance’, that is, focussed on activities carried out by 
legal entities endowed with a special authority by State institutions and primarily 
targeted at law enforcement and crime prevention – including terrorism. Nowadays, 
such activities imply the massive use of digital technologies (smart systems) and the 
processing of large amounts of data, both collected ad hoc or collected for other 
purposes. In this view, surveillance activities can be considered as
any monitoring or observing of persons, listening to their conversations or other activities, or 
any other collection of data referring to persons regardless whether this is content data or meta 
data, which is carried out by the State, or in its behalf  or at its orders. (Cannataci, 2019)
In this regard, several authors (see for instance Mann & Ferebonk, 2013) point to 
the fact that the very word ‘surveillance’, of French origin, implies a ‘gaze from 
above’ (sur veillance), underscoring the hierarchical and asymmetric relationship 
between the ‘watcher’ and the ‘watched’.
At the same time, this State activity is presently confronted by the use that 
organised crime and terrorists are making of new technologies and the Internet 
(including what is called Deep Internet and Dark Internet) for their criminal 
activities, off-line and on-line. Thus, law enforcement authorities are also faced 
with the need to increase their capacity to combat the criminal use and penetra-
tion of the new technological environment. Furthermore, in the present context 
old and new forms of surveillance co-exist, co-support, and feed off  each other, 
thus producing ‘mutual augmentation’, which could possibly produce much 
greater and amplified surveillance (Colonnello, Alfonsi, Marta, & Mezzana, 2014; 
Trottier, 2011). Thus, a relevant area of discussion currently revolves around how 
to ensure an Internet where the citizens are safe from criminal activities as well as 
from undue surveillance from law enforcement agencies, while at the same time 
these same agencies are provided with sufficient capacity to effectively combat 
the actions of criminals and terrorists. This balance is considered by many to be 
difficult to strike.
It is important to observe that the deployment of new technologies to some 
extent challenges the State monopoly on surveillance and opens the way to a 
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wider range of actors, not only to public authorities. This realisation has brought 
several authors, including those related to the Surveillance Study Network,2 to 
broaden the definition of surveillance from an institutional function to a wide-
spread social practice of which State surveillance is only a special case. Thus, the 
notion of surveillance society has been introduced, understood as a
society which functions because of the extensive collection, recording, storage, analysis and 
application of information on individuals and groups as they go about their lives (big data). In 
this case private bodies, including big corporations, join the State actors as agents of surveil-
lance for their own purposes, including business. (Surveillance Study Network3)
This notion implies the need for more diffused and granular use of instruments 
to check the ways in which the data about personal behaviour are collected and 
perused. At the same time, the notion of surveillance society focusses on the idea 
that there are observers (above) and those observed (below) with basically the 
private sector interacting and competing with the State in surveilling the citizens 
in their private lives.
A further extension in the understanding of surveillance in the contemporary 
world is achieved by authors like David Lyon, who speaks of a ‘Culture of surveil-
lance’. This notion focusses on the agency of citizens/users who are not only pas-
sive subjects of surveillance, or merely ‘devolve’ their personal data, but actively 
participate in its operation by their daily actions, including surveillance of others 
(e.g. on social media, see Trottier, 2011), self-surveillance, and ‘quantified self ’ 
practices (Lupton, 2020). What is to be noted is also the fact that the direction-
ality of surveillance, albeit remaining asymmetrical in power relationships, no 
longer goes only in one direction, that is, top down, but moves also ‘bottom up’ 
(see the notion of ‘Sousveillance’, i.e. ‘watching from below’, of Mann, 2013). 
This means also that some individuals and groups have acquired the capability 
of recording and monitoring the behaviour of public officials and law enforce-
ment agents, and to some extent of big companies. This multiactor and multi-
lateral surveillance gives rise to various power configurations, both cooperative 
(e.g. community policing4) and confrontational, which challenge the monopoly 
(now ‘oligopoly’) of the State and of large corporations on data collection and 
evaluation. One current example is the case of the death of the American citizen 
George Floyd, whose last minutes were recorded not only by the police body-
cams, and nearby CCTVs, but also by several bystanders, so that the social 
meaning of the event was from the start framed in a way that highlighted the 
misbehaviour of the police officials involved. It must be noted that this plurality 
of visual sources played a significant role also in the legal trial that brought to the 
conviction of officer Derek Chauvin.
SOCIAL COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE AND  
SOCIETAL TRUST
As we have discussed, at present surveillance technologies are multiple, ubiqui-
tous, pervasive, heavily relying on ICTs, and are changing fast and becoming 
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more and more sophisticated so that there is a heated debate about their pos-
sible problems, harms, and costs for individuals, groups, and society as a whole. 
This is by no means a recent development: since the last half  of  the twentieth 
century, the ever-increasing use of  technology for the discovery and collection 
of  personal information for surveillance and security purposes has raised con-
cerns about risks (e.g. with regard to privacy protection), harms and costs to 
individuals and groups by social scientists, jurists, ethicists, researchers, and by 
advocacy and citizens’ organisations. Surveillance studies provided interesting 
categories to analyse the application of  such technologies in order to identify the 
main issues to be taken into account (Lyon, 2007; Marx, 2002; Macnish, 2018). 
Based on a review of the relevant literature, we provide here a quick overview 
of the social costs that can derive from the use of  contentious, inappropriate, 
or non-proportionate practices. As a preliminary observation, we can note that 
privacy protection is always at the centre of  concern, in the reflection about 
surveillance activities. Also in this case there are different definitions of  privacy 
and personal data protection (from the right to be let alone, to privacy as a 
fundamental right of  identity protection and self-determination and freedom 
of expression). For our purposes, we define privacy as a dynamic social form of 
defence of  the self  and of  its subjectivity, at various levels: from the ethological 
level, linked to the defence of  one’s own personal territory, to the psychological 
level, and gradually up to the legal level (Mezzana & Krlic, 2013). On the basis 
of  the relevant literature, it is possible to identify three areas of  concern about 
the social costs of  surveillance. For identifying these areas, we used the findings 
of  the EU Project RESPECT (Rules, Expectations & Security through Privacy-
Enhanced Convenient Technologies) contained in the ‘Final report on social 
costs of  surveillance’ (Colonnello et al., 2014).
A first area of concern is related to the use and management of data (Big data 
and personal data) and data processing technologies (including smart and auto-
mated ones). This area includes:
•	 Social sorting, that is, social classification and selection for valuative purposes 
of individuals and groups often based on not accessible/transparent criteria 
(often biased by stereotypes – categorical suspicion related to gender, ethnic, 
racial, religious, or political aspects) incorporated in algorithms and in auto-
mated technologies (e.g. in the case of CCTV it can contribute to the construc-
tion and reinforcement of a condemnatory gaze on the powerless).
•	 Surveillance/function creep, that is, the interchangeability of digital technolo-
gies, or in other words the gradual widening of the use of a technology or 
system beyond the purpose for which it was originally developed to other uses 
and ends; or data collected for one purpose being used for another.
•	 Data slippage, that is, moving of data from one context to another.
•	 False positives, exposing people to the harm that can arise from errors or misi-
dentification or misinterpretation of data or behaviours recorded.
•	 Leaky containers, namely the practices by which, with the development of 
new technologies and greater national and global interconnections, there is a 
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‘loss’ (intentional or accidental) of personal information from one system to 
another, which may damage the reputation of another person, causing harm 
to their private, social, and economic life, undermining their credibility within 
a social group or community.
This area includes also the important ethical issue of dual use, defined as the 
fact that a product or a technology can be used with both good and bad inten-
tions/aims (bad intentions that have to be considered among the case of mal-
practices, like e.g. deliberate or accidental releases of private information – data 
breach). In the case of surveillance technologies, dual use is a very relevant topic, 
which involves using crime prevention technologies like phone interception, face 
recognition in social media, or cryptography, for political uses against dissidents 
or minority groups, with a violation of human rights. Part of the current debate 
veers on the necessity and possibility to incorporate remedies for such concerns in 
the very design and deployment of surveillance technologies.
A second area of concern focusses on the social costs related to the deploy-
ment and use of inappropriate or non-proportionate surveillance technologies 
and activities on individuals and groups. As we said before, privacy is important 
for protecting the identity and the subjectivity of individuals. Inappropriate or 
non-proportionate surveillance activities might produce effects and harms on 
personal identity (defined as the capacity of individuals to control the reality in 
which they operate), on autonomy (defined as decision making power and free-
dom of movement and action) and on the reputation (defined as the protection 
of the good names of people). In this context, the possible common harms identi-
fied include exclusion and discrimination; stigmatisation of groups and lifestyles; 
constraints to mobility; stalking and harassment; limitation and self-censorship; 
change in social behaviour (e.g. in public space for the presence of CCTV, or 
public shaming in social media); loss of opportunities in one’s private, social and 
professional life; loss of personal/group social capital and relations. In this con-
text, particular attention has to be devoted to gender-based discrimination and 
to the stigmatisation of persons with disabilities, indigenous people, or migrants 
(Cannataci, 2018, 2019).
A third area concerns, in a broader perspective, the effects that inappropri-
ate and non-proportionate surveillance practices, even if  enacted in the name 
of security, produce in further diminishing social and public trust and confi-
dence in government, public institutions, and private organisations, including 
the de-legitimisation of the police in their role and on how this role is performed. 
Furthermore, such surveillance activities, in some cases, might affect also the 
quality of democracy and the full participation in the social, political, and eco-
nomic life of individuals and groups, with phenomena such as abuse of power 
in the name of national security and protection from terrorism, suppression, or 
inhibition of political dissidence, reduction of fundamental civil liberties and 
fundamental rights, or forms of mass espionage/surveillance. Furthermore, some 
bad practices of surveillance like categorical suspicion, judicial errors, manipula-
tion of evidence, or miscarriage of justice (tied with the use of biometric surveil-
lance) might also affect the virtuous operation of the administration of justice.
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Finally, beyond the deployment of sousveillance activities by citizens that we 
discussed earlier, the surveillance technologies can produce, as a reaction, also 
phenomena of resistances and non-compliance performed by individuals and 
groups using different forms and tools.
At this point of our reflection, the question is how to design and deploy 
responsible, appropriate, and proportionate surveillance technologies and activi-
ties able to cope with both the demand for security and autonomy, and to the new 
challenges posed by the new frontiers of surveillance technologies.
TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE SURVEILLANCE
From what we have discussed so far, it does appear that surveillance and its 
culture are a fundamental feature of contemporary societies. In fact, surveil-
lance activities in the different definitions that we have presented are becoming 
more and more pervasive and granular, by means of increasingly diversified and 
advanced technologies. At the same time, however, their deployment has become 
multilateral not only because State actors are interacting/competing with private 
actors but also because citizens individually and as organised groups can play 
an active role and, at certain conditions, reverse the ‘gaze’ from the bottom up. 
This gives rise to several overall power configurations that, albeit asymmetrical 
in terms of potency, are by no means exclusively top down. These new configura-
tions can include also horizontal relationships such as peer-to-peer surveillance 
or self-surveillance.
Thus, the context of  surveillance can be seen as closely connected to those 
forms of  enhanced social subjectivity that we have discussed above and rep-
resents also a major challenge, in that the many layered issues that it poses, 
including the risks and social costs discussed in the previous paragraph, are not 
yet fully socialised, or, we might say, are ‘under-socialised’. By this we mean 
that security and surveillance technologies, strategies, and arrangements are 
being developed at a very fast pace so that their embeddedness in society is 
still weak, developed with scant interaction with the different stakeholders and 
with insufficient public control and assessment of  their impacts, including con-
siderable heterogeneity in the evaluation instruments. This lack of  socialisa-
tion is at the origin of  economic and social costs to individuals, groups, and 
societies, also due to the implementation of  questionable practices of  surveil-
lance. Furthermore, this occurs in a context in which societies and citizens are 
much more reactive and attentive with respect of  malpractice and this might 
reinforce distrust in science and research, and in institutions. On the contrary, 
what we mean by socialisation is the capacity to adapt technologies to the 
needs, expectations, and problems of  society and the capacity to control social 
dynamics incorporated in science and technology. This socialisation of  science, 
technology, and research is not to be regarded as a unitary and linear process, 
but a composite and multidirectional one, requiring the involvement of  actors 
and groups (Bijker & d‘Andrea, 2009; d’Andrea, Quaranta, & Quinti, 2005; 
Mezzana Ed., 2011).
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To sum up, what seems to be lacking is a shared awareness of what is at stake 
and of viable ways to exercise social responsibility in view of inclusive and mul-
tilateral forms of governance, in line with what authors like David Lyon have 
called ‘digital citizenship’.
A possible path towards a full socialisation of surveillance could perhaps be 
traced by looking at the perspective of Responsible Research and Innovation 
(RRI) launched by the European Commission to manage science–society relations 
in the European Research Area (Burget, Bardone, & Pedaste, 2017; European 
Commission, 2012; Owen et al., 2013; van den Hoven, 2014; Von Schomberg, 
2011, 2019). To be sure, currently there is a widespread debate on the merits of 
the RRI approach, that is, questioning its very definition and purpose. In our 
understanding, RRI can be viewed as a policy reaction to the changes already 
occurring in science and innovation or, better, an attempt to drive these changes 
towards desirable or at least manageable outputs.
In this regard, RRI can be considered as an umbrella concept, that is supposed 
to advocate an action to better embed science, research, and innovation in the 
fabric of society, by pointing to certain key elements of concern such as: gender 
equality in science, open access to research data and publications, research eth-
ics and integrity, citizen engagement, science education, and governance. These 
key elements are often integrated by four dimensions: inclusiveness, anticipation, 
responsiveness, and reflexivity, which might be relevant in the context of surveil-
lance (Compass, 2018; Floridi, 2012; Klimburg-Witjes & Huettenrauch, 2021; 
Kormeling, 2018; Menevidis, Mohd Nor, Briege and  Mitrou, 2014; Stahl, 2013; 
SIENNA, 2020; Van de Poel et al., 2020).
Inclusiveness seems in fact to respond to the multilateral feature of present-
day surveillance. This requires that all actors and stakeholders involved (State 
agencies, technologists, scientists, companies, policymakers, citizens, civil soci-
ety organisations, etc.) are able to interact with each other. To fully satisfy 
the condition of  inclusiveness, appropriate means need to be devised to allow 
citizens to voice their perspectives and concerns about the deployment of  sur-
veillance technologies in everyday life situations. At the same time, the antici-
patory dimension is of  paramount importance in a field where a fast-paced 
technological development constantly produces new technical possibilities that 
in turn call for ethical decisions, social acceptance, and normative frameworks. 
Furthermore, the pace at which technological developments tend to happen 
requires the capacity for timely responses to the challenges of  a constantly 
changing landscape. Finally, as we pointed out already, what is also required is 
the attitude of  all concerned actors to be able to reflect on the implications of 
such developments in order to build a shared vision of  what is at stake in order 
to cope with an environment in which surveillance with its contribution to pub-
lic security and with its risks and drawbacks is so much intertwined in the fabric 
of  contemporary social life.
In conclusion, it is necessary to understand the conditions by which emerging 
social subjectivity can be informed by what has been termed an ‘ethics of care’ 
in order to assure fundamental instances of fairness, data justice, visibility, and 
recognition in the design, deployment, and use of surveillance technologies.
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NOTES
1. These include CCTV, RFID, SMART technologies, geo-localisation technologies, 
biometric technologies, voice identification, face recognition, Data science and Big Data, 
Artificial intelligence, ICTs, Internet of things, wearable technologies, encryption and 
anonymisation technologies, use of malicious malware and spyware, social media scan, etc.
2. Surveillance Studies Network (https://www.surveillance-studies.net/) is a charitable 
company registered in UK, but international in its membership, dedicated to the study of 
surveillance in all its forms. They publish the peer reviewed journal Surveillance and Soci-
ety (http://surveillance-and-society.org/) and acts as a clearing house for social science and 
policy research and consultancy about surveillance.
3. This is the definition provided by the Surveillance Study Network, in its blog post 
‘An introduction to the surveillance society’, available at https://www.surveillance-studies.
net/?page_id=119.
4. See Mifsud Bonnici and Cannataci (2018).
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CHAPTER 3




The received wisdom underlying many guides to ethical research is that information 
is private, and research is consequently seen as a trespass on the private sphere. 
Privacy demands control; control requires consent; consent protects privacy. This 
is not wrong in every case, but it is over-generalised. The distorted perspective leads 
to some striking misinterpretations of the rights of research participants, and the 
duties of researchers. Privacy is not the same thing as data protection; consent is 
not adequate as a defence of privacy; seeking consent is not always required or 
appropriate. Beyond that, the misinterpretation can lead to conduct which is unethi-
cal, limiting the scope of research activity, obstructing the flow of information in a 
free society, and failing to recognise what researchers’ real duties are.
Keywords: Privacy; information privacy; consent; public sphere; ethical 
review; rights and duties
Many of the ethical rules relating to research begin with a presumption that the 
information that is being obtained is, in some sense, private. The Australian National 
Health and Medical Research Council’s guidance explains:
Individuals have a sphere of life from which they should be able to exclude any intrusion …. A 
major application of the concept of privacy is information privacy: the interest of a person in 
controlling access to and use of any information personal to that person. (ANHMRC, 1999, p. 52) 
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In later advice, they describe privacy as ‘a domain within which individuals and 
groups are entitled to be free from the scrutiny of others’ and states that ‘An ethi-
cally defensible plan for research … should … include measures to protect the 
privacy desired by participants’ (ANHMRC, 2018, pp. 102 and 50). The central 
test is that people decide for themselves what they are prepared to reveal. If  the 
information is under the control of the research participants, it can only be used 
by a researcher if  the research participant gives consent. From this we go to the 
idea that all research concerning human beings must be subject to the free, fully 
informed consent of the people concerned.
There are lots of things wrong with this account. It leads to some striking mis-
interpretations of the rights of research participants, and the duties of research-
ers; but beyond that, it can lead to conduct which is frankly unethical.
PRIVACY
John Stuart Mill wrote of privacy as a ‘reserved territory’.
There is a part of the life of every person who has come to years of discretion, within which the 
individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the 
public collectively.’ (Mill, 1848, chapter 11)
Some ideas of privacy seem to work on the principle that people’s affairs are 
nobody else’s business until the person in question says otherwise – a position 
which holds, not that no one else should interfere, but that the person must be in 
control of the process (Rössler, 2005, p. 72). Within that model, people can give 
up their privacy; they choose what to reveal; they can sell their information. That 
seems, however, to conceive of privacy as a sort of ownership. Judges Warren and 
Brandeis (1890), who are commonly credited with the introduction of the princi-
ple of privacy into US law, took a very different view:
The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions … is in 
reality not the principle of  private property, but of  an inviolate personality …. The intensity 
and complexity of  life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some 
retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of  culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual 
…. (p. 205)
No one, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, ‘shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence’ (United 
Nations, 1948). This is about respect for persons. It is not framed in terms of 
having a say; it is not about control or choice, though it could well enhance both. 
The suggestion that this principle can be breached with consent is an excuse, 
used to legitimate the intrusion into personal space that the principle of pri-
vacy is supposed to prevent. If  one accepts that information is truly private and 
personal, research – or any other activity that violates the reserved territory – 
ought to minimise intrusion and accept that some things cannot be examined.
There are exceptions and limits to this understanding of privacy, but I will 
come to those later. The invasion of privacy is objectionable both in its own 
right, and because it is liable directly to affect how people live – what they can 
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do, where they can go, and how they should act. That is the case for maintaining 
confidentiality, and anonymity in circumstances where it helps protect the sub-
ject of research from identification. Arguments about privacy have tended to get 
lost somewhere in arguments about data protection and control, but the test of 
privacy is quite different. It is about the preservation of an ‘inviolate personality’, 
and the sanctity of personal data has little directly to do with that.
INFORMATION PRIVACY: CONSENT AND CONTROL
The second stage of the argument is about information privacy, ‘the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others’. (Westin, cited 
in Kimmel, 1988). Information privacy is usually matched with the principle of 
informed consent: that people have to agree to the use of information, and that 
they have to be sufficiently informed to know what they are agreeing to.
As far as possible participation in sociological research should be based on the freely given 
informed consent of those studied. This implies a responsibility on the sociologist to explain 
in appropriate detail, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research is about, who 
is undertaking and financing it, why it is being undertaken, and how it is to be distributed and 
used. (British Sociological Association (BSA), 2017, p. 5)
There are two subtly different principles outlined here. The first, information 
privacy, puts in charge the person to whom the information relates. (The prin-
ciple of  data protection is derived from this general approach. The terms are 
used almost interchangeably in the literature – arguably information privacy 
is a little wider – but for practical purposes, I will treat information privacy 
and data protection as being roughly equivalent.) In the context of  research, 
information privacy and data protection imply that consent has to be negoti-
ated. People who are being researched are entitled to be informed; they have to 
consent to the project; consent is a continuous process; they have the right to 
withdraw at any time.
The other set of principles relates to the conduct of the researcher. Guides to 
research ethics are typically directed to the researcher, not to the research partici-
pant. The duties of the researcher are to explain, to avoid coercion, and to make 
sure that they are not stepping over the line. Some people might want to argue 
that rights are correlative with duties, so that these two principles boil down to the 
same thing; if  researchers have a duty, it is does not seem to be saying anything 
different from the idea that people participating in research have rights. However, 
even if  the distinction between information privacy and informed consent is not 
immediately evident, they are not the same. The key difference is this: it is quite 
possible that they refer to different people. One important example is included 
in Westin’s definition of information privacy: the subjects who have the right to 
decide about privacy might be groups or institutions. Organisational research is 
often done for or about an organisation; it is the organisation that gives consent, 
not the participants. The people who take part in that research are contacted on 
the basis of their organisational role or position, and placed under an obligation 
to cooperate with the research.
32 PAUL SPICKER
An even more important distinction lies between research participants and 
research subjects. Information privacy is supposed to protect the subjects – the 
people to whom the information relates. Research participants are not necessarily 
people who are engaged with the research, and the information in question may 
not be about them. A participant in research on domestic violence vouches infor-
mation about an abusive partner. A professional recounts experience working 
with children with mental disorder. A person claiming social security complains 
about the treatment given to her by an officer. In every case, that information 
does not belong to the person who is reporting it. The consent of the participant 
is not enough. The data relate to third parties, and the principle of information 
privacy has been breached.
The distinction between subjects and participants is rather too often elided in 
the literature. The UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, for example, 
defines research ‘participants’ in these terms:
Human participants are defined as including living human beings, human beings who have 
recently died (cadavers, human remains and body parts), embryos and foetuses, human tissue 
and bodily fluids, and human data and records (such as, but not restricted to medical, genetic, 
financial, personnel, criminal or administrative records and test results including scholastic 
achievements). (ESRC, 2015, p. 42)
The idea that cadavers and human tissue samples ‘participate’ in research is 
slightly surreal. (I am not sure what qualifies as a ‘recent’ death, but I cannot 
see that the strength of feeling people may have about, e.g., the organs of their 
dead child, grow dimmer with the passing of years. What matters is surely the 
relationship, not the length of time.) What the ESRC intends to say is that these 
subsidiary sources of information are also protected by the principle of infor-
mation privacy. Where information privacy applies, the control of the research 
subject extends to every scrap of private data – including bodily fluids and his-
toric records – and that someone who has the right to hold that data must be 
consulted.
This seems to be connected only very loosely with the idea of ‘privacy’ I have 
been discussing. Data protection and consent are not properly speaking ethical 
principles in their own right; they are methods intended to protect privacy, and it 
is as methods that they need to be judged. On one hand, consent is not enough to 
defend privacy. Privacy is a human right, and people cannot consent to give up 
their human rights; and while some requests are less intrusive than others, there 
is no way of asking for explicit consent that is not in itself  an intrusion. On the 
other hand, data protection can be violated with no intrusion, and no immedi-
ate implications for personal privacy. The secondary analysis of data, based on 
information that was gathered for a different purpose for the original research, is 
illustrative. Research and data archives exist precisely to make this sort of analy-
sis possible. It is difficult to see what implications for privacy there might be in 
working with tissue. Of course, one has to take care that the use of derived infor-
mation should not be constructed in such a way as to compromise the position of 
individuals illegitimately. We usually use anonymity and confidentiality to cover 
that eventuality.
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It could be argued that privacy is simply the wrong principle to refer to. 
Faden and Beauchamp argue that consent has much more to do with self- 
determination and personal autonomy than it does to privacy. Consent is about 
the exercise of personal choice (Faden, Beauchamp, 1986). There are limits, how-
ever, to how far the person giving up the information is in control, or should be, 
in so far as there is a potential for conflict; what matters are the duties of the 
researcher, rather than the rights of the participant. I think that most researchers 
will accept that they have some obligations to the people who participate in their 
research, but there is a large gap between that and ‘information privacy’. There will 
be circumstances where the two approaches combine, where there is no practical 
difference between respecting the participant and giving the participant a degree of 
control; but there are also circumstances where control over information becomes 
a way to protect the powerful, exploit the vulnerable, such as when it is a means 
to hide corruption or abuse. The principle of information privacy (or data protec-
tion) is a poor guide to ethical conduct. If we are hoping for researchers to act 
ethically, it is not clear that ceding control to participants is the way to go about it.
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY
Even at the level of the individual, it is debatable whether we can ever treat our-
selves as wholly private. We are social animals. We communicate with each other 
in common terms. Our understanding of ourselves, Gilbert Ryle argued, is based 
substantially on our knowledge of other people; we cannot have a sense of self  
until we know about others (Ryle, 1963). When we extend the principle to two 
people, difficulties arise. Each person has rights, and their rights are conditioned 
and mediated in terms of the society they live in. The contexts can be complex: 
the Dutch idea of ‘sphere sovereignty’, initially stated by Kuyper (1899) and later 
by Dooyeweerd (1979), is based on the idea that that there are several spheres of 
life where different rules apply – spheres such as the home, religion, business, and 
politics. We have come to reject – I think rightly – the claim that domestic violence 
is a private matter between husband and wife, or that parental chastisement in 
one’s own home has nothing to do with the world outside (Schneider, 1994).
The limitations of this kind of privacy are marked by the idea of the private 
sphere – Mill’s ‘reserved territory’. The private sphere stands in contradistinc-
tion to the public sphere – the areas of life where society or the state have the 
right to pass information to others. All criminal acts are, by definition, public; 
the public authorities have declared that certain acts must be treated legally as 
public matters. (That makes it rather questionable that so many researchers think 
they should protect their participants from the consequences of actions revealed 
by the research. Public actions are not protected by principles of privacy, and it 
is troubling when they are made the subject of data protection.) Where general 
rights are at stake – such as human rights – the privacy or confidentiality of the 
research process does not override them.
Many of the codes of guidance issued by professional associations get this 
wrong. The Social Policy Association offers as a general principle the idea that 
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‘Information provided to a researcher in the context of a research study should 
be treated as confidential’ (SPA, 2009). That implies that the information is 
presumed to be private. But social policy is concerned with public issues and 
public information; much of the point of the field is to subject public action to 
open scrutiny. If  information is found in the course of research, there has to be a 
very good reason not to reveal it. The British Society of Criminology states that 
‘Researchers should not breach the ‘duty of confidentiality’ and not pass on iden-
tifiable data to third parties without participants’ consent’. It goes on to advise 
that ‘In general in the UK people who witness crimes or hear about them before 
or afterwards are not legally obliged to report them to the police’ (BSC, 2006). 
(There are three main legal exceptions – terrorism, child protection and money 
laundering.) Criminal law defines a range of actions as public, not private. It is 
not always clear whether an action is criminal – but privacy is too often used as a 
defence against legitimate public scrutiny.
Similarly, the Social Research Association cites US guidance:
The US Office for Protection from Research Risks allows observational research to be exempt 
from consent unless:
a) ‘information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identi-
fied, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and
b) any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably 
place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial 
standing, employability, or reputation’. (SRA, 2003, p 33)
If  there is a risk of criminal or civil liability, it is because the subjects have harmed 
other people. That is exactly the point at which the duties a researcher has to a 
subject are likely to be outweighed by the need to avoid harm to others.
Defining what is private, and what is public, can be difficult. Different rules 
apply in different circumstances. Private actions can take place in public settings, 
and public actions can happen in private ones. There are circumstances where 
people do things in private that are public in their nature – people who are abus-
ing public authority often try to do it behind closed doors. While justice should 
in principle be open and transparent, there are special cases where justice is better 
served in private – for example, in decisions about the care of children.
As a general proposition actions are public if:
•	 They occur in the public domain, and are open to be witnessed by mem-
bers of the public. There are exceptions to this: circumstances where people 
legitimately do things in public places that are not meant to be witnessed or 
public – adjusting clothing, falling over, or sleeping. There is a judgement 
to make; social media fizzle with examples of people doing silly things that 
they may regret. But there is no obvious moral duty to ignore public behav-
iour; if  there is a default position, it is that behaviour in public occurs in the 
public domain unless there are good reasons to the contrary.
•	 They have been defined as public by a lawfully constituted authority. All 
criminal acts are public, because the law declares them to be – that is what 
a ‘crime’ is. The same applies to some things that may otherwise seem per-
sonal – rules about marriage, sexuality, motoring, taxable income, workers’ 
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rights, public companies (which have to report their financial activity pub-
licly) and much else besides.
•	 They concern public affairs, such as government, legislation, and the sys-
tem of justice. Part of the argument for considering these things as public 
is the shared, social nature of the activity, but that is not the whole story. 
The legitimacy and authority of democratic governments rests not just on 
a process of voting, but on a degree of openness, transparency, and the 
opportunity to engage in public fora. Treating governance as public is not 
just a description; it is a moral positioning its own right.
Researchers who are working primarily in the public sphere are often 
fired by ethical concerns, but those concerns look rather different from the 
traditional focus of guides to research ethics. Policy analysts aim to ‘tell 
truth to power’. The American Society for Public Administration aims to 
‘serve the public interest’ and ‘uphold the law’, including ‘constitutional 
principles of equality, fairness, representativeness, responsiveness and due 
process’. (ASPA, 2012) My own discipline, social policy, has a critical role 
in holding governments to account. [One of my last research projects was 
based on speaking to officials administering social security, and it was done 
without asking the government department which controls access to those 
officials, because the department would have refused. However, more than 
200 officials participated (PCS, 2017).]
•	 They concern issues that are already accepted as being in the public domain – 
typically, because they have been published. That is the standard defence 
of secondary analysis, meta-analysis, and critical reappraisal of evidence. 
Secondary analysis and research archives use data in ways that neither the 
participant nor the researcher can reasonably anticipate, and if  the data 
belongs to the participant, that appears to be unethical. So, in principle, 
would be repetition of comments or information provided by one person 
for a different purpose. In my own work, I have used previously published 
accounts to discuss some of the intensely personal issues around dementia, 
incontinence, and learning disability. I did not of course ask the people 
concerned – I do not know who they are – but I would not have asked them 
if  I did. I was citing other people’s research.
I claimed at the start of this chapter that some of the misinterpretations about 
the scope and process of research could be unethical, and this is an example. 
Treating public information as if  it must be private is at best ethically question-
able, at worst repugnant. Restricting truthful accounts of the things that people 
do in public, and subsequent discussion of them, is a restraint on free speech and 
a free press; that kind of restraint infringes the right of everyone else, as members 
of the public, to know. Obstruction of the examination of public norms, rules, 
and laws is a prescription for tyranny. Discussion and examination of published 
material is fundamental to science, learning, education, and a free society. And 
examination of government and policy is essential to democracy, which has been 
defined as ‘government by discussion’ (Cohen, 1997). The defence of the public 
sphere is in all our interests.
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RESEARCH WITHOUT CONSENT
Much of the literature on informed consent starts from the assumption that there 
is something intrinsically wrong with research where no consent is given. The 
development of that doctrine began with a legitimate concern, about the use 
of pointless, invasive ‘experiments’ by Nazi doctors, and the Nuremberg Code 
became the model for bio-medical research everywhere. The doctrines that I have 
been examining reflect those concerns, but they have gone some way beyond 
them. The doctrine of information privacy can only legitimately apply in circum-
stances where the person who gives the consent is the person who legitimately 
controls the release of that information to the researcher. There are many circum-
stances where that is not the case. They include, most obviously, information that 
is public in its nature. Even in the private sphere, however, there is information 
over which the research participant does not hold the rights. This includes infor-
mation that relates to organisations, to third parties (and other people), and to 
other participants – and most research based on evidence from participants calls 
for some ‘triangulation’, cross-validation, or corroboration to be useful, at which 
point it ceases to be under the control of individual respondents. It might still be 
good practice (and good manners) for a researcher to behave as if  their research 
participant was a valued source – I have tried to do that – but I have also, without 
compunction, used freedom of information legislation, which requires public offi-
cials to respond to queries. We should not suppose that the researcher’s primary 
duty is to the respondents.
Much of the literature concerned with involuntary participation in research is 
concerned with ‘covert research’, a term which generally refers to circumstances 
where the researcher does not tell research subjects or participants that research is 
taking place. [That is often muddled with the different, and relatively unusual, sit-
uation where researchers do not tell people that research is going on and actively 
deceive participants about what they are doing. Most cases of deception take 
place within the framework of a research project that seems to be about some-
thing else (Kimmel, 1996, p. 73).] It is more helpful to think of covert research as 
being undisclosed, or having ‘limited disclosure’ (ANHMRC, 2007). Legitimate 
examples of research where no disclosure was necessary or appropriate might 
be taken to include monitoring the use of mobile phones while driving (Walker, 
Williams, & Jamrozik, 2006), considering health and safety issues in the manage-
ment of major sporting events (Lekka, Webster, & Corbett, 2010), or surveillance 
of internet use to produce economic indicators (McLaren & Shanbhogue, 2011). 
All three of those pieces of research have taken place in the public sphere, and 
they were all clearly done for the public benefit; it would be shocking if  they were 
not permitted.
Undisclosed research could be considered a breach of privacy if  it led to the 
publication of material that was private – but the same would be true of research 
with full disclosure. The doctrine of privacy does imply a default – a set of barri-
ers and protections that researchers can only cross subject to permission, co-oper-
ation, and safeguards, and sometimes, particularly when there is a risk of harm, 
not even then. Consent may contribute to the protection of research subjects, but 
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it is not a guarantee of it. I was part of a research team developing an instrument 
to assist with planning social care provision for people with dementia (Spicker & 
Gordon, 1997). The main objective of the instrument was to use data to inform 
planners about the needs of the population, and so to minimise intrusion in indi-
vidual circumstances. Wherever possible, information was obtained from people 
who were already in possession of the data, and the information was anonymised 
and dealt with collectively. The study was designed to obtain the information in a 
manner which would minimise disturbance or cost to the subjects of the research, 
and to process and use the information in a manner which would not impose costs 
or otherwise harm them.
There were no problems raised during formal ethical review, because as far 
as the review committee was concerned this was not an invasive process. Ethical 
concerns were, however, raised as we proceeded. There was no effective way of 
obtaining consent from people with dementia; explaining the purpose of the 
research to people with dementia and their carers, even in outline, would itself  
carry risks (many people with dementia have not been told); even minimal inter-
vention could be intrusive – questions about memory loss, behaviour, insecurities, 
or personal care are inevitably difficult to ask. We sought to protect and safeguard 
the interests of the respondents – our interviewers were professionally qualified 
and experienced social workers. Ultimately, however, this all depends on a series 
of moral judgments, and a question of whether the benefits of the research (a 
less invasive procedure than current assessments) could justify the process. There 
cannot be blanket rules.
ETHICAL RESEARCH: THE DUTIES OF RESEARCHERS
I began this chapter with a widely accepted model of ethical behaviour in research: 
privacy demands control, control requires consent, and consent protects privacy. 
This is not wrong in every case, but there are more than enough counter-examples 
to show that it cannot be taken as a default position.
Researchers do have duties to protect people, but those duties are badly 
described in conventional codes of guidance. First, there are duties to everyone 
and anyone – human rights, the rights of citizens, the rights of vulnerable people, 
and so on. Researchers have a duty at least to avoid, and where the information 
is clear to report, crimes against humanity, the abuse of power, and the abuse of 
persons. These rights should have the highest priority in research – certainly, they 
trump any issue about the research itself, and any undertakings the researcher 
might make to specific persons. The supposition that researchers have a duty to 
conceal the wrongs that some people do to others, that powerful people have the 
right to control information, and that nothing can be done without their consent, 
is plainly unethical.
Second, there are duties arising from the research that is being done – its 
potential use, its application, and its effects on research subjects. Research should 
be beneficent (aiming to do something good), or at least non-maleficent (doing 
no harm). Privacy can be an important constraint on research, but there are acts 
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of observation, recording, and reporting that have no evident implications for 
privacy. Google and Twitter commonly monitor people’s use of terms or the sub-
ject of searches; many researchers are involved in similar activities. When people 
complain about the mass use of internet-based data, they are assuming that in 
some way that this has trespassed on their rights. How? Are Icelanders somehow 
violated because their government manages (and sells) genetic information about 
the population? Merz and his colleagues are highly critical of the Icelandic exam-
ple. In their view, an action that would be legitimate if  it was solely for govern-
mental purposes ceases to be legitimate if  it is used commercially (Merz, McGee, 
& Sankar, 2004). There is a distinct argument to make here about the research 
relationship – how the research might be affected by obligations incurred as a 
result of funding or sponsorship – but the simple fact of whether this relates to 
government or the private sector does not seem to me to have anything to do with 
the process of research. Neither the aims of the action, nor the process, nor the 
outcomes have any evident implications that affect any individual person. The 
objections to such measures are being represented, questionably, as a point of 
absolute principle, without considering whether there is actually a violation of 
privacy or of rights. If  research is beneficent, does no harm and does not intrude 
on personal space, there should be no obstacle to it.
Third, there are duties to participants – which I take to mean the people with 
whom researchers interact directly (a much more limited category than appeared 
earlier in this argument). The rights of participants are ‘particular’, not ‘general’; 
they define the duties which are negotiated with the researcher. The defence of 
particular rights is a matter of integrity. Researchers should avoid, for example, 
making promises they cannot legitimately keep – such as promises of confiden-
tiality made to people engaged in criminal activity. It is important, however, to 
recognise that duties to participants are contingent, and must have a lower pri-
ority than general duties such as human rights, human dignity, or the rights of 
citizenship. That is a still more important example of the ways in which treating 
research as private may be unethical.
Much of the process of research is concerned with making information public, 
in the broad sense of that term. The process of research generally involves taking 
data, of whatever sort, and processing it in a form that will be presented to other 
people. Whenever research is done with the intention of producing a report, or 
making the findings known to people other than the researcher and the partici-
pants, it can be said to be a ‘publication’. The very word ‘publication’ might rea-
sonably be taken to suggest that the material is made available to the public, but 
that is not requisite; in law, a ‘publication’ might refer simply to communication 
to a third party. Sometimes the presentation itself  is confidential – for example, 
when an organisation has commissioned research about its operations – but even 
then, information is likely to be taken from one place and moved to another. [In 
an American case, confidential communications within a company have been held 
to be ‘publications’ (Bals v. Verduzco, 1992).] The transmission of material across 
boundaries is fundamental to research work.
There are topics which cannot be broached without some degree of intrusion 
into people’s private space, and wherever that is done, it needs to be approached 
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with a sense of ethical integrity and a degree of sensitivity. Where information is 
private, there may be a case for confidentiality and anonymity. That is not true 
in every situation, and where the activity falls clearly into the public sphere, there 
is no duty to consult with participants, to negotiate the terms of the research, or 
even to disclose that research is taking place. In most circumstances, research is 
not a private matter, and the assumption that it must be private is itself  a viola-
tion of another ethical principle – one of the foundational principles of modern 
civilisation. We have to be able to examine the world we live in.
REFERENCES
American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). (2012). Retrieved from http://www.aspanet.org/
public/ASPADocs/Principles%2012-09-10.pdf
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (ANHMRC). (1999). National statement 
on ethical conduct in research involving humans: Commonwealth of Australia.
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (ANHMRC). (2007). National statement 
of ethical conduct in human research. Retrieved from http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/
ethics/2007_humans/contents.htm
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (ANHMRC). (2018). National statement 
on ethical conduct in human research: Commonwealth of Australia.
Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353 (Ind. 1992).
British Sociological Association (BSA). (2017). Statement of ethical practice (p. 5). Retrieved from 
https://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/24310/bsa_statement_of_ethical_practice.pdf
British Society of Criminology (BSC). (2006). Code of ethics for researchers in the field of criminology. 
Retrieved from http://www.britsoccrim.org/ethical.htm
Cohen, J. (1997). Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In R. Goodin & P. Pettit (Eds.), 
Contemporary political philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dooyeweerd, H. (1979). Roots of western culture. Toronto: Wedge.
UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). (2015). ESRC framework for research ethics. 
Retrieved from https://esrc.ukri.org/files/funding/guidance-for-applicants/esrc-framework-for-
research-ethics-2015/
Faden, R., & Beauchamp, T. (1986). A history and theory of informed consent. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Kimmel, A. (1988). Ethics and values in social research. London: Sage.
Kimmel, A. (1996). Ethical issues in behavioural research. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kuyper, A. (1899). Calvinism: Six stone lectures. Amsterdam: Hoeveker and Wormser.
Lekka, C., Webster, J., & Corbett, E. (2010). A literature review of the health and safety risks associated 
with major sporting events. Merseyside: Health and Safety Executive.
McLaren, N., & Shanbhogue, R. (2011). Using internet data as economic indicators. Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin Q2, 51, 134–140.
Merz, J., McGee, G., & Sankar, P. (2004). “Iceland Inc.”?: On the ethics of commercial population 
genomics. Social Science & Medicine, 58, 1201–1209.
Mill, J. S. (1848). The principles of political economy. Retrieved from http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/
mill/john_stuart/m645p/book5.11.html
PCS. (2017). The future of social security in Scotland: Views from within the system. Glasgow: Public 
and Commercial Services Union.
Rössler, B. (2005). The value of privacy. Cambridge: Polity.
Ryle, G. (1963). The concept of mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Schneider, E. (1994). The violence of privacy. In M. Fineman & R. Mykitiuk (Eds.), The public nature 
of private violence. New York, NY: Routledge.
Social Policy Association (SPA). (2009). Social policy association guidelines on research ethics. 
Retrieved from http://www.social-policy.com/documents/SPA_code_ethics_jan09.pdf
Spicker, P., & Gordon, D. (1997). Planning for the needs of people with dementia. Aldershot: Avebury.
40 PAUL SPICKER
Social Research Association (SRA). (2003). Ethical guidelines.
United Nations. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights, art 12.
Walker, L., Williams, J., & Jamrozik, L. (2006). Unsafe driving behaviour and four wheel drive vehicles. 
British Medical Journal, 331, 71.






Covert research has a mixed reputation within the scientific community. 
Some are unsure of its moral worth, others would proscribe it entirely. This 
reputation stems largely from a lack of knowledge about the reasons for 
choosing the covert method. In this chapter, these reasons will be recon-
structed in detail and all the elements that will allow one to judge the level 
of  ethicality of covert research will be laid out for the reader. In particular, 
the chapter will answer the following questions: What harms can result 
from covert research to the subjects participating in the research? Is covert 
research necessarily deceptive? In which cases is it ethically permissible for 
a researcher to deceive? What is the scientific added value of the covert 
research, that is, what does covert research discover that overt research 
does not? What are the risks to researchers acting undercover? Finally, 
some suggestions will be offered to research ethics reviewers to help in their 
appraisal of  covert research.
Keywords: Covert research; deception; research ethics committees; social 
research ethics; qualitative research; investigative social research
Covert research is clearly not to everyone’s analytic taste but the commitment is to explore 
different and creative ways of  constructing ethnographic narratives. The covert ethno-
graphic role can be a deeply artful one that offers a way to form intimate insider accounts 
about a wide range of  topics. It should become a more standard part of  the ethnographic 
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craft (Atkinson, 2015) rather than be outcast as a methodological pariah. In certain forms 
of  autoethnography, online lurking within cyber ethnography and bystander observations 
of  public behaviours, there seems to be a growing appetite for covert research, although it 
is certainly not becoming mainstream. There remains a classic fear and fascination about 
covert research. (Calvey, 2019, p. 259)
INTRODUCTION
Covert research – research which is done without informing those involved 
(i.e. the ‘subjects’ of  research) – has been labouring under a negative reputa-
tion in the academic community for some decades (Barnes, 1963; Calvey, 
2017; Erikson, 1966; Herrera, 1999; Homan, 1980; Shils, 1982; Warwick, 
1982). The origin of  the disgrace into which covert research has fallen, after 
a long period of  grace,1 is to be sought in the fact that it is seen as extremely 
ethically and morally dubious. This suspicion of  the perceived dangers of 
covert research is shared by both the members of  many research ethics review 
committees (RECs) or institutional review boards (IRBs) which promote a 
rigorous code of  ethics, believing that it violates many of  the rights of  those 
being studied in an unacceptable way, and many scholars, especially soci-
ologists and anthropologists, who have done various forms of  collabora-
tive research over recent years. These latter believe that covert research does 
incalculable damage to the pact between researchers and those they study 
that they have taken such care to construct (Christians, 2000; Denzin, 1997; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Noddings, 2003). These attitudes as a whole have 
led to the complete marginalisation of  covert research, with many RECs 
and IRBs beginning to ban it in all circumstances and many researchers 
having stopped doing it altogether. Today covert research is a method used, 
with some difficulty, by a markedly limited number of  researchers (Calvey, 
2017).
I would argue that this is a highly negative development in academic terms and 
that the stigmatising of covert research on ethical grounds is excessive and unjust. 
In this chapter, I will argue that there are many reasons why covert research can be 
considered ethically acceptable. I will abstain from listing the accusations tradi-
tionally levelled at covert research2 as these are extremely well known and I focus 
instead on the motives which have, both implicitly and explicitly, been marshalled 
in support of this research method.
In general, I believe that it is possible to distinguish between two overall 
approaches to the defence of covert research, one moderate and one radical. 
These two perspectives reflect different visions of research ethics, the duties of 
researchers and the rights of those involved particularly in social science research. 
I will illustrate both perspectives, starting from the moderate approach. But 
first I should clarify that my thinking will refer primarily to qualitative research 
(Hammersley, 2020) and not other forms of research (such as experiments), 
and focus on work in sociology and social psychology and, to a lesser extent, 
anthropology.
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THE MODERATE DEFENCE OF THE GROUNDS FOR 
COVERT RESEARCH
The moderate approach to covert research has certainly been the most wide-
spread of the two approaches within the social science community (Calvey, 2008; 
Lugosi, 2006; Perez, 2019; Roulet, Gill, Stenger, & Gill, 2017; Spicker, 2011).
The exponents of this approach do not invoke total researcher freedom calling 
for an end to all forms of ethics regulation. Quite the contrary, they assert that, 
if  done in a certain way, covert research can and must be considered compatible 
with the ethics standards currently prevalent in the academic community. This 
approach might even be called ‘reformist’, as its objective is to bring certain types 
of covert research into the legitimate and recognised methods fold and demon-
strate its compatibility with overt methods.
To this end, the moderates or reformers have put forward the following 
arguments:
Lying Must Be an Exception
In the first place the ‘reformers’ argue that lying is not to be considered a ‘nor-
mal’, natural part of social sciences research and that, where possible, researchers 
must behave honestly and make participants aware of the real reason for their 
presence in the field. This is especially the case where research is on vulnerable 
or fragile people. And in any case social scientists should be called on to justify 
their ethical behaviour and field work choices before ethics committees or, in the 
absence of these, in the sections of their articles dealing with methodology and 
ethics (Lugosi, 2006).
Overt and Covert Research Are Not Clearly Distinguishable
Reiterating this point, that is, that intentional and blatant lying cannot be toler-
ated as a normal research method (Spicker, 2011), the moderate defenders of cov-
ert research argue that a situation in which the subjects of research are truly fully 
informed and aware of a researcher’s purposes and intentions is closer to myth than 
to real life (Fine, 1993; Fine & Shulman, 2009). From this perspective, it is argued, 
covert and overt research cannot be seen as easily identifiable and distinguishable 
entities (Calvey, 2017; McKenzie 2009)) and even in the best overt research there 
are inevitably many opaque elements, ambiguities and a lack of transparency and 
clarity. In this respect, the informed consent practices now widespread do not avert 
doubt and confusion (Marzano, 2012; Traianou & Hammersley, 2020) and would 
frequently seem, beyond significantly limiting research freedom, to serve more to 
defend the interests and reputation of academic institutions than to protect the peo-
ple studied (Hedgecoe, 2016; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007; Van den Hoonard, 2011).
Informing Subjects Is Sometimes Really Impossible
Sometimes it is a research location which determines whether or not research 
work can be performed in a fully open way (Lugosi, 2006; Spicker, 2011). This is 
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the case of ethnographic work done in public places such as town squares, open 
air markets, football stadiums and so on. In such situations, it is obviously impos-
sible for ethnographers to inform everyone they meet of the fact that research is 
underway (Traianou & Hammersley, 2020). In any case, those going to public 
places know that they are exposing themselves to the public gaze and thus any 
social analysts that could be present.3 This is also true of those lacking private 
spaces and living permanently in public places (such as the homeless people stud-
ied by Perez, 2019).
Informed Consent Can Never Cover Everything That Happens in the Field
A further element rendering much research at least partially covert is the fact 
that isolating research from other contexts can be an extremely complex matter 
and much of researchers’ most significant information is acquired in the field in 
informal, random conversations in corridors, exchanges of opinion and friendly 
chats on the margins of formal interviews. What could researchers do about this? 
Shed all information acquired in this context? Should such valuable information 
regarding an understanding of, say, an organisational culture really be thrown 
away solely because it has been sourced from ordinary human conversations out-
side a research protocol formally approved by an ethics committee? Not to speak 
of all those behaviours which researchers put into practice in their contacts with 
those they study designed to manage impressions or rather improve their reputa-
tions in the eyes of those they are studying for the purposes of obtaining specific 
benefits and better access to the information of interest to them.
Sometimes the Most Important Things Are Learned through Unintentional  
Covert Research
More generally, we should not imagine that the places in which ethnographic 
work takes place resemble the Trobriand islands in Malinowski’s work, where 
strangers are rarely to be seen. In contemporary advanced industrial (and post-
industrial) societies, the lion’s share of places and spaces are packed with people 
coming and going freely, appearing on the scene briefly or barging in without 
researchers being given the chance to warn them of their presence. I can illustrate 
with a personal experience of mine relating to research into people dying of can-
cer which I did some years ago in a large Italian hospital. The research began in a 
semi-covert way (Marzano, 2007) in the sense that the hospital staff  knew about 
the project and that the head of the hospital ward had approved it. The last part 
of this ethnographic project was overt, with everyone (staff, patients and their 
relatives) being informed of its nature and purposes. It was, however, precisely 
in this last phase of my field work that something totally unforeseen occurred: 
one day I was in the staff  room of the palliative care ward intent on writing up 
some of my field notes when a doctor (dietician) suddenly came in together with 
the wife and daughter of a patient. The three of them acted as if  I was not there 
(perhaps the doctor assumed I was a colleague although I was not wearing a white 
coat), sat down at the other end of the table and the doctor proceeded to explain 
the best diet and food to be given to the patient (last stage terminally ill) to the 
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two women. I witnessed the whole conversation in silence and it was an extremely 
chilling conversation in which a patient entirely unaware of his real condition was 
treated like a pet to be induced to eat certain foods with little tricks. I wrote out 
the dialogue in my diary and then added it to my research in rigorously anony-
mous form (Marzano, 2004). Many years later, I still believe I was right to do so 
because those few minutes of dialogue were a stark representation of the dehu-
manisation of the patient and brought across very clearly the way the terminally 
ill were treated in Italy to my readers. Unintentional covert research can also 
sometimes be very fruitful.
Informed Consent Inevitably Concerns Only the Initial Research Design
It should also be borne in mind that, as is well known, the qualitative research 
framework is extremely flexible (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 265; Wiles 
et al., 2007), subject to ongoing restructuring and redefining and changing fre-
quently during the course of a researcher’s field work (Calvey, 2008; Lugosi, 
2006). For this reason, it can indeed happen that the information supplied at 
the outset of research, and for which informed consent may have been obtained 
from participants, will no longer be complete or up-to-date at a later point in 
the research. Researchers are very rarely able (or willing) to inform participants 
of such changes and these latter are, in any case, not sociologists and anthro-
pologists and unlikely to be interested in finding out more about the details of 
what social scientists do, their curiosities and research interests. Very frequently, 
what participants are most interested in is something researchers are also keen to 
ensure, namely being able to get on with what they are doing, without too many 
interruptions and excessive disturbances, working, interacting and going about 
their normal lives without being disturbed by ethnographers’ presence or words. 
Keeping them constantly informed as to changing research strategies would be a 
nuisance, a source of irritation, to them. The result, however, is that in this case, 
too, researchers’ objectives and intentions are partially covert.
A Covert Method May Be the Most Suitable Way of Getting Into the Field
The moderate defenders of research also argue that acting covertly can some-
times be ethically admissible on the grounds that its time frame is limited as is its 
purpose, serving solely to facilitate the researcher’s access to the field. In certain 
contexts, in fact, researchers revealing their true identity may be prejudicial to the 
very potential for the research, in the last analysis. For example, at the time of 
his research into gay bars, Lugosi (2006) believed that it would have been danger-
ously counterproductive for him to have revealed, right from the start, the real 
reasons for his presence and that it was far better to build up solid friendships 
during his hours of work as a barman, and the many free time hours he chose 
to spend there, before doing so. In all cases such as this, acting covertly is an 
exceptional and momentary state in which researchers commit to making their 
true identity known as soon as possible to the largest possible number of people. 
Acting covertly is simply a necessary expedient with which to initiate research in 
a social environment to which it would otherwise have been very difficult to gain 
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access. It is possible that most if  not all field research can begin in this state of 
‘naturally covert observation’ which gives rise to a topic of research enquiry in 
the first place.
It Is Not Always the Researcher Who Chooses to Hide His/Her Identity
In certain situations working undercover is not an independent or free choice and 
it is researchers’ gatekeepers who require this as a precondition for allowing them 
access to the field (Traianou & Hammersley, 2020). This has happened to me 
twice (Marzano, 2018): the first time when I was studying people dying of cancer 
and the head of the hospital’s oncology ward whom I had contacted through a 
common friend told the doctors and nurses on the ward who I was and then that 
if  I wanted to observe what went on there all I needed to do was to put on a white 
coat and tell patients and their relatives that I was a trainee. The second time was 
when the heads of a Catholic group I was studying proposed that I take part in 
an educational week of theirs but only on condition that I did not tell the other 
participants that I was a sociologist and not a member of the community like all 
the others: ‘The risk would that they would feel like laboratory guinea pigs’, I 
was told, ‘and would get annoyed.’ In both cases the only alternative would have 
been breaking off  the research. The fact is that, in the groups and organisations 
we study there are significant power imbalances and these can be visible not only 
in the decisions of the organisation’s heads to impose the researcher’s presence 
(disregarding the consent of the others) but also, in some cases, not revealing 
the presence of the researcher to those involved. In such cases, challenging this 
norm, making one’s identity explicit, would mean challenging the hierarchy, cast-
ing doubt on the right of the heads to decide (Traianou & Hammersley, 2020).
Sometimes Asking for Subjects’ Consent Is Impractical or Inappropriate
In other research, the obstacles to overt research consist in the fact that (a) the 
subjects are not, for various reasons, capable of understanding the nature of the 
researcher’s work or that (b) asking them to sign an informed consent form would 
be an ethically inopportune action (Marzano, 2012). The first situation is very 
frequent (how many of those who sign informed consent forms are truly aware 
of its consequences?) and in some cases glaring. An example is Lawton’s research 
into hospices and the terminally ill (Lawton, 2001; see also Paterniti, 2000). This 
British researcher tried to keep patients coming to the hospice informed about the 
nature of her work but she could only rarely be sure that they had fully under-
stood, given the late stage of their illness and their frequent dementia. The second 
situation is a matter of those social contexts in which signing a consent form (even 
simply informed consent) is bound up with painful memories and has exploita-
tion and domination associations. This is the case of the waste pickers studied by 
Perez (2019, see also Gubrium et al., 2014, p. 1609). Perez herself  has spoken of 
preferring, at many stages in her career, to use covert methods including to avoid 
offending the people she was observing. For example, despite fearing that they 
would forget, she did not remind the waste pickers she spent the day with what she 
had told them at the outset, that is, that she was recording them. Doing so would, 
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she believed, have been ethically ‘required’ but it might have meant implying that 
their mental faculties were in some way lacking and so ethically compromised. 
This could be a very serious accusation for people subjected to stigmatisation and 
social disparagement on a daily basis which they refuted by reminding others, 
including the ethnographer, of their qualifications.
Autoethnography and Online Research: Two Research Methodologies That Are 
Difficult to Reconcile with Overt Research
There are also new forms of research which have become very popular over recent 
years and are difficult to reconcile with informed consent and conventional codes 
of ethics. These are autoethnography (Ellis, 2004; Jones, Adams, & Ellis, 2016) 
and online research (Calvey, 2017; Hennell, Limmer, & Piacentini, 2020). In 
autoethnography, scholars recount events from their own lives in detail and then 
critically analyse them. Clearly the narrator is never the only character in such 
texts, as is generally true of autobiographies, with other people being mentioned 
and their actions described. It is equally clear that this takes place without the 
prior consent of these latter. The facts described have already happened and fre-
quently the people spoken of are no longer there or no longer in contact with the 
ethnographer. The cyberethnography situation is similar, namely ethnographic 
study of online material. Whilst it is theoretically possible to envisage researchers 
informing subjects of their presence in many situations, there is no doubt that 
online work exponentially increases the potential for ‘lurking’, namely doing very 
easy covert research into what happens on a certain site or social media page 
without intervening (and thus revealing one’s true purpose) (Calvey, 2017). This is 
particularly true in the case of studies of social media (Woodfield, 2017) in which 
many of the ethical issues examined in relation to ‘research in public places’ arise 
(Iphofen, 2011).
The Risk of Causing Harm with Qualitative Research Is Very Limited
If  we reread the history of ethnographic research objectively, we are obliged to 
accept that the harm done to the subjects of covert ethnographic research, includ-
ing the most controversial, has been negligible to non-existent. Take the most 
controversial of all covert ethnography, the one universally cited as a negative 
example by all the critics of this method, Laud Humphrey’s Tearoom Trade, a 
covert study of casual homosexual sex in public toilets in the second half  of the 
1960s. Even this much criticised research has been seen to have caused no harm 
to those Humphrey (1975) observed and then interviewed. Quite the contrary, it 
contributed to increasing tolerance of gay people in America and to bringing an 
end to repressive policies (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2018). The most significant 
risks were those its author himself, who later became a well-known activist in the 
defence of the civil rights of homosexuals, took in order to carry it out (Galliher, 
Brekhus, & Keys, 2004). And in some ways a similar argument, though on a 
smaller scale, can be made as regards Wacquant’s (2004) book on boxers in an 
African-American ghetto in Chicago.
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Covert Research Must Always Be Considered as a Kind of Last Resort
From a moderate perspective, scholars never opt for covert research without giv-
ing it serious thought. Quite the opposite, they make recourse to it only when 
strictly necessary, sometimes uneasily and with feelings of guilt and in any case 
always preferring to come out into the open and reveal their identities as soon as 
possible. For example, Virtová, Stöckelová, and Krásná (2018) have recounted 
that the member of the group who undertook the field work got herself  hired at 
the electronic goods factory chosen for the study and kept her identity concealed 
in order to be able to carry out her research work freely without interference by 
the firm’s management. As time went on, however, the moral urge to drop her 
mask and tell her worker colleagues the truth intensified and, after revealing her 
identity to some of her department colleagues, she went as far as to allow one of 
them, who had in the meantime become a close friend, to have a say on research 
strategy, decide who could be told the truth and which parts of the research needed 
to be terminated or rewritten. A similar decision was taken by Perez (2019) and 
myself, years ago and in similar terms, described the moral quandary which led to 
me seeking out and finding a way to do overt research (Marzano, 2007).
The Superiority of Situated Ethics
In summary, the exponents of what I have called a moderate form of covert 
research espouse a situated ethics (Calvey, 2008) in which they conceal their 
research identities only in certain situations and with specific limits and con-
straints ensuring full moral responsibility for their actions. In the view of its expo-
nents, situated ethics and a sense of ‘positionality’ supply those involved in its 
research with much wider, more authentic and incisive protection than that given 
by mere informed consent, that is, a process which is frequently solely formal and 
defensive in purpose (regarding the reputation of the researcher or the academic 
institution he or she belongs to).
THE RADICAL APPROACH
The approach to covert research I have termed moderate or reformist has cer-
tainly been the most popular approach over the last two decades and it has, to 
some extent, rehabilitated this approach. That said, I cannot avoid citing here, 
however summarily, what I see as a more radical approach to covert research. 
It starts from the assumption that knowledge of the truth is a complicated busi-
ness which requires getting over the defensive barriers put up by subjects to stop 
the truth coming out (Mitchell, 1993). In this context, covert research is seen 
as an absolute necessity and the sharing of information and research projects 
between scholars and subjects dangerously utopian. This perspective sees the 
research world as marked by conflict and the juxtaposition of interests with those 
observed on one side and researchers on the other.
This decidedly minority view is rare today and its great prophet is Jack Douglas, 
a very original theoretician and passionate researcher (Johnson, 2015). The book 
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in which he set out his ‘research philosophy’ most clearly (Douglas, 1976) begins 
with this striking phrase: ‘The goal of all social research is to discover, understand 
and communicate truth about human beings in society’. Douglas is certainly well 
aware that this affirmation is replete with problems, heuristic complications and 
huge epistemological and methodological difficulties, believing that it must be 
considered the starting point for all knowledge acquisition all the same. Naturally 
the truth Douglas spoke of is not the absolute truth of the positivists but the 
everyday life truth we all seek out in our lives. For Douglas, in seeking out the 
truth, sociologists have no option but to prioritise one source in particular in their 
everyday lives and academic work equally, namely direct experience, first person 
participation, getting into the shoes, at least for a whilst, of a member of the 
social group or organisation to be studied. What can be gleaned from interviews 
comes second, as the direct experience of other people, with what can be deduced 
from mere logic or common sense coming last. The reason behind this research 
methods ‘hierarchy’ is to be sought in the fact that nothing is more reliable than 
direct experience. In interviews, there is always the chance that interviewees are 
lying or, at least, concealing part of the truth and the likelihood of this increases 
on certain themes (primarily sex, money and power) and above all in a society as 
divided and conflicted as contemporary America.
Douglas does not deny that there are research situations and contexts in which 
scholars can proceed by means of relationships of trust with the people they study 
and base their studies on the willingness of the latter to co-operate with them. 
There are, however, according to Douglas, others, and they are certainly not few 
in number, in which finding out the truth requires adopting a different research 
strategy, namely lying, acting under false pretences and infiltrating. I have already 
referred to the basic reasons behind this: the people sociologists often study are 
likely to lie and deceive often, they resist with all their power, and frequently in 
an organised way, any attempt by researchers to penetrate their worlds to get to 
know and describe them. And this is not only the case of criminals but also of 
the most normal of people, of us all, when things we prefer to keep hidden are 
involved. The perimeter of lies, deceit and half-truths is, for Douglas, so wide in 
social life that giving up covert methods would mean giving up casting light on 
the lion’s share of human activities and thwart the knowledge gathering mission 
of the social sciences, relegating these to innocuous and moralistic disciplines.
It would, however, be mistaken to deduce an overall indifference to research 
ethics from the orientation of Douglas’s research. In my view, and Douglas might 
perhaps agree, it would be closer to the truth to argue that the ethical principles 
his work is inspired by are not those of the currently prevalent code of ethics 
approach but rather inspired by the need to prioritise ‘parrhesia’ wherever possi-
ble, namely telling the truth, above all to the powerful, who don’t want to hear it 
(Alvesalo-Kuusi & Whyte, 2018, Galliher, 1979). Parrhesia, as Michel Foucault 
(1983, 2011, 2012) reminded us in a reworking of ancient philosophy, is in some 
cases a courageous gesture (exposing the researcher to the anger and revenge of 
the powerful) and, in others, a gesture of friendship and brotherhood. In other 
words, telling the truth may serve to condemn an abuse but also to help a friend 
to take stock of reality. This is what Douglas (1976, p. 115) is implicitly reminding 
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us when he argues that investigative research also means stating, or rather put-
ting into writing, a truth which might wound some of those in the field who have 
become friends, people we sympathise with but who we have done research on 
and who, when the results are written up, we must treat like all the others, no 
concessions. For Douglas (1976 p. 115), truth tellers are duty bound to report
illegal, shady or deviant activities (from the standpoint of the middle-class public) which the 
member would prefer were not reported, which could be used against the members by political 
enemies, and which the authors might prefer did not exist.
Truth tellers stop before nothing in their desire to tell the truth. In his book, 
Douglas describes frankly and in detail the academic world’s many hypocrisies 
and lies and also sets out in full the many lies he himself  has told in his private life. 
For Douglas ethics is not a bureaucratic issue which can be relegated to a board 
or protocol, but a profound moral duty bound up with telling the truth, whatever 
the cost and always. For him, the institutionalisation of the professional behav-
ioural codes from which sanctions could be applied are a threat to freedom and 
constitute a tool by which to impose grey, depressing conformity and thus avert 
the emergence of new ideas which might jeopardise consolidated power balances 
(Douglas, 1979). The laws of liberal democratic states are more than sufficient 
to safeguard research ethics without the need for sanctions from specific ethics 
boards.
Douglas’s very unusual approach has prompted bitter criticism by some, but 
also admiration and applause from others who have, however, only rarely emu-
lated his approach to investigative research. Of these latter, many of his students 
can certainly be cited (Adler, 1993; Adler & Adler, 1987; Johnson, 1975, 2015; 
Melnikov & Kotarba, 2017, 2020), as well as certain contemporary authors whose 
approach is very close to the ‘critical sociology’ approach (Brannan, 2015, 2017; 
Lloyd, 2020; Sugden & Tomlinson, 1999), a formidable highly sui generis anthro-
pologist like Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2004) and, above all, some of the greatest 
researchers in the history of ethnography from Dalton of Men Who Manage, 
(cited more than once by Douglas himself  as a sublime example of investigative 
research), Rosenhan of Being Sane in Insane Places, Festinger of When Prophecy 
Fails and Goffman of  Asylums (see also Mitchell, 1993).
CONCLUSIONS
Covert research was, for decades, a method made use of by social scientists with-
out especial difficulty, feelings of guilt or inadequacy or negative implications 
for those studied. The change in cultural climate which took place in the 1980s 
and its newly introduced ethics standards has made covert research increasingly 
difficult, and frequently impossible when monitoring by ethics committees is 
required. However, covert research has not died out and many of the research-
ers adopting it (those I have called moderate or reformist) have done so in an 
attempt to demonstrate its compatibility with the generally accepted principles 
of ethics regulation. Outside this perimeter, a covert research tradition (which I 
have called radical) which is incompatible with codes of ethics but not with the 
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ethical principles involved in social research has struggled, all the same, to survive 
on the strength of those uncomfortable truths which many do not want to hear.
NOTES
1. Much of the epic social sciences research of the past was covert, with a few exam-
ples being Dalton (1959), Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956), Goffman (1961) and 
Rosenhan (1973). For a complete list see Calvey (2017).
2. This has been analysed fully in the works cited at the beginning of this chapter.
3. Incidentally things are not simple even here, given the fact that, as Spicker, (2011) 
has noted, it is not solely public action which takes place in public places but also private 
actions which should be observed and reported with greater caution by social scientists.
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CORRELATION, NOT CAUSATION, 




Large-scale data analytics have raised a number of ethical concerns. Many of 
these were introduced in a seminal paper by boyd and Crawford and have been 
developed since by others (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Lagoze, 2014; Martin, 
2015; Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, & Floridi, 2016). One such concern 
which is frequently recognised but under-analysed is the focus on correlation 
of data rather than on the causative relationship between data and results. 
Advocates of this approach dismiss the need for an understanding of causation, 
holding instead that the correlation of data is sufficient to meet our needs. In 
crude terms, this position holds that we no longer need to know why X+Y=Z. 
Merely acknowledging that the pattern exists is enough.
In this chapter, the author explores the ethical implications and challenges 
surrounding a focus on correlation over causation. In particular, the author 
focusses on questions of legitimacy of data collection, the embedding of persis-
tent bias, and the implications of future predictions. Such concerns are vital for 
understanding the ethical implications of, for example, the collection and use 
of ‘big data’ or the covert access to ‘secondary’ information ostensibly ‘publicly 
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available’. The author’s conclusion is that by failing to consider causation, the 
short-term benefits of speed and cost may be countered by ethically problem-
atic scenarios in both the short and long term.
Keywords: Correlation; causation; ethics; big data analytics;  
legitimacy; bias
INTRODUCTION
This is a world where massive amounts of  data and applied mathematics replace every other 
tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of  human behaviour, from linguis-
tics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do 
what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented 
fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves. (Chris Anderson, then Editor-
in-Chief  of  Wired, writing in 2008. Cited in boyd & Crawford, 2012; see also Ananny, 2016; 
Hildebrandt, 2011).1
Large-scale data analytics have raised a number of concerns in recent years. 
Many of these were helpfully introduced by boyd and Crawford and have been 
developed since by others (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Lagoze, 2014; Martin, 2015; 
Mittelstadt et al., 2016). One such concern which has led to only limited discus-
sion is that of a focus on correlation of data to results in preference to a focus 
on the causative relationship between the data and the results (boyd & Crawford, 
2012; Mittelstadt et al., 2016). Adherents to this approach, captured eloquently 
in the above quote by Anderson, dismiss the need for an understanding of causa-
tion. Instead the correlation of data is assumed sufficient to meet our needs.
An example of the focus on correlation rather than causation can be found 
in a TED talk by Jennifer Golbeck (2013). Research linked the enjoyment of 
curly fries to a higher level of intelligence than ‘normal’. This is almost certainly 
not because eating curly fries makes a person more intelligent, nor because being 
intelligent causes a person to like curly fries. Rather, it may simply be because one 
person with a higher-than-average intelligence liked curly fries on Facebook as 
a joke, and her friends continued that joke. As people who have a higher-than-
average intelligence tend to be friends on social media with others with higher-
than-average intelligence, this leads to the strange correlation between intelligence 
and liking curly fries. The consequences, however, are that companies wishing to 
market products to people of higher-than-average intelligence may choose to tar-
get people who like curly fries, knowing that there is an established correlation 
and irrespective of the reason for that correlation. Worse, recruiters may start to 
look for apparently random but established correlations in seeking candidates for 
jobs. While being the subject of a marketing campaign is not typically intrusive 
(although it can be: see Ebeling, 2016, pp. 49–66), being turned down for a job 
in preference for another person simply because they like curly fries is definitely 
objectionable.
At the same time, large-scale data analytics can provide a wealth of ben-
efits to individuals and society. This extends well beyond personalised coupons 
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or targeted advertising to significant advances in public health and welfare. If  
research can establish clear connections on a national scale with existing data 
regarding links between, for example, red meat consumption and bowel cancer, 
or between obesity and particular foods, then governments may have an obliga-
tion to carry out this research. The purpose of this chapter is not to dismiss data 
analytics as unethical en masse, nor to provide an overview of ethical concerns. It 
is rather to draw attention to the ethical issues arising from one particular aspect 
of data analytics, namely the attention paid to correlation in preference to (or 
instead of) causation.
The curly fries example is relatively easy for non-statisticians to understand. In that 
case, a correlation occurs between people with a higher-than-average IQ and people 
who ‘like’ curly fries. However, data analytics is typically far more opaque than in 
this example. A more complex case is the famous case of retail chain Target discover-
ing that a teenage girl was pregnant before she told her father (Duhigg, 2012). In his 
article, Charles Duhigg suggests a number of items in the teenager’s shopping basket 
would, when taken together, indicate to the data analytics team at Target that she is 
pregnant. These include buying more moisturiser, switching to unscented moistur-
iser, and buying a large bag that could double as diaper bags when the baby arrives. 
Independently none of these would bear much significance. It is when taken together 
that they take on a relevance not seen in the individual parts.
The items Duhigg lists bear an obvious relation to the pregnancy of the teen, 
but this need not be the case. The data analytics team at Target were not decid-
ing which items were relevant based on their intuitions and then tracking these. 
Rather they were reverse engineering the known shopping baskets of customers 
who were also known to be pregnant to see what goods they had bought, and 
then searching for these prospectively with customers whose state of pregnancy 
was not known.
In Duhigg’s example, then, there is an understandable causative role played 
by the items in the shopping basket: we can quickly see why at least some of 
these items, when taking together, might give an indication that the customer is 
pregnant. Likewise, in the curly fries example, there is a confounding variable 
(one not measured but which has an influence on seemingly unconnected results), 
namely the fact that the correlation is noted on a social media platform where 
like-minded people commonly cluster together.
However, it is not implausible that there could well be other items in a shop-
ping basket which, again taken together, could indicate that a customer is preg-
nant. Imagine that these include 2lbs of carrots, 1lb of celery, scented candles, 
pillow cases, four AA batteries, and a CD. These could compare with a normal 
shopping basket of 3lbs of carrots, no celery, scented candles, eight AA batter-
ies and two CDs. The first basket, through a long series of correlations, could 
provide an indication that the customer is pregnant, while the latter does not 
provide such an indication. That is, in this example, I want to stipulate a lack of 
any causative connection between the items bought and the results of the data 
analysis, and a lack of any confounding variables. Nonetheless, the correlation 
holds in 70% of cases and so it appears to be a reasonable assumption to make 
that this shopper is pregnant.2
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In this chapter, I look at the ethical issues that arise from this focus on the 
correlative rather than the causative. I argue that this focus may be effective in 
the short term but it is ethically problematic. In particular, I hold that there are 
three reasons why we should be cautious of this approach. Firstly, this approach 
leads us away from considering the legitimacy of the data collected. Secondly, the 
approach lends itself  to the embedding of persistent outliers and bias. Thirdly, 
the approach may miss the fact that, as any investor in financial services will say, 
past performance is no guarantee of future success. As noted above, there may be 
confounding variables that could be found to underpin a number of discoveries in 
big data. However, to stress the point that I am making about an unhealthy focus 
on correlation of data to the detriment of understanding causation, I will assume 
cases where there are no confounding variables.
LEGITIMACY
Central to the approach currently taken to big data analysis is that the data sci-
entist frequently does not know which data will be relevant and which data will 
not. The response is to collect all of the data available in order to see which prove 
to be relevant. Does this matter? Clearly there are ethical questions that need 
to be raised about how the data are obtained, particularly whether the person 
providing the data has given valid and fully informed consent for that data to be 
collected and used in this way. Assuming this is the case, though, does it matter 
that all available data are collected and processed?
I want to argue that there is a significant difference here between what data are 
effectively legitimate, what are legally legitimate, and what are morally legitimate 
to collect. The current paradigm confesses its ignorance of what are effectively 
legitimate, and so seeks to collect all the data available, in order to discover which 
are effective in producing the results that interest the data scientist. This is tem-
pered by legal restrictions as to what data are permissible to collect and what are 
not. Depending on the particular site or nation state, it may be illegal to collect 
data on a person’s voting or health records. Also important of course is who is 
doing the collecting: it may be legal for a government to collect some data which 
it is not legal for a business to collect, or vice versa. One consideration that can be 
overlooked in this decision, though, is what data are morally legitimate to collect.
Whether it is morally legitimate to collect the data may never occur to the 
data scientist. It is not that they are necessarily malicious: their intentions are 
good and they want the best results for all concerned. However, intentions only 
go so far and consequences (intended and unintended) need to be considered as 
well. They may also choose not to see the collection of the data as their problem. 
Their job is to analyse the data provided. How that data are gathered is an issue 
for someone else.
Imagine a case in which data are collected by a university on the educational 
achievement of its students and the skin colour of its students. Then imagine 
that a clear correlation is drawn between the academic achievement of a student 
and the colour of their skin, so that it transpires that black students perform 
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worse than white. There could of course be any number of reasons for this, from 
the university running scholarship programmes for black students from deprived 
backgrounds who have further to go in order to catch up with white colleagues 
who tend to come from more privileged backgrounds, to racism among the uni-
versity staff  who grade papers.3 The discovery of this correlation, though, could 
lead to a number of outcomes. Among these are that the university may choose 
to do nothing, or it could carry out an audit of staff  and students to uncover any 
hitherto undiscovered racist assumptions, or it could choose to focus on recruit-
ing white students in order to raise its results in national league tables.
While these consequences differ in their ethical acceptability, they also raise 
the question as to whether the data should have been collected in the first place. 
In this instance, the good that can be achieved by discovering staff  with racist 
assumptions might be sufficiently advantageous to justify the collection of these 
data. However, this response implies that the cause of  the correlation is of interest 
to the university. This seems to be morally unproblematic and not my focus here. 
By contrast, my starting assumption has been that the cause is not of interest 
but rather the results themselves (in Anderson’s words, ‘the numbers speak for 
themselves’). If  that is the case, then the university would ask not ‘why is this data 
the way it is’ but ‘what could we do with these results?’ The consequences of the 
collection are therefore focussed on action, which is itself  governed by a series of 
values, rather than on research or discovery.
Even if  the data were used for beneficent ends, it does not follow that all data 
that could be collected would be used for beneficent ends. Could a university mor-
ally collect the voting records of its students, or a list of their sexual partners? 
These seem to be more problematic. Certainly there might be a beneficent desire 
to uncover causes and help the students in some way, but the potential for abuse 
may increase with ever more intrusive data collection. Ultimately, the point may 
be reached at which the potential for abuse outweighs the potential for benefit to 
the students. At this point it would seem that the university would not be justified 
in collecting the data. The scale of intrusiveness of the data collected is clearly 
also a problem.
Thirdly, it is worth noting that different data may be collected for different 
reasons. The ethnicity of students may be collected for the morally legitimate end 
of ensuring that the university’s recruitment process is not biasing against stu-
dents on the grounds of their ethnicity, or to pass to government records aimed 
at monitoring social trends. Likewise, the university would be legitimate in col-
lecting data about student performance. Indeed, it would be failing in its role as 
an educational institution if  it neglected to pay attention to the academic perfor-
mance of its students. However, the scenario becomes more problematic when 
these independent data sets are combined and subsequently used for a hitherto 
unforeseen or unanticipated end.
Ultimately, the collection of data on people is a form of surveillance, which 
raises a number of ethical issues (Lyon, 2002). In order to be ethical, surveillance 
should be subject to a number of limits regarding who is carrying it out and 
whether they are accountable, why they are doing so, whether it is proportionate, 
whether there are less intrusive ways of arriving at the same end, whether the 
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collection is likely to be successful in achieving the justifying cause, and whether 
the surveillance is discriminating between those who are liable and those who are 
not (Macnish, 2014). It does not seem unreasonable that the collection of data 
for analysis should be subject to the same ethical considerations as other forms 
of surveillance.
One response to the surveillance objection may relate not to the collection 
of  new data, but the use of  historic data already collected. This is not, it may 
be argued, an act of  surveillance. The surveillance occurred at the point of 
collection. This is data arising from past surveillance which is now available 
for data scientists to use. Furthermore, given that the data exist, there may 
even be an obligation for it to be subject to analysis in the interests of, for 
example, public health.
The immediate counter to this response is to point out that surveillance does 
not involve merely the collection of data, but the collection and processing of  
that data. Surveillance may exist without the processing of data (i.e. it is not a 
necessary condition), but in this case, taking a broad understanding of what is 
meant by processing, there would be little purpose in the surveillance. As such it 
would not be justified on the grounds of the aforementioned need for a just cause. 
Furthermore, if  my government collected my emails five years ago but did not 
read them at the time of collection but chose to read them today, I would argue 
that I have been under surveillance both at the time of collection and at the time 
of processing (i.e. reading) of my emails. This distinction gets to the heart of 
the revelations made by Edward Snowden in 2013 that the USA, UK and other 
governments were collecting large quantities of internet data relating to domestic 
citizens. While the intelligence communities at the time protested there was no 
violation of privacy as the internet data had not been accessed, it was nonetheless 
an act of surveillance (Macnish, 2016).
A further problem to arise from the processing of historic data is the possible 
lack of informed consent given by the owners of that data for its processing (see, 
e.g., Foster & Young, 2011). This has been one problem with the UK government’s 
recent attempts to capture citizens’ health data in a centralised database known 
as ‘care.data’. This concerns health data which were initially given by patients to 
their GPs (general practitioners – their primary care physicians). Their reasons 
for doing so were probably legion, although one reason was almost certainly not 
the pooling of that data for future analysis. Certainly some may not have found 
the pooling of their data for analysis objectionable, just as many do not find this 
objectionable today. However, the fact remains that in giving the data to the GP, 
the patient did not give informed consent for this particular use of that data. As 
such, it is right that the patient be sought out in order to gain informed consent 
for this secondary use of the data.
There are understandable concerns with this focus on informed consent such 
that public health could suffer as a result of paying too much attention to finding 
and addressing the concerns of every citizen before accessing their data, a price 
that is too high to pay when the costs are minimal (Ganesh, 2014). However, this 
is to underplay the procedural importance of informed consent and the potential 
harms involved in the pooling of medical data.
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Procedurally, the gaining of informed consent is central to the ethics sur-
rounding the collection of data relating to individuals. This was emphasised in 
the Nuremburg Code and again in the Helsinki Declaration. There is a concern 
that a precedent will be established in ignoring the need for informed consent, 
with long-term ramifications. If  liberal democracies cannot abide by their own 
standards in medical ethics, then they sacrifice any moral high ground in respond-
ing to others that do the same in more objectionable instances. To act on informa-
tion over which people should have control without their consent is an abuse of 
their autonomy and can have a severe impact on their lives.
Secondly, there are a number of potential harms arising from the pooling of medi-
cal records, not least the discovering of health records of individuals, be they public 
figures, employees, or insurance applicants. It may be objected that this is not the 
intention of data scientists, and that there are security measures in place to prevent 
the leaking of information. However, it should be remembered that Edward Snowden 
managed to walk out of what is one of the most secure buildings in the world with mil-
lions of documents of top secret information on a memory stick. Given that Snowden 
had been subject to some of the most intense scrutiny before being allowed into those 
buildings, including polygraphs and background checks, it is naïve to suggest that 
health records will not be discovered and removed for the purpose of personal gain 
from large-scale pooled databases.
A final concern with the focus on legality rather than the moral legitimacy of the 
collection of data is that technology moves apace of legislation. Problems usually have 
to arise for a number of years before they lead to the introduction of legislation, and 
then a few more years before the response is passed into law. This enables unethical 
practices to continue unaffected for a considerable period before they are ultimately 
ended by legislation. It also overlooks the fact that while legislators generally try to 
ensure that laws are ethical, this is not always the case. Competing interests are often 
brought to bear on the legislative process and laws passed today have to be consistent 
with laws passed yesterday. As such, it may be that the law, when it is passed, does not 
go far enough to protect those it was designed to protect.
In speaking of collecting legitimate data we may therefore be using the term in 
one of at least three ways: effective, legal, or moral. What is legal and effective to col-
lect may not be moral. Or, it may be moral to collect data for one purpose but then 
unethical to use it for a different purpose. This latter concern is especially pertinent to 
historic data. A standard approach to alleviate the concerns regarding inappropriate 
collection or use of a person’s data is to seek their informed consent. While this may 
be cumbersome and slow the process of analysis with a clear public benefit, there 
are sound ethical, procedural, and practical concerns that mean we should not side-
step this. Finally, there are dangers in an over-reliance on legislation to guide morally 
legitimate collection owing to the pace of change in the former, which can easily be 
outstripped by developments in technology.
EMBEDDING OF PERSISTENT OUTLIERS AND BIAS
A second problem for large-scale data analytics is the introduction of bias and 
discrimination. Bias can be obvious, such as the aforementioned case leading to 
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the increased recruitment of white students over black students, or through simi-
lar forms of social sorting such as upmarket stores sending coupons to regular 
customers but not occasional customers. The end result of this process is that 
the wealthier regular customers pay less to use the store than poorer occasional 
customers (Lyon, 2002). When this is seen to be the case, that bias can be guarded 
and, to some extent, legislated against.
More problematic is hidden bias which is by its nature less easy to discover. As 
an example of hidden bias, imagine a public transport system which is successfully 
designed to serve the needs of 90% of the public. This sounds laudable: no system 
is perfect and 100% use is unrealistic without coercion. What, though, if the 10% 
who are not served by the transport system all fall into this category because they are 
unable to use it, owing to some form of disability? Certainly one cannot please all of 
the people all of the time, but to discriminate against someone purely for that person’s 
disability, even if the discrimination is unwitting, is clearly unethical.
In the case of everyday statistics, such hidden bias is a possibility. Given the 
scale and focus on likelihood of correlation of big data analytics, though, it is not 
only probable that hidden bias would be present, but probable also that such bias 
would remain hidden for longer. That a system has a 90% success rate may be 
indicative of a highly effective and desirable system. Yet, if  the 10% of occasions 
when the system fails always involves the same people, or group of people, then 
there is a problem.
Returning to the scenario of university recruitment, imagine that a university 
is seeking to improve its place in the national league tables. To this end, it carries 
out data analysis on the students currently achieving the highest grades and looks 
at their behaviour in the last two years of school before attending university. This 
avoids the obvious bias encountered before of correlating grades with skin col-
our. The results, when they are collected, then indicate that the best-performing 
students all played polo, golf, and sailed in this crucial two-year period. This 
leads to the university increasing its recruitment efforts among school students 
who sail and play golf  and polo. There is a reasonable likelihood at this point that 
the university would effectively be focussing its recruitment efforts on fee-paying 
schools rather than state schools, in the process recruiting more white than black 
students, as well as more wealthy than under-privileged students.
It is logically possible that most students who attended fee-paying and predom-
inantly white schools are more successful at university than those who attended 
state schools. This could be because they are more intelligent or because they 
are advantaged in some way by the fee-paying education system, or a number of 
other reasons. It is demonstrably false that people have higher intelligence purely 
because their parents had sufficient money to send them to a fee-paying school. It 
might, though, be possible that students at fee-paying schools are trained better 
in critical thinking or independent work than those at state schools, and so are 
better prepared for university when they arrive. The result is that they ‘hit the 
ground running’ while those from state schools feel as if  they are constantly try-
ing to catch up. Alternatively, they may simply be better prepared by the school 
for the requirements to get into university and are as such better at ‘playing the 
game’ than those who attended state schools.
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In this case, the university faces a choice as to whether to improve its place in 
the national rankings by recruiting from fee-paying schools, or by providing an 
opportunity for those less privileged to develop their skills in critical thinking and 
independent working. If  the former is true, then the university’s actions could be 
justified by (and may even genuinely be determined by) the results of the data 
analysis. They are not seeking to be elitist or racist, although these are likely to be 
the results of their actions.
The above scenario imagined one university engaged in this practice. However, 
if  one imagines every university taking a similar approach then an obvious prob-
lem emerges. In the first instance, recruitment becomes focussed on and heav-
ily competitive for students from fee-paying schools. With time, though, further 
accumulated data will predominantly come from students who have attended fee-
paying schools, thus focussing recruitment still further on a few key fee-paying 
schools and not even considering state schools at all. It is also entirely feasible 
that some schools become aware of which extra-curricular activities are favoured 
by the best universities (some schools are capable of conducting their own data 
analytic processes on historic cases) and start to offer and endorse those activities 
to pupils. Once more, the better-resourced schools will be more successful than 
those with more stretched budgets. In both cases, though, rather than being lib-
erated by education, those less privileged find that university education at least, 
and the opportunities that go with it, have returned to being a preserve of the 
wealthy.4
While this is a hypothetical example, one does not have to look far to uncover 
cases in which hidden bias persists in algorithmic approaches to social problem-
solving. Perhaps the best known of these is the city of Boston’s adoption of a 
smart phone app to automatically locate potholes in public roads (the city fixes 
20,000 potholes every year). This meant that rather than wait for people to com-
plain about the state of the roads, the city could respond more quickly. The app 
may even have been perceived as having a social levelling effect, given that under-
privileged groups in society may be less likely to complain about the state of their 
roads than other groups. If  this was the case, though, the app was unsuccessful. 
As Kate Crawford (2013) notes,
People in lower income groups in the US are less likely to have smartphones, and this is particu-
larly true of older residents, where smartphone penetration can be as low as 16%. For cities like 
Boston, this means that smartphone data sets are missing inputs from significant parts of the 
population – often those who have the fewest resources.
As Crawford notes, Boston’s Office of  New Urban Mechanics was aware of 
this problem and worked hard to adjust for it, but it does not take a leap of 
the imagination to consider the impact of  this thinking had the Office been less 
careful.
One such instance has been noted in relation to motor insurance policies, 
which are increasingly being tied to the installation of a ‘black box’ in the owner’s 
vehicle and which monitors driving habits. These can then be correlated with the 
habits of other drivers so that profiles are developed regarding ‘safe’ drivers and 
‘unsafe drivers’ based on their driving. The immediate effect is to penalise unsafe 
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drivers for their more risky behaviour and, one hopes, in the long term promote 
safer driving for all.
One such example of an indicator of unsafe driving is the time of day 
or night at which a person is on the roads and the frequency with which they 
drive. According to Robinson and colleagues, one system operated by insurer 
Progressive favours drivers who do not go out at night and who drive infrequently. 
However, they go on to point out, drawing on research by Maria E. Enchautegui 
(2013), the unintended effects of this may serve to punish particular communities, 
and especially those on low incomes, who ‘are more likely to work the night shift, 
putting them on the road late at night, and to live further from work’ (Robinson, 
Yu, & Rieke, 2014, p. 6).
In essence, the Progressive system puts late night workers into a similar cat-
egory as late night party-goers,
forcing them to carry more of the cost of intoxicated and other irresponsible driving that hap-
pens disproportionately at night. Statistically speaking, this added cost does not simply reflect 
the risk that the late night commuter may be hit by a drunk driver. It also reflects the possibil-
ity that, as far as the insurer can tell, the late responsible night worker may be a drunk driver. 
(Robinson et al., 2014, p. 6)
Rather than spreading risk among the insured population, then, the system 
focusses that risk on particular groups who are already marginalised in society.
A final case which deserves mention is that of Latanya Sweeney’s discovery 
that online searches for names typically associated with black people had a signif-
icantly greater chance of returning advertisements which related to arrests than 
names associated with white people. Names associated with black people
generated ads suggestive of an arrest in 81 to 86 percent of name searches on one website and 
92 to 95 percent on the other, while those assigned at birth primarily to whites, such as Geoffrey, 
Jill and Emma, generated more neutral copy: the word ‘arrest’ appeared in 23 to 29 percent of 
name searches on one site and 0 to 60 percent on the other. On the more ad trafficked web-
site, a black-identifying name was 25% more likely to get an ad suggestive of an arrest record. 
(Sweeney, 2013, p. 1)
Sweeney notes that this occurs not because of an explicit bias in the software, but 
because that software
learns over time which ad text gets the most clicks from viewers of the ad. It does this by assign-
ing weights (or probabilities) based on the click history of each ad copy. At first all possible ad 
copies are weighted the same, they are all equally likely to produce a click. Over time, as people 
tend to click one version of ad text over others, the weights change, so the ad text getting the 
most clicks eventually displays more frequently. (Sweeney, 2013, p. 34)
In essence, then, the software learns over time to reflect the biases which exist in 
society (Robinson et al., 2014, p. 16).
In this section, we have seen a number of cases, hypothetical and real, in which 
a focus on correlation and not causation of results is ethically problematic in that 
this can mask discrimination and bias. There is hence a concern that through 
focussing on correlations and failing to uncover the story behind those corre-
lations, hidden biases might remain hidden for longer. Worse still, those biases 
could be exacerbated through decisions made on the basis of correlative data 
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which has not been subject to adequate scrutiny regarding the causes of those 
correlations.
PREDICTING THE FUTURE ON THE STRENGTH  
OF THE PAST
It is an oft-repeated phrase in financial services that past performance is no guar-
antee of future success. Just because an investor has done well in the past there is 
no way of being sure that she will continue to do well in the future. Past results 
may have come about through luck or through a confluence of events that have 
since ceased to pertain.
The same is true in data analytics when causation is ignored for correlation. On 
an entertaining website, and now book, Tyler Vigen (2015a, 2015b) has provided 
graphs of a number of examples which fit the concerns raised in this chapter of 
seeking correlation without concern for causation. These include the following 
from among a list of 30,000:
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In using these charts I am clearly oversimplifying, and drawing on oversim-
plifications, for ease of illustration. No one would attempt to predict the number 
of science doctorates to be awarded in the USA by basing the prediction purely 
on the total revenue generated by arcades. However, the focus on the correla-
tion effect in big data analytics at the expense of causation could have similarly 
absurd, but less obvious, effects.
Imagine a case in which an analysis of all terrorists of any stripe, up to the 
present, have all walked at precisely 57 metres/minute (leaving to one side the 
thorny question of how we define a terrorist). Further analysis might also dem-
onstrate that anyone who is not a terrorist has always walked faster or slower 
than 57 metres/minute. Does this mean that it would be reasonable to develop an 
automated security system that recognises and disables only those who walk at 57 
metres/minute? To some degree this might be sensible: the statistics as stipulated 
appear to be overwhelming. However, there are a number of problems with this 
approach.
Firstly, returning to the opening quote of this section, the past is not always 
a reliable indicator of  the future. Aside from standard challenges to inductive 
logic regarding geese at Christmas, whereby the goose is always welcomed 
into the farmhouse kitchen with food until Christmas morning when she is 
welcomed with a cleaver, when there is no confounding variable (such as the 
knowledge of  Christmas traditions) or known reason for the correlation, there 
is no reason to presume that correlation will continue. Hence, just because all 
and only terrorists have until now walked at 57 metres/minute, there is no 
guarantee that all and only terrorists in the future will walk at 57 metres/
minute. Indeed, should it become known that all and only terrorists walk at 
57 metres/minute (and that this is being used as a means of  identification 
of  terrorists) then future terrorists are likely to consciously adopt a different 
walking speed.
Secondly, it is important to understand where the data are drawn from in 
these cases. It is, after all, impossible to measure the walking pace of  every 
person on the planet and even if  we were to do this it would only be relevant 
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to the time at which the measurement occurred. Walking speeds change with 
age and circumstance, as well as with culture. Currently, data sets regarding 
walking behaviour tend to be developed in the West and so have a predomi-
nantly western bias (Macnish, 2012). Hence, the aforementioned problem of 
hidden bias can enter the system through the choice of  data set and have 
a significant impact on the system’s applicability and ability to accurately 
predict the future. The implications of  this are that the use of  a seemingly 
strong correlation to identify terrorists could be flawed either over geography 
or over time, with the result that innocent people are harassed and stigmatised 
(Macnish, 2012).
The terrorist example is one with serious consequences. It is no light matter 
to be mistaken for a terrorist. However, if  the outcomes of the analysis are com-
paratively trivial then this is less of a problem. One might be tempted to say that 
the pregnant teenager in Duhigg’s story was a fairly trivial case of data analyt-
ics. The father did not presume that his daughter was pregnant but rather that 
Target was acting irresponsibly in sending her coupons for items that a pregnant 
woman might want. If  he had thought that she was pregnant on the basis of 
the coupons alone, and if  he had a particularly low view of pregnant teenagers, 
then the consequences for the daughter could have been far more severe. Taking 
this not to be the case in this instance, though, the worst that would happen in a 
scenario in which Target had a 60% success rate in identifying pregnant women, 
would be that 40% of those identified received coupons that they would never 
use. Furthermore, in signing up to a loyalty card programme, customers accept 
that they will get coupons through the post (indeed, many do it for this reason), 
often assuming that these will be fairly arbitrary and that some will therefore be 
of little interest to them. Indeed, Duhigg (2012) notes in his article the creepi-
ness for a customer of realising that Target knows she is pregnant on receipt of 
such tailored coupons. The response, he claims, has been to include coupons for 
random items that it is known no pregnant woman is likely to want, such as lawn 
mowers or garden furniture. This is not to say that pregnant women would not 
want these items, merely that they do not relate to pregnancy in the way that other 
coupons might.
Serious cases are not restricted to security, though. They might also emerge in 
the health and public welfare sectors. For example, the discovery of a correlation 
between those who use a certain prescription drug and those who die when under 
general anaesthesia should rightly lead to hospitals warning patients not to use 
this drug when they are about to undergo an operation requiring a general anaes-
thetic. If, though, both the drug and the operation are significant to the patient’s 
life, then the patient will be forced to choose between the two.
As things stand, this is a regrettable but not unconscionable scenario. Such 
things happen. However, it may be that the manufacturer of the drug used a par-
ticular compound in the composition of the drug which was inert in the delivery 
of the drug but which reacted negatively with a certain level of anaesthetic. If  the 
supplier stopped using this compound, purely by chance, then the forced decision 
would cease to be an issue. Owing to the use of historic data in deriving the cor-
relation, though, no one would know this without further tests being carried out. 
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It is not implausible that the manufacturer of the drug stopped using the com-
pound after the data were collected but before the results were published, and so 
the ensuing warnings would be unnecessarily harmful.
Each of these cases is to a greater or lesser extent plausible. Furthermore, it is 
not unreasonable to draw conclusions and base future predictions on past data. 
Once more, though, the concern in this chapter is not the basing of future predic-
tions on past data but the basing of such on past data alone without seeking the 
reasons for any correlations. For example, the correlation between the drug and 
death while under anaesthesia is plausible, and it is a valuable activity to notice 
this correlation and warn others in the light of the perceived pattern. However, 
without working to understand why there is a correlation, subsequent changes to 
the drug might go unperceived.
The practical challenge to this warning in particular is likely to be that such 
practices (seeking correlation as grounds for prediction without uncovering caus-
ative factors) are more likely to proliferate in business than in security or medi-
cine. In such cases, the harms are more akin to receiving irrelevant coupons than 
people dying or terrorists evading capture. Yes, the response would come, the 
system is not perfect but then we do not seek perfection, and where is the harm?
To this my response would be that people’s behaviour is governed in part by 
the expectations that are placed on them. If  these expectations are derived from 
an arbitrary group then the expectations themselves risk being arbitrary. If  the 
data set used is of current customers, who are overwhelmingly male, then the 
predictions may be significantly more pertinent to men than women. If  this gov-
erns not only coupons but also marketing and design of stores, this may make it 
harder for women to use those stores (if  maybe only for social reasons such as a 
predominance of certain styles and colours in the store windows and no female 
assistants such that the average woman needs to sum up greater courage in enter-
ing the store and prepare herself  for a degree of mansplaining). This in turn has 
a societal impact of at best embedding and condoning existing social divisions, 
and at worst implicitly endorsing and furthering those divisions, which should be 
avoided. Hence, even apparently harmless or low risk uses of correlative data for 
predictions can have significant outcomes.
CONCLUSION
I have warned here against an exclusive focus on correlations in big data analytics. 
Failing to consider causation may be effective in the short term but it will prove 
to be ethically problematic in both the short and long term. Paying attention to 
causes could overcome the three problems explored here: the legitimacy of the 
data collected, the emergence of bias and persistent outliers, and the difficulty of 
predicting future events on the basis of current data.
The challenge is that in considering causes, the data scientist will lose the 
advantages of speed and complexity that accompany big data. Being forced to 
examine why a particular correlation occurs might slow the publishing or using 
of that data, with potentially significant social effects. If, for instance, a strong 
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correlation is found between eating a certain food and colon cancer, then it may 
well be prudent to advise people to refrain from eating that food prior to discov-
ering the reason for that relationship, which could take years to uncover. At the 
same time, as I hope to have demonstrated, there are also potentially significant 
social effects that arise from ignoring causes as well. It is hence short-sighted to 
promote the quick returns that can be gained by ignoring causes as being justified 
by social benefit. The fuller picture shows social benefit and harm that can arise 
from this approach and so it is not one to be taken lightly.
NOTES
1. I believe that Anderson has since retracted this statement, although cannot find refer-
ence to this retraction.
2. Clearly, the dark arts of big data (Target’s chief  data analyst was prevented from 
communicating with Duhigg when Target discovered that he had discussed his work with 
a reporter) are vastly more complex than I have suggested here (Duhigg, 2012). However, 
to attempt to capture this complexity would detract from the central argument. I shall 
therefore continue to use simplified cases to press home the concerns with this approach of 
favouring correlation over causation.
3. Although intended as a hypothetical example, this is sadly the case in UK universities 
at least. See Alexander and Arday (2015). I am grateful to Rosemary Hill for drawing my 
attention to this report as well as for comments on an earlier draft.
4. A similar situation in the workplace is imagined by boyd, Levy, & Marwick (2014).
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CHAPTER 6
THE BIG DATA WORLD: BENEFITS, 




Advances in Big Data, artificial Intelligence and data-driven innovation bring 
enormous benefits for the overall society and for different sectors. By contrast, 
their misuse can lead to data workflows bypassing the intent of privacy and 
data protection law, as well as of ethical mandates. It may be referred to as 
the ‘creep factor’ of Big Data, and needs to be tackled right away, especially 
considering that we are moving towards the ‘datafication’ of society, where 
devices to capture, collect, store and process data are becoming ever-cheaper 
and faster, whilst the computational power is continuously increasing. If using 
Big Data in truly anonymisable ways, within an ethically sound and societally 
focussed framework, is capable of acting as an enabler of sustainable develop-
ment, using Big Data outside such a framework poses a number of threats, 
potential hurdles and multiple ethical challenges. Some examples are the 
impact on privacy caused by new surveillance tools and data gathering tech-
niques, including also group privacy, high-tech profiling, automated decision 
making and discriminatory practices. In our society, everything can be given 
a score and critical life changing opportunities are increasingly determined 
by such scoring systems, often obtained through secret predictive algorithms 
applied to data to determine who has value. It is therefore essential to guaran-
tee the fairness and accurateness of such scoring systems and that the decisions 
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relying upon them are realised in a legal and ethical manner, avoiding the risk 
of stigmatisation capable of affecting individuals’ opportunities. Likewise, 
it is necessary to prevent the so-called ‘social cooling’. This represents the 
long-term negative side effects of the data-driven innovation, in particular 
of such scoring systems and of the reputation economy. It is reflected in 
terms, for instance, of self-censorship, risk-aversion and lack of exercise of 
free speech generated by increasingly intrusive Big Data practices lacking 
an ethical foundation. Another key ethics dimension pertains to human-data 
interaction in Internet of Things (IoT) environments, which is increasing 
the volume of data collected, the speed of the process and the variety of 
data sources. It is urgent to further investigate aspects like the ‘ownership’ of 
data and other hurdles, especially considering that the regulatory landscape 
is developing at a much slower pace than IoT and the evolution of Big Data 
technologies. These are only some examples of the issues and consequences 
that Big Data raise, which require adequate measures in response to the ‘data 
trust deficit’, moving not towards the prohibition of the collection of data but 
rather towards the identification and prohibition of their misuse and unfair 
behaviours and treatments, once government and companies have such data. 
At the same time, the debate should further investigate ‘data altruism’, deep-
ening how the increasing amounts of data in our society can be concretely 
used for public good and the best implementation modalities.
Keywords: Big Data; artificial intelligence; data analytics; ethics challenges; 
individuals’ control over personal data; dataveillance
THE ERA OF BIG DATA AND THE  
‘DATAFICATION’ OF SOCIETY
We live in the era of Big Data, where governments, organisations and marketers 
know, or can deduce, an increasing number of data items about aspects of our lives 
that in previous eras we could assume were reasonably private (e.g. our race, ethnicity, 
religion, politics, sexuality, interests, hobbies, health information, income, credit rat-
ing and history, travel history and plans, spending habits, decision-making capabili-
ties and biases and much else). Devices to capture, collect, store and process data are 
becoming ever-cheaper and faster, whilst the computational power to handle these 
data is continuously increasing. Digital technologies have made possible the ‘data-
fication’ of society, affecting all sectors and everyone’s daily life. The growing impor-
tance of data for the economy and society is unquestionable and more is to come.1
But what does ‘Big Data’ mean? Though frequently used, the term has no 
agreed definition. It is usually associated with complex and large datasets on which 
special tools and methods are used to perform operations to derive meaningful 
information and support better decision making. However, the Big Data concept 
is not just about the quantity of data available, but also encompasses new ways 
of analysing existing data and generating new knowledge. In public discourse, 
the term tends to refer to the increasing ubiquity of data, the size of datasets, the 
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growth of digital data and other new or alternative data sources. From a more 
specifically technical perspective, Big Data has five essential features:
•	 Volume: the size of the data, notably the quantity generated and stored. The 
volume of data determines its value and potential insight. In order to have Big 
Data, the volume has to be massive (Terabytes and Petabytes or more).2
•	 Variety: the type and nature of the data, as well as the way of structuring it. Big 
Data may draw from text, images, audio, video (and data fusion can complete miss-
ing pieces) and can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Data can be 
obtained from many different sources, whose importance varies depending on the 
nature of the analysis: from social networks, to in-house devices, to smartphone 
GPS technology. Big Data can also have many layers and be in different formats.
•	 Velocity: the time needed to generate and process information. Data have to 
flow quickly and in as close to real-time as possible because, certainly in a busi-
ness context, high speed can deliver a competitive advantage.
•	 Veracity: data quality and reliability; it is essential to have ways of detecting 
and correcting any false, incorrect or incomplete data.
•	 Value: the analysis of reliable data adds value within and across disciplines and 
domains. Value arises from the development of actionable information.
BIG DATA AS AN ENABLER OF GROWTH BUT 
HARBINGER OF ETHICAL CHALLENGES
Big Data is increasingly recognised as an enabling factor that promises to trans-
form contemporary societies and industry. Far-reaching social changes enabled 
by datasets are increasingly becoming part of our daily life with benefits ranging 
from finance to medicine, meteorology to genomics, and biological or environ-
mental research to statistics and business.
Data will reshape the way we produce, consume and live. Benefits will be felt in every single 
aspect of our lives, ranging from more conscious energy consumption and product, material 
and food traceability, to healthier lives and better health-care …. Data is the lifeblood of eco-
nomic development: it is the basis for many new products and services, driving productivity 
and resource efficiency gains across all sectors of the economy, allowing for more personalised 
products and services and enabling better policy making and upgrading government services 
…. The availability of data is essential for training artificial intelligence systems, with products 
and services rapidly moving from pattern recognition and insight generation to more sophis-
ticated forecasting techniques and, thus, better decision making …. Moreover, making more 
data available and improving the way in which data is used is essential for tackling societal, 
climate and environment-related challenges, contributing to healthier, more prosperous and 
more sustainable societies. It will for example lead to better policies to achieve the objectives of 
the European Green Deal. (COM, 2020b)
The exploitation of Big Data can unlock significant value in areas such as deci-
sion making, customer experience, market demand predictions, product and market 
development and operational efficiency. McKinsey & Company (Bailly & Manyika, 
2013) report that the manufacturing industry stores more data than any other sector, 
with Big Data (soon to be made available through Cyber-physical Systems) expected 
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to have an important role in the fourth industrial revolution, the so-called ‘Industry 
4.0’ (Kagermann & Wahlster, 2013). This revolution has the potential to enhance pro-
ductivity by improving supply chain management (Reichert, 2014) and creating more 
efficient risk management systems based on better-informed decisions. Industry 4.0 is 
also aimed at developing intelligent products (smart products) capable of capturing 
and transmitting huge amounts of data on their production and use. These data have 
to be gathered and analysed in real-time so as to pinpoint customers’ preferences and 
shape future products. Data are also expected to fuel the massive uptake of trans-
formative practices such as the use of digital twins in manufacturing.
As mentioned, Big Data also creates value in many other domains includ-
ing health care, government administration and education. The application of 
transparency and open government policies is expected to have a positive impact 
on many aspects of citizens’ lives. This will hopefully lead to the development 
of more democratic and participative societies by improved administrative effi-
ciency, alongside perhaps more obvious uses such as better disease prevention in 
the health sector or self-monitoring in the education sector.
However, these positive effects must be offset against complex and multi-
dimensional challenges. In the health care sector, an area that could benefit enor-
mously from Big Data solutions, concerns relate, for instance, to the difficulty 
of respecting ethical boundaries relating to sensitive data where the volume of 
data may be preventing the chance to acquire the informed and specific consent 
required before each processing instance takes place. Another example, in the 
education sector, is the risk that students feel under surveillance at all times due 
to the constant collection and processing of their data, thus potentially leading to 
a reduction of their creativity and/or in higher levels of stress.
When considering Big Data, the debate needs to highlight the several potential ethi-
cal and social dimensions that arise, and explore the legal, societal and ethical issues. 
Here, there is a need to elaborate a societal and ethical framework for safeguarding 
human rights, mitigating risks and ensuring a consistent alignment between ethical 
values and behaviours. Such a framework should be able to enhance the confidence of 
citizens and businesses towards Big Data and the data economy. As acknowledged by 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), ‘big data comes with big responsi-
bility and therefore appropriate data protection safeguards must be in place’.3
Recent ethical debate has focussed on concerns about privacy, anonymisation, 
encryption, surveillance and, above all, trust. The debate is increasingly moving 
towards artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous technology, in line with tech-
nological advances. It is likely that as technology changes even further upcoming 
new types of harms may also be identified and debated.
THE CONTINUITY (OR NOT) OF DATA SCIENCE 
RESEARCH ETHICS WITH SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH ETHICS
Given data-intensive advances, a pertinent question is whether ethical princi-
ples developed in the social and behavioural sciences using core concepts such 
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as informed consent, risk, harm, ownership, etc. can be applied directly to data 
science, or whether they require augmentation with other principles specifically 
conceived for ‘human-subjects’ protection in data-intensive research activities. 
Traditionally, human-subjects’ protection applies when data can be readily asso-
ciated with the individual who bears a risk of harm in his or her everyday life. 
However, with Big Data there may be a substantial distance between everyday 
life and the uses of personal data. If  technical protections are inadequate, and 
do not prevent the re-identification of sensitive data across distinct databases, it 
is challenging to predict the types of possible harms to human subjects due to 
the multiple, complex reasons for sharing, re-using and circulating research data.
If  these difficulties are insurmountable within existing paradigms of research 
ethics, we will need to re-think the traditional paradigms. Here, a new framework 
of research ethics specific to data science could perhaps be built that could better 
move the ‘person’ to the centre of the debate. The expanding literature on privacy 
and other civil rights confirms that the ethical dimension of Big Data is becoming 
more and more central in European Union (EU) debate, and that the common 
goal is to seek concrete solutions that balance making the most of the value of 
Big Data without sacrificing fundamental human rights. Here, the Resolution 
on the fundamental rights implications of Big Data (2016/2225), adopted by the 
European Parliament, underlines that though Big Data has valuable potential for 
citizens, academia, the scientific community and the public and private sectors, it 
also entails significant risks namely with regard to the protection of fundamental 
rights, the right to privacy, data protection, non-discrimination and data security. 
The European Parliament has therefore stressed the need for regulatory compli-
ance together with strong scientific and ethical standards, and awareness-raising 
initiatives, whilst recognising the importance of greater accountability, transpar-
ency, due process and legal certainty with regard to data processing by the private 
and public sectors.
Likewise, the European Commission (EC) recognises the importance of 
safeguarding European fundamental rights and values in the data strategy and 
its implementation (COM, 2020b), whilst in the COM (2020a), built upon the 
European strategy for AI, it is underlined that in order to address the opportuni-
ties and challenges raised by AI systems and to achieve the objective of trustwor-
thy, ethical and human-centric AI, it is necessary to rely on European values and 
to ensure ‘that new technologies are at the service of all Europeans – improving 
their lives while respecting their rights’ (COM, 2020a). In the same direction, a 
coordinated European approach on the human and ethical implications of AI, as 
well as a reflection on the better use of Big Data for innovation, was announced in 
her political guidelines by the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (2019).
BIG DATA AND ITS IMPACT ON PRIVACY
Human Dignity at Risk Due to the ‘Creep Factor’ of Big Data
The use of Big Data, new surveillance tools and data gathering techniques 
represent a fundamental step for the European economy. Nevertheless, it also 
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poses significant legal problems from a data protection perspective, despite the 
renewed legal framework (General Regulation on the Protection of Personal 
Data, GDPR). In the Big Data paradigm, traditional methods and notions of 
privacy protections might be inadequate in some instances (e.g. informed consent 
approaches), whilst the data are often used and re-used in ways that were incon-
ceivable when the data were collected.
As acknowledged by the EDPS, the respect for human dignity is strictly inter-
related with the respect for the right to privacy and the right to the protection 
of personal data. That human dignity is an inviolable right of human beings is 
recognised in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. This essential right 
might be infringed by violations like objectification, which occurs when an indi-
vidual is treated as an object serving someone else’s purposes (European Data 
Protection Supervisor, Opinion 4/2015).
The impact of  Big Data technologies on privacy (and thereby human dig-
nity) ranges from group privacy and high-tech profiling, to data discrimina-
tion and automated decision making. It is even more significant if  people 
disseminate personal data in the digital world at different levels of  awareness 
throughout their main life phases. Here, people can often make themselves 
almost completely transparent for data miners who use freely accessible data 
from social networks and other data associated with an IP address for profil-
ing purposes.
This ‘creep factor’ of Big Data, due to unethical and deliberate practices, 
bypasses the intent of privacy law. Such practices are allowed by advances in 
analysing and using Big Data for revealing previously private individual data (or 
statistically close proxies for it) and often have the final aim of targeting and 
profiling customers.
Another concern in relation to Big Data is the possibility of the re-identifi-
cation of the data subject after the process of anonymisation. This might occur 
using technologies of de-anonymisation made available by the increased com-
putational power of modern day personal computers, enabling a trace back to 
the original personal data. Indeed, traditional anonymisation techniques, making 
each data entry non-identifiable by removing (or substituting) uniquely identifi-
able information, has limits: despite the substitution of users’ personal informa-
tion in a dataset, de-anonymisation can be overcome in a relatively short period 
of time through simple links between such anonymous datasets, other datasets 
(e.g. web search history) and personal data. Re-identification of the data subject 
might also derive from the powerful insights produced when multiple and specific 
datasets from different sources are joined. This might allow interested parties to 
uniquely identify specific physical persons or small groups of persons, with vary-
ing degrees of certainty.
The re-identification of data poses serious privacy concerns: once anonymised 
(or pseudo-anonymised), data may be freely processed without any prior consent 
by the data subject, before the subject is then re-identified. The situation is exac-
erbated by the lack of adequate transparency regarding the use of Big Data: this 
affects the ability of a data subject to allow disclosure of his/her information and 
to control access to these data by third parties, also impacting civil rights.
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It is advisable that organisations willing to use Big Data adopt transparent 
procedures and ensure that these procedures are easily accessible and knowable 
by the public. In this way, an ethical perspective would truly drive innovation and 
boundary setting, properly taking into account the individual’s need for privacy 
and self-determination.
New Types of Stigmatisation and Manipulation of Civil Rights in the ‘Group 
Privacy’ Landscape
The right to privacy is undergoing an evolution. Originally arising as the right to 
be let alone and to exclude others from personal facts, over the years it has shifted 
to the right to being able to control personal data, and is now moving further in 
the direction of improved control. The current direction is towards the right to 
manage identity and the analytical profile created by third parties which select the 
relevant patterns to be considered in metadata. This third phase dwells not only 
on data that enable the identification of specific physical persons, but more on 
data suitable for finding out specific patterns of behaviour such as health data, 
shopping preferences, health status, sleep cycles, mobility patterns, online con-
sumption, friendships, etc., of groups rather than of individuals. Despite the data 
being anonymous (in the sense of being de-individualised), groups are increas-
ingly becoming more transparent: indeed, stripping data from all elements per-
taining to any sort of group belongingness would result in stripping the collection 
itself  from its content and therefore its usefulness.
This information gathered from Big Data can be used in a targeted way to 
encourage people to behave or consume in a certain way. Targeted marketing is 
an example, but other initiatives (for instance, in the political landscape), based 
on the ability of Big Data to discover hidden correlations and on the inferred 
preferences and conditions of a specific group, could be adopted to encourage or 
discourage a certain behaviour, with incentives whose purposes are less transpar-
ent (including not only market intelligence, but other forms of manipulations in 
several sectors – such as in voting behaviour).
New types of stigmatisation might also arise, for instance, in relation to the 
commercial choices and other personal information of groups. Forms of dis-
crimination are likely, especially when the groups get smaller (identified by geo-
graphical, age, sex, etc. settings). In this sense, Big Data techniques might eclipse 
longstanding civil rights protections.
What increases ethics concern is the related collection and aggregation of mass 
Big Data, and the resulting structured information and quantitative analysis for 
this purpose that are not subject to the application of current data protection 
regulations. Therefore, innovative ways of re-thinking citizens’ protection are 
needed, capable of offering adequate and full protection.
The ‘Sharing the Wealth’ Model and the ‘Personal Data Store’ Approach for 
Balancing Big Data Exploitation and Data Protection
As pointed out by the EU Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA), it is necessary to overcome the conceptual conflict between privacy 
78 MARINA DA BORMIDA
and Big Data and between privacy and innovation. The need is to shift ‘… the 
discussion from “big data versus privacy” to “big data with privacy”’, and to 
recognise the privacy and data protection principles as ‘an essential value of big 
data, not only for the benefit of the individuals, but also for the very prosperity 
of big data analytics’ (ENISA, 2015, p. 5). There is no dichotomy between ethics 
and innovation if  feasible balancing solutions are figured out and implemented. 
The respect for citizens’ privacy and dignity and the exploitation of Big Data’s 
potential can fruitfully coexist and prosper together, balancing the fundamen-
tal human values (privacy, confidentiality, transparency, identity, free choice and 
others) with the compelling uses of Big Data for economic gains. This is aligned 
with EDPS’s recent opinion (European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 
3/2020 on the European strategy for data) underlining that data strategy’s objec-
tives could encompass ‘to prove the viability and sustainability of an alternative 
data economy model – open, fair and democratic’ where, in contrast with the cur-
rent predominant business model,
characterised by unprecedented concentration of data in a handful of powerful players, as well 
as pervasive tracking, the European data space should serve as an example of transparency, 
effective accountability and proper balance between the interests of the individual data subjects 
and the shared interest of the society as a whole.
The key question is how to ensure this coexistence and the underlying bal-
ance is achieved. The answer is not simple and relies on multiple dimensions. 
From a technological perspective, Privacy by Design and Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs) come into play.4
As stated by the EU Regulation 2016/679, the data protection principles 
should be taken into consideration at a very early stage, as well as privacy meas-
ures and PETs should be identified in conjunction with the determination of the 
means for processing and deployed at the time of the processing itself. ENISA 
proposed an array of privacy by design strategies, ranging from data minimisa-
tion and separate processing of personal data, to hiding personal data and their 
interrelation, opting for the highest level of aggregation. The PETs to imple-
ment these strategies are already applied in the Big Data industry: they rely on 
anonymisation, encryption, transparency and access, security and accountabil-
ity control, consent ownership and control mechanisms. Even so, an adequate 
investment in this sector is required, as confirmed by the small number of pat-
ents for PETs compared to those granted for data analytics technologies. Efforts 
need to be directed towards strengthening data subject control thereby bringing 
transparency and trust in the online environment. In fact, trust has emerged as a 
complex topic within the contemporary Big Data landscape. At the same time, 
it has become a key factor for economic development and for the adoption of 
new services, such as public e-government services, as well as for users’ accept-
ance to provide personal data. In some instances, such as in the medical field, 
the choice not to provide a full disclosure of the requested information might 
impact the individual’s wellbeing or health (besides indirectly hindering progress 
in research), given that these are personal data and the trust relationship with the 
data collector (e.g. the staff  of a hospital) is functional to the individual’s wellbe-
ing and/health.
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The ‘sharing the wealth’ strategy proposed by Tene and Polonetsky (2013) 
for addressing Big Data challenges is based on the idea of providing individu-
als access to their data in a usable format and, above all, allowing them to take 
advantage of solutions capable of analysing their own data and drawing useful 
conclusions from it. The underlying vision is to share the wealth individuals’ data 
helps to create with individuals themselves, letting them make use of and benefit 
from their own personal data. This approach is also aligned with the vision of the 
Big Data Value Association (BDVA Position Paper, 2019), which outlines oppor-
tunities of data economy arising over the next decade for the industry (business), 
the private users (citizens as customers), the research and academic commu-
nity (science) and local, national and European government and public bodies 
(government).
Other authors (Rubinstein, 2013) underline the potentialities of a new busi-
ness model based on the personal data store or personal data space (PDS). Such 
a business model shifts data acquisition and control to a user-centric paradigm, 
based on better control of data and joint benefits from its use. This solution 
(and the necessary implementing technology), if  developed, might enable users’ 
empowerment and full control over their personal data. In fact, it would permit 
users to gather, store, update, correct, analyse and/or share personal data, as well 
as having the ability to grant and withdraw consent to third parties for access to 
data. In this way, it would also work towards more accountable companies, where 
the commitment in personal data protection might become an economic asset for 
digital players.
PDS are also aligned with the importance of data portability, strongly advo-
cated by the EDPS in view of guaranteeing people the right to access, control and 
correct their personal data, whilst enhancing their awareness. Data portability 
also nurtures the suggested approach of allowing people to share the benefits of 
data and can foster the development of a more competitive market environment, 
where the data protection policy is transformed into a strategical economic asset, 
thus triggering a virtuous circle. Companies would be encouraged to invest to find 
and implement the best ways to guarantee the privacy of their customers: indeed, 
data portability allows customers to switch providers more easily, also by taking 
into account the provider more committed to respecting personal data and to 
investing in privacy-friendly technical measures and internal procedures.
The ‘sharing the wealth’ paradigm and the potentialities of a new ethically 
driven business model relying on personal data are at the basis of the European 
Project DataVaults – ‘Persistent Personal DataVaults Empowering a Secure and 
Privacy Preserving Data Storage, Analysis, Sharing and Monetisation Platform’ 
(Grant Agreement no. 871755), funded under the H2020 Programme.5 This pro-
ject, currently under development, is aimed at setting, sustaining and mobilis-
ing an ever-growing ecosystem for personal data and insights sharing, capable of 
enhancing the collaboration between stakeholders (data owners and data seek-
ers). Its value-driven tools and methods for addressing concerns about privacy, 
data protection, security and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) ownership will 
enable the ethically sound sharing both of personal data and proprietary/com-
mercial/industrial data, following strict and fair mechanism for defining how to 
generate, capture, release and cash out value for the benefit of all the stakeholders 
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involved, as well as securing value flow based on smart contract, moving towards 
a win–win data sharing ecosystem.
The European Privacy Association even proposes to see data protection 
for digital companies not as mere legal compliance obligations, but as part of 
a broader corporate social responsibility) and socially responsible investments 
in the Big Data industry. It is recommended to valorise them as assets within 
renewed business models, able to help companies responsibly achieve their eco-
nomic targets.
From a wider perspective, as also underlined by BDVA (2020) in particular 
in relation to the Smart Manufacturing environment, the soft law in the form 
of codes of conduct could bring a set of advantages at ecosystem level in each 
domain. In fact, such sources are expected to offer guidance and to address in 
meaningful, flexible and practical ways the immediate issues and ethical chal-
lenges of Big Data and AI innovations in each sector, going beyond current gaps 
in the legal system: they can operate as a rulebook, providing more granular ethi-
cal guidance as regards problems and concerns, resulting in an increase of confi-
dence and legal certainty of individuals which also encompass trust building and 
consolidation.
In parallel, this calls for promoting the acquisition of skills on privacy as a 
value and right, on ethical issues of behaviour profiling, ownership of personal 
contents, virtual identity-related risks and digital reputation control, as well as on 
other topics related to Big Data advancements. On this purpose, Bachelor’s and 
Master’s degree programmes in Data Science, Informatics, Computer Science, 
Artificial Intelligence and related subjects could be adequately integrated in order 
to cover these themes. In this way, human resources in Big Data businesses could 
include ad hoc professional figures.
At the same time, in order to promote the commitment of the business world, 
it is advisable that the efforts of those companies which invest in ethical relation-
ships with customers are recognised by governments and properly communicated 
by the companies themselves to their customer base. The certification approach 
should also be explored, as inspired by the Ethics Certification Program for 
Autonomous and Intelligent Systems launched by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers for AIS6 products, services and systems.
This would let them further benefit in terms of improved reputation and let 
them increase the trust of customers towards their products and services. At 
the same time, information on business ethics violations occurring through the 
improper use of Big Data analytics should be transparent and not kept opaque 
to consumers.
A Critical Perspective on the ‘Notice and Consent’ Model and on the Role of 
Transparency in the Evolving World of Big Data Analytics
Emerging commentators argue that the data protection principles, as embodied 
in national and EU law, are no longer adequate to deal with the Big Data world: 
in particular, they criticise the role of transparency in the evolving world of Big 
Data analytics, assuming that it no longer makes sense considering the complex 
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and opaque nature of algorithms. They also debate the actual suitability of the 
so-called ‘notice and consent’ model, on the grounds of consumers’ lack of time, 
willingness or ability to read long privacy notices.
Others prefer to emphasise accountability, as opposed to transparency for 
answering Big Data ethics challenges, being focussed on mechanisms more 
aligned with the nature of Big Data (such as assessing the technical design of 
algorithms and auditability). GDPR itself  highlights, besides the role of trans-
parency, the growing importance of accountability.
Instead of denying the role of transparency in the Big Data context, others sug-
gest that it is not possible to offer a wholesale replacement for transparency and 
propose a more ‘layered’ approach to it (for instance, as regards privacy notices 
to individuals and also the information detail), in conjunction with a greater level 
of detail and access being given to auditors and accredited certification bodies.
On the contrary, transparency itself  might be considered as a requirement 
needed for accountability and seems unavoidable in the context of respect for 
human dignity. Traditional notice and consent models might be rather insufficient 
and obsolete in view of the effective exercise of control and in order to avoid a sit-
uation where individuals feel powerless in relation to their data. Nevertheless, to 
overcome this weakness, an alternative, more challenging path is to make consent 
more granular and capable of covering all the different processing (and related) 
purposes and the re-use of personal data. This effort should be combined with 
increased citizens’ awareness and a higher participation level, as well as with effec-
tive solutions to guarantee the so-called right to be forgotten.
In the same user-centric approach, based on control and joint benefits and 
promoted by EC and European-wide initiatives,7 a number of views foster new 
approaches premised on consumer empowerment in the data-driven business 
world. These approaches strongly aligned with the transparency and accountabil-
ity requirements, ask for proper internal policies and control systems, focussed on 
pragmatic, smart and dynamic solutions and able to prevent the risk of compa-
nies becoming stuck in bureaucracy.
DISCRIMINATION, SOCIAL COOLING, BIG DATA DIVIDE 
AND SOCIAL SORTING
A possible side effect of datafication is the potential risk of discrimination of data 
mining technologies in several aspects of daily life, such as employment and credit 
scoring (Favaretto, De Clercq, & Elger, 2019). It ranges from discriminatory prac-
tices based on profiling and related privacy concerns (e.g. racial profiling enabled 
by Big Data platforms in subtle ways by targeting characteristics like home address 
and misleading vulnerable less-educated groups with scams of harmful offers),8 to the 
impact of Big Data in the context of the daily operation of organisations and public 
administrations (e.g. within human resources offices). In the latter context, crucial 
decisions, like those about employment, might rely on the use of Big Data practices 
which might bring the risk of unfair treatment through discrimination based on gen-
der, race, disability, national origin, sexual orientation and so on.
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Social Cooling as a Side Effect of Big Data
We live in a society where everything can be given a score and critical life chang-
ing opportunities are increasingly determined by such scoring systems, often 
obtained through secret predictive algorithms applied to data to determine which 
individuals or which social group has value. It is therefore essential to consider 
human values as oversight in the design and implementation of these systems 
and, at the same time, to guarantee that the policies and practices using data 
and scoring machines to make decisions are realised in a legal and ethical man-
ner (including avoiding automated decision-making practices not compliant with 
regulatory boundaries set forth by art. 22 GDPR). Fair and accurate scoring sys-
tems have to be ensured, whilst also avoiding the risk that data might be biased to 
arbitrarily assign individuals to a stigmatising group. Such an assignment might 
potentially allow that decisions relevant for them are not fair and, in the end, 
might negatively affect their concrete opportunities.
Any Big Data system has to ensure that, if  existing, automated decision mak-
ing, especially in areas such as employment, health care, education and financial 
lending, operates fairly for all communities, and safeguards the interests of those 
who are disadvantaged. The use of Big Data, in other words, should not result 
in infringements of the fundamental rights of individuals, neither in differential 
treatment or indirect discrimination against groups of people, for instance, as 
regards the fairness and equality of opportunities for access to services.
As indicated by the European Parliament, all measures possible need to be 
taken to minimise algorithmic discrimination and bias and to develop a com-
mon ethical framework for the transparent processing of personal data and auto-
mated decision making. This common framework should guide data usage and 
the ongoing enforcement of EU law. From this perspective, it is necessary that 
the use of algorithms to provide services – useful for identifying patterns in data – 
rely on a comprehensive understanding of the context in which they are expected 
to function and are capable of picking up what matters. It is also essential to 
establish oversight activities and human intervention in automated systems as 
well, besides considering that Big Data needs to be coupled with room for politics 
and with mechanisms to hold power to account. In this way, unintended negative 
societal consequences of possible errors introduced by algorithms, especially in 
terms of the risk of systematic discrimination across society in the provision of 
services, might be prevented or at least minimised.
This will also limit the widening of one of the chilling effects of Big Data 
related to discrimination, the so-called social cooling. Social cooling could limit 
people’s desire to take risks or exercise free speech, which, over the long term, 
could ‘cool down’ society.9 The term describes the long-term negative side effects 
in terms, for instance, of self-censorship, risk-aversion and exercise of free speech, 
of living in a reputation economy where Big Data practices that lack an ethical 
dimension are increasingly apparent and intrusive.
Social cooling is due to people’s emerging perception that their data, including 
the data reflecting their weaknesses, is turned into thousands of different scores 
and that their resulting ‘digital reputation’ could limit their opportunities. As a 
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consequence, they feel pressure to conform to a bureaucratic average, start to 
apply self-censorship and tend to change their behaviour to achieve better scores. 
This might result, especially if  public awareness remains very low, in increased 
social rigidity, limiting people’s ability and willingness to protest injustice and, in 
the end, in a subtle form of socio-political control. The related societal question is 
whether this trend will have an impact on the human ability to evolve as a society, 
where minority views are still able to flourish.
The social cooling effect emphasises another dimension of a mature and 
nuanced perception of data and privacy: its ability to protect the right to be 
imperfect, in other words the right to be human.
Big Data Divide
The expression Big Data Divide has a two-fold meaning. First, it refers to the 
difficulty in accessing services delivered through the use of the Internet and other 
new technologies and to the complexity in understanding how these technologies 
and related services work. This kind of digital divide might have consequences, 
for instance, with regard to online job hunting: senior citizens, who are unfamil-
iar with this new way of job hunting, can be harmed in terms of lost job oppor-
tunities. The same may happen with regard to other tools such as online dating 
services for finding a new partner or for social interactions. The consequences 
might be frustration and social withdrawal. Similarly, inclusion concerns are 
related to the possible definition of new policies based on a data-driven approach 
(e.g. data collected via sensors, social media, etc.); there is the concrete possibility 
that some individuals or portions of a society might not be considered. The risk is 
that the new policy will only take into account the needs of people having access 
to the given technological means. Secondly, the notion of a ‘Big Data divide’ 
refers to the asymmetric relationship between those ‘who collect, store, and mine 
large quantities of data, and those whom data collection targets’ (Andrejevic, 
2014). The Big Data divide is perceived as potentially able to exacerbate power 
imbalances in the digital era and increase the individual’s sense of powerlessness 
in relation to emerging forms of data collection and data mining.
Furthermore, it has been argued that Big Data and data mining emphasise 
correlation and prediction and call to mind the emergent Big Data-driven forms 
of social sorting (and related risk of discrimination). This remark refers to the 
ability – enabled by Big Data and data mining – of discerning unexpected, unan-
ticipated correlations and of generating patterns of actionable information. Such 
ability provides powerful insights for decision making and prediction purposes, 
unavailable to those without access to such data, processing power and findings: 
those with access are advantageously positioned compared to those without it.
Predictive analytics for data-driven decision making and social sorting can 
also lead to ‘predictive policing’ (Meijer & Wessels, 2019), where extra surveil-
lance is set for certain individuals, groups or streets if  it is more likely that a crime 
can be committed. Though systematic empirical research, capable of generating 
an evidence base on the benefits and drawbacks of this practice, seems to be still 
missing, the predictive policy encompasses a political challenge: if  it is difficult to 
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ignore these kinds of findings and doing nothing to prevent the occurrence of the 
crime, at the same time the risk of stigmatisation of such individuals or groups has 
to be tackled. A balance could be sought considering, for instance, the interven-
tion threshold and correlating the type of intervention with the likelihood of crime 
anticipated by the algorithms, being careful to exclude incidental co-occurrences.
Big Data from the Public Sector Perspective
Big Data for Public Use 
Another area to investigate is how Big Data might be used for public good and 
with public support.
Both in the ‘European Strategy for Data’ (COM, 2020b) and in the recent 
Proposal for a Regulation on European Data Governance (‘Data Governance 
Act’) which is the first of a set of measures announced in the strategy, data altru-
ism is facilitated, meaning ‘data voluntarily made available by individuals or com-
panies for the common good’ (COM, 2020c). The increasing amounts of data in 
society might change the type of evidence that is available for policy makers and, 
at the same time, policy makers can linger over computer models and predictive 
analytics as a basis for their decisions. The chance to draw meaningful insights 
(relevant for policy elaboration purposes) from data would require a comprehen-
sive data infrastructure, where data sources are well organised and can be accessed 
by authorised people for the appropriate use. The discussion mainly explores the 
opportunities in local services in view of accompanying local decisions by evi-
dence for securing investment from central budget holders. The surveys ranged 
from identifying what approaches work better for the public at a lower cost to 
efficaciously demonstrate and show where resources are lacking and investment 
needed. However, the possible use of data analysis in many local authorities is 
being confronted by more traditional approaches, as well as with civil servants’ 
diffidence in exploiting the potentialities of cutting-edge technologies. Thereby 
an organisational and cultural change needs to be supported, through awareness 
campaigns and other initiatives.
An interesting example of how Big Data can be exploited for the common 
good and public interest in conjunction with private business’ priorities is the 
solution developed in the project AEGIS – ‘Advanced Big Data Value Chain for 
Public Safety and Personal Security’ (Grant Agreement no. 732189), funded by 
the European Commission in the H2020 Programme. The project brought
together the data, the network and the technologies to create a curated, semantically enhanced, 
interlinked and multilingual repository for public and personal safety-related Big Data. It 
delivers a data-driven innovation that expands over multiple business sectors and takes into 
consideration structured, unstructured and multilingual datasets, rejuvenates existing models 
and facilitates organisations in the Public Safety and Personal Security linked sectors to pro-
vide better & personalised services to their users.10
The services enabled by this technology aim to generate value from Big Data 
and renovate the Public Safety and Personal Security sector, positively influenc-
ing the welfare and protection of the general public. Project achievements aim to 
have positive impacts in terms of economic growth and enhanced public security, 
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as well as for individuals, by improving safety and wellbeing through prevention 
and protection from dangers affecting safety (such as accidents or disasters).
Dataveillance, Big Data Governance and Legislation 
Big Data poses multiple strategic challenges for governance and legislation, with 
the final aim of minimising harm and maximising benefit from the use of data. 
Such challenges require consideration of risks and risk management.
The first issue is related to the practice of the so-called ‘dataveillance’, where 
the use of data improves surveillance and security. It refers to the continuous 
monitoring and collecting of users’ online data (data resulting from email, credit 
card transactions, GPS coordinates, social networks, etc.), including communi-
cation and other actions across various platforms and digital media, as well as 
metadata. This kind of surveillance is partially unknown and happens discreetly. 
Dataveillance can be individual dataveillance (concerning the individual’s per-
sonal data), mass dataveillance (concerning data on groups of people) and facili-
tative mechanisms (without either considering the individual as part of a group, 
or targeting any specific group).
In the public perception, the idea that one’s position and activity might be in some 
way tracked at most times has become an ordinary fact of life, in conjunction with 
an increased perception of safety: almost everyone is aware of the ubiquitous use 
of CCTV11 circuits, the GPS12 positioning capabilities inside mobile devices, the use 
of credit cards and ATM13 cards and other forms of tracking. On the contrary, this 
active surveillance might also have an impact on citizens’ liberties and might be used 
by governments (and businesses too) for unethical purposes.
Ethical concerns revolve around individual rights and liberties, as well as on 
the ‘data trust deficit’, whereby citizens have lower levels of trust in institutions to 
use their data appropriately.
Other important tools for accountability to the public should be implemented, in 
order to avoid the public perception that there are no mechanisms for accountability 
outside of public outcry. This implies tackling the challenge for Big Data govern-
ance. For instance, it would be useful if there were a formulation and upholding of an 
authoritative ethical framework at the national or international level, drawing upon a 
wide range of knowledge, skills and interests across the public, private and academic 
sectors, and confirmed by a wide public consultation.
Alongside this ethical framework an update of the current legislative system 
would be opportune for minimising harm and maximising benefit from the use of 
data: in fact, the regulation is developing at a much slower pace than the Big Data 
technology and its applications. This results in the business community’s respon-
sibility to decide how to bridle the insights offered by data from the multiple data 
sources and devices, according to their respective core ethical values.
DATA OWNERSHIP
Another dimension of the debate on Big Data also revolves around data ownership, 
which might be considered as a sort of IPR issue separate from technology IPR.
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The latter refers to the procedures and technologies used to acquire, process, 
curate, analyse and use the data. Big Data technology IPRs are mostly covered 
by the general considerations applicable for software and hardware IPRs and the 
related business processes, though considered in the Big Data domain. In this 
view, special IPR approaches are not needed, being covered by existing models 
and approaches existing for the assertion, assignment and enforcement of copy-
right, design rights, trademarks and patents for IT technology in general.
On the contrary, data ownership refers to the IP related to the substantive data 
itself, including both raw data and derived data. The main IP rights in relation to 
data are database rights, copyright and confidentiality: due to the fact that data-
base rights and copyright protect expression and form rather than the substance 
of information, the best form of IP protection for data is often considered the one 
offered by the provisions safeguarding the confidentiality of information, being 
capable of protecting the substance of data that is not generally publicly known.
IP challenges in the Big Data domain are different from existing approaches 
and need special care, especially as regards protection, security and liability, 
besides data ownership. At the same time, addressing the challenges raised by 
IP issues is essential, considering the expected high incomes due to increased Big 
Data innovation and technology diffusion.
Data ownership and the rights to use data might be covered by copyright and 
related contracts which are valid when collecting the data, often including also 
confidentiality clauses. In case of further processing of big datasets, it has to be 
explored when and how this creates new ownership: in fact, the acquisition of 
data, its curation and combination with other datasets, as well as possible analysis 
of them and resulting insights, creates new rights to the resulting data, which need 
be asserted and enforced.
Regardless of the considerations stemming from the regulatory perspective, 
notably Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, the main ethical 
dilemma concerns how to consider user’s data. In other words, the question is to 
whom these data belong: still to the user, or to the company that conducted the 
analyses, or the company that gathered the original data?14
All these issues should not only be specifically addressed by national and 
European legislation on IPR in relation to data, which is of uncertain scope at 
the moment, but also investigated by the data ethics debate: best practices for col-
lection, recommendations and guidelines would be very useful. Currently, a key 
role for addressing this issues is played by contract provisions.
In view of ensuring the fair attribution of value represented in data creation, 
but, at the same time, considering the multiple, competing interests at stake in 
B2B15 data sharing, balancing operations should be conducted between the data 
producers’ interest to remain in control of their data and to retain their rights 
as the original owners, the public interest in avoiding data monopolies (due to 
the fact that data still fuel innovation, creativity and research) and data subjects’ 
interest in their personal information collected by a company.
Regarding the first of these interests and the related ownership claims, the 
legal framework is still uncertain and fragmented. The situation is further com-
plicated by the difficulty of applying legal categories: the data are an intangible 
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good difficult to define and the same legal concept of data ownership is not clearly 
defined. Many questions arise, such as: does existing EU law provide sufficient 
protection for data? If  not, what more is needed? Are data capable of ownership 
(sui generis right or copyright law)? Is there a legal basis for claims of ownership 
of data? Is there the need of enactment of exclusive rights in data? Or is it better 
to explore alternatives?
Regarding alternatives, an interesting option is to provide the factual exclusiv-
ity of data through flexible and pragmatic solutions able to provide certainty and 
predictability, by combining agile contracting with enabling technological tools. 
As for the contractual layer of this solution, it consists of ad hoc and on-the-fly 
B2B data exchange contracts, provided under the well-defined data sovereignty 
principle to safeguard data producers’ control over data generated. For this pur-
pose, access and usage policies or protocols need to be implemented. At the same 
time, it is necessary to establish a trade-off  with other interests, like individual 
‘interest’ over personal data, in this case. On the contrary, the technological layer 
provides enabling technologies to implement and enforce the terms and conditions 
set forth by the data sharing agreements. Technologies to be explored include, for 
instance, sticky policies, Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technologies and smart 
contract, Digital Rights Management technologies and APIs.16
This kind of solution is well-developed by the International Data Space 
Association (IDSA),17 consisting of more than one hundred companies and institu-
tions from various industries and of different sizes from 20 countries collaborating 
to design and develop a trustworthy architecture for the data economy. Its vision and 
reference architecture rotate around the concept of ‘data sovereignty’, defined as ‘a 
natural person’s or corporate entity’s capability of being entirely self-determined with 
regard to its data’ (IDSA, 2019). Data sovereignty, which is materialised in ‘terms and 
conditions’ (such as time to live, forwarding rights, pricing information, etc.) linked 
to data before it is exchanged and shared. Such terms and conditions are supported 
and enforced through the technical infrastructure, including tools for the secure and 
trusted authorisation, authentication and data exchange (such as blockchain, smart 
contracts, identity management, point-to-point encryption, etc.) to be customised to 
the needs of individual participants.
In line with the joint benefit approach and with the related user-centric business 
model based on PDS, a similar path could be further extended also for strength-
ening the contract provisions underpinning high-value personal data ecosystems 
leaving the process under the individuals’ control, like in the DataVaults Project. 
This is also the goal of the new Smart Cities Marketplace Initiative within the 
Citizen Focus Action Cluster: ‘Citizen Control of Personal Data’,18 launched on 
27 January 2021. Its intention is
to contribute to speeding up the adoption, at scale, of common open urban data platforms, and 
ensure that 300 million European citizens are served by cities with competent urban data plat-
forms, by 2025. The potential for citizen’s personal data to contribute to data ecosystems will be 
significantly enhanced by introducing secure, ethical and legal access to this highly coveted and 
valuable personal data, incorporating citizen-generated data as ‘city data’.
Novel contract rights, including IPR provisions, might be further spread in 
the data-driven economy, in view of confirming users’ control over their data, 
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as well as their empowerment, thereby contributing to going beyond possible 
existing differences between national laws and gaps in the European legislation.
Nevertheless, as in the past, when the IPR development has followed the com-
mercialising of innovation, the growth of the Big Data market is likely to generate 
also the further renewal of the IPRs’ regulatory framework underpinning it and 
to pave the way to set a coherent system at European level.
CONCLUSIONS
The rise of Big Data and the underlying ability to capture and analyse datasets 
from highly diversified contexts and generate novel, unanticipated knowledge, 
as well as AI developments relying on data, are capable of producing economic 
growth and bringing relevant benefits, both at the social and the individual level. 
This rapidly sprawling phenomenon is expected to have significant influence on 
governance, policing, economics, security, science, education, health care and 
much more.
The collection of Big Data and inferences based on them are sources enabling 
both economic growth and generation of value, with the potential to bring fur-
ther improvement to everyday life in the near future. The examples span from 
road safety, to health services, agriculture, retail, education and climate change 
mitigation. Possible improvements rely on the direct use and collection of Big 
Data or on inferences or ‘nowcasting’ based on them: new knowledge and insights 
are generated, as well as real-time reports and analyses with alerting purposes can 
be produced.
At the same time, Big Data practices and techniques put at stake several ethi-
cal, social and policy challenges, threats and potential hurdles. They are often 
interrelated and range from concerns related to data ownership to the ‘datafica-
tion’ of society, to privacy dilemmas and the potential trade-off  between privacy 
and data analytics progress, social cooling, dataveillance, discriminatory practices 
and the emerging Big Data divide. Such challenges, threats and potential hur-
dles also include, for instance, the data-driven business ethics violations, the ‘data 
trust deficit’, the concerns due to the use of Big Data in the public sector and the 
desirable role of the government towards the fair policy development and the 
provision of enhanced public services.
These and similar items need greater ethics engagement and reflection, in the 
framework of an interdependent ecosystem, composed of different and comple-
mentary competences (primarily legislators, data-driven businesses, IT developers 
and data scientists, civil society organisations and academia) in order to come up 
with a Big Data market fully respectful of human dignity and citizens’ rights and 
susceptible of further development in an ethically acceptable way.
The fruitful development of this ecosystem might also require the adjustment 
of familiar conceptual models and archetypes of research ethics, to better align 
them with the epistemic conditions of Big Data and the data analytics work. The 
envisioned alignment should reflect also on the shift towards algorithmic knowl-
edge production to identify and address eventual mismatches between the Big 
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Data research and the extant research ethics regimes. In parallel, inquiry should 
be moved away from considering only traditional categories of harm (e.g. physi-
cal pain and psychological distress) to cover other types and forms (e.g. effects of 
the perennial surveillance on human behaviour and dignity and group discrimi-
nation). Likewise, the concept of the human subject and related foundational 
assumptions should be revisited to include not only individuals, but also distrib-
uted groupings or classifications.
The need to productively re-think some concepts of research ethics and 
regulations, due to the development of large-scale data analytics, represents an 
opportunity to reaffirm basic principles and values of human dignity, respect, 
transparency, accountability and justice. The final aim is to contribute to shap-
ing the future trajectory of the Big Data revolution, with its interplay with AI 
breakthroughs, in a way that is truly responsive to foundational ethical principles.
NOTES
1. COM (2020b). This communication is part of a wider package of strategic docu-
ments, including the COM (2020a), the Communication on Shaping Europe’s digital future.
2. The volume of data produced is growing quickly, from 33 zettabytes in 2018 to an 
expected 175 zettabytes in 2025 in the world (IDC, 2018).
3. European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 3/2020 on the European strategy for 
data. In the same document, the EDPS applauds the EC’s commitment to safeguard that 
European fundamental rights and values, underpinning all aspects of the data strategy and 
its implementation.
4. A high-value description and classification of the PETs and their role was provided by 
the e-SIDES project (https://e-sides.eu/e-sides-project) deliverables. In the e-SIDES Deliv-
erable D3.2 and in the related White Paper, the overview of existing PETs is accompanied 
by an assessment methodology of them for facing legal and ethical implications based on 
interviews and desk-research: it provides, on the one hand, the technology-specific assess-
ment of selected classes of PETs, and, on the other hand, a more general assessment of 
such technologies.
5. In particular within the call H2020-ICT-2019-2, topic ICT-13-2018-2019 ‘Supporting 
the emergence of data markets and the data economy’. Further information on DataVaults 
can be retrieved at the following link: https://www.datavaults.eu/.
6. Autonomous and Intelligent Systems.
7. See, for instance, EC’s COM (2019) and EFFRA (2013, 2020).
8. An interesting reading on the risk of racial profiling which might be generated by new 
technological tools and methods, such as Big Data, automated decision making and AI is 
the ‘General recommendation No. 36 (2020) on preventing and combating racial profiling 
by law enforcement officials’ released by the United Nations’ Committee on the Elimina-




12. Global Positioning System.
13. Automated Teller Machine.
14. An interesting reading on this topic is AA.VV (2016).
15. Business to Business
16. Application Programming Interfaces.
17. https://www.internationaldataspaces.org/
18. https://smart-cities-marketplace.ec.europa.eu/news/new-initiative-citizen-control-
personal-data-within-citizen-focus-action-cluster. This initiative is committed to seek to 
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remove existing constrains and helping to create the conditions and relationships whereby 
‘the citizen will be willing to share personal data with a city and with other actors in the 
data economy. The ambition behind this new initiative is to give the smart cities movement 
a boost by providing cities with access to a rich personal data pool. This pool of data, in 
turn, would stimulate further activity within the data economy, accelerate the take-up of 
urban data platforms and contribute to the improvement of mobility, health, energy effi-
ciency and better governance among other’.
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CHAPTER 7
HEALTH DATA, PUBLIC INTEREST, 
AND SURVEILLANCE FOR NON-
HEALTH-RELATED PURPOSES
Mark Taylor and Richard Kirkham
ABSTRACT
A policy of surveillance which interferes with the fundamental right to a private 
life requires credible justification and a supportive evidence base. The authority 
for such interference should be clearly detailed in law, overseen by a transpar-
ent process and not left to the vagaries of administrative discretion. If a state 
surveils those it governs and claims the interference to be in the public interest, 
then the evidence base on which that claim stands and the operative concep-
tion of public interest should be subject to critical examination. Unfortunately, 
there is an inconsistency in the regulatory burden associated with access to 
confidential patient information for non-health-related surveillance purposes 
and access for health-related surveillance or research purposes. This inconsist-
ency represents a systemic weakness to inform or challenge an evidence-based 
policy of non-health-related surveillance. This inconsistency is unjustified and 
undermines the qualities recognised to be necessary to maintain a trustwor-
thy confidential public health service. Taking the withdrawn Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) between NHS Digital and the Home Office as a 
worked example, this chapter demonstrates how the capacity of the law to con-
strain the arbitrary or unwarranted exercise of power through judicial review 
is not sufficient to level the playing field. The authors recommend ‘levelling 
up’ in procedural oversight, and adopting independent mechanisms equivalent 
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to those adopted for establishing the operative conceptions of public interest 
in the context of health research to non-health-related surveillance purposes.
Keywords: Public interest; confidentiality; independent oversight; health-
related surveillance; data protection; privacy
INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers the issue of data sharing in the context of health. 
Notwithstanding the highly sensitive interests involved, health data have long 
been known to be of public value for the secondary purposes of medical research 
and health-related surveillance and can have non-health-related uses as well. This 
variable use of health data has raised the prospect of an equivalent variability in 
the oversight of data sharing, creating a risk that, in the long-term, public trust 
in the security of health data might be undermined. This chapter evidences the 
problem and outlines a solution.
To illustrate the risks, we explore the example of the now withdrawn 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the United Kingdom (UK) between 
NHS Digital and the Home Office1 to supply the latter with information obtained 
by the health service. One of the purposes of the data sharing was to enable the 
Home Office to better locate those suspected of an immigration offence. Here a 
decision on the ‘public interest’ in disclosure was taken without exposure to the 
kind of open debate that is typically associated with governance models applied 
before data sharing for other purposes. For example, those seeking access to con-
fidential patient information for the purposes of health research, notwithstand-
ing its public value, must normally have a patient’s explicit consent or navigate 
an approvals process with more independent scrutiny and challenge than was 
applied to the Home Office’s non-health-related surveillance purposes. Health-
related surveillance may not always be subject to the same intensity of case-by-
case review, and here data disclosure under recent Coronavirus notices may be a 
good example of reduced review standards being applied. Nevertheless, health-
related surveillance in the context of health research is typically characterised by 
a balance being struck between competing public interests (e.g., between confi-
dentiality and public health protection) that has been relatively precisely articu-
lated in legislation following parliamentary debate and informed by independent 
advice. The deficit in process for non-health-related surveillance increases the risk 
that a decision on the public interest in disclosure will have shallow roots, run 
no deeper than institutional and short-term political interest, and will pay insuf-
ficient regard for the interests of all those affected.
We suggest that this situation is problematic for a variety of reasons and 
provide a recommendation for the way forward. The main concern is that the 
mischief that the law is designed to address is the need to secure the trust of 
users of health services, by ensuring that health data is only released, lacking an 
individual’s consent, according to an applied standard of the public interest. To 
make this argument, we adopt the concept of social legitimacy and consider the 
Health Data, Public Interest, and Surveillance 95
extent to which current governance arrangements ensure that those subject to 
governance have reasons to accept the conceptions of public interest applied by 
decision-makers.
To address the concerns raised in this chapter, we acknowledge that the law in 
the UK does provide some constraints on arbitrary or unwarranted exercise of 
power. However, whilst there is some capacity in judicial remedies, its limitations 
in this context are also laid bare. Given the problems, this chapter concludes with 
the recommendation that it is necessary to level the playing field between those 
who would access confidential patient information for the purposes of health sur-
veillance, those who would access the same data for the purposes of non-health-
related surveillance, and those who would access it for the purposes of carrying 
out research to determine the effectiveness and effects of either type of policy. 
If  social legitimacy in the governance framework is to be upheld, then we would 
recommend levelling up rather than levelling down. At the heart of the solution 
needs to be either an extension of parliamentary scrutiny or the expansion of the 
remit of independent advice on patient data.
This chapter takes the following approach. We begin by establishing the cur-
rent historical and legal basis for the control of health data in the UK. This is 
followed by a defence of an important normative purpose of legislation in this 
context and an argument that this is being undermined by practices exemplified 
by the, now withdrawn, MoU between NHS Digital and the Home Office. Our 
conclusion is that the withdrawn MoU illustrates the risk of poor legal design, 
which currently insufficiently allows for oversight and in this instance was reliant 
on the ad hoc intervention of a Parliamentary select committee to block poten-
tially unlawful practice. A preferable approach which can pre-empt problems 
before they arise is to strengthen, in the management of patient data, either pro-
spective parliamentary scrutiny or the role of independent advice, as is already 
the case for health-related research without explicit patient consent.
THE UK LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF  
HEALTH DATA
Background and Legal Context
The importance of being able to use health data for health surveillance purposes 
is longstanding. For instance, when in 1854 John Snow plotted cases of cholera 
on a map of Soho in London, his work was dependent on data he had gathered 
from affected households. For health surveillance to maximise its potential to 
achieve public health benefits through learning and research, it has long been 
understood that access to confidential health information is often required. For 
centuries, this practice was not covered by statute, and instead in law was only 
dealt with tangentially by the common law duty of confidence. This position 
became politically untenable around the turn of the millennium, when following 
a series of scandals, such as Alder Hey (Redfern, Keeling, & Powell, 2001), there 
was a sustained political reaction to using identifiable health data for purposes 
beyond individual care without individual consent. The subsequent momentum 
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towards requiring the explicit consent of a patient for the use of confidential 
patient information for secondary purposes, jeopardised some health surveillance 
purposes. At this point, Parliament stepped in.
The significance of sensitive health data for medical purposes beyond individ-
ual care, including medical research and health-related surveillance, is today rec-
ognised by statutory provisions that permit the duty of confidence to be set aside. 
This body of law, which is detailed below, allows confidential patient information 
to flow from general practitioners (GPs), hospital doctors, and other healthcare 
professionals to national bodies otherwise equipped to monitor and respond to 
public health risks.
Recent years have revealed, however, the increasing significance and use that 
may be attached to health data for secondary purposes beyond medical research 
and health-related surveillance. Advances in information processing, the underly-
ing technological capacity to transfer and analyse big data sets, and the changing 
– increasingly national (rather than local) level – data flows associated with a mod-
ern health care service, are creating new opportunities to use confidential patient 
information to achieve other kinds of public benefit and undertake other kinds of 
surveillance activity. The previous use by the Home Office of data obtained and 
generated through the provision of health care to identify immigration offend-
ers is a case in point. This ‘growth area’ raises several legal dilemmas, as the use 
of confidential patient data for surveillance unrelated to medical purpose is not 
systematically subject to the same procedural safeguards as is the case in relation 
to use of data for medical purposes. The processes and principles that for nearly 
20 years have been associated with the use of health data for secondary medical pur-
poses, including surveillance, are not routinely applied in the case of surveillance 
for non-health-related purposes. This contrast in legal regimes is detailed below.
Health Surveillance Using Health Data
The powers to share health data for surveillance programmes are extensive and 
operate within a legal framework that can authorise disclosure without individual 
patient consent when that is in the public interest. Further, such power to disclose 
data operates through in-built procedural safeguards that require decisions to be 
determined upon public interest, safeguards which have their roots in parliamen-
tary disquiet over the possibility of unchecked political discretion regarding the 
proper conception of public interest to apply in this context. For nearly 20 years, 
those safeguards have been interpreted and applied by a body charged with pro-
viding independent advice to decision-makers.
The foundation of this approach is S. 251 of the National Health Service Act 
2006 (re-enacting S. 60 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001), which makes 
provision for the Secretary of State to lay Regulations establishing a lawful basis 
for the disclosure of confidential health information for medical purposes. These 
Regulations can make provision for the common law duty of confidence to be set 
aside and provide a lawful basis for the disclosure of confidential patient infor-
mation where none might otherwise exist. Such provisions can be made for a 
range of purposes, including for surveillance purposes. In fact, it was a perceived 
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risk to the continued viability of cancer registries in England and Wales that 
motivated, at least in part, the introduction of the Regulations. When debat-
ing them, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath quoted correspondence received from Sir 
Richard Doll and Sir Richard Peto of the Clinical Trials Service:
It is, we believe, important for the future health of the people in this country that a legislative 
framework should exist that ensures that public health surveillance and medical research can 
continue. (625 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.), 2001, cols. 865–866)
The National Health Service Act 2006 itself, as the parent act, describes the 
parameters of the Regulations that can be made. It does so widely. Medical pur-
poses are broadly defined to mean the purposes of any of:
(a) preventative medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research, the provision of care and treat-
ment and the management of health and social care services, and
(b) informing individuals about their physical or mental health or condition, the diagnosis of 
their condition or their care and treatment. (National Health Service Act 2006, S. 251(12)(a))
The passage of the legislation was accompanied by continued support for a 
process to facilitate data sharing, but there was disquiet with the proposal that 
a Whitehall politician should have the ability to set aside the duty of confidence 
owed by a health professional to a patient for purposes that were not tightly con-
strained. The fear was that permitted uses might come to undermine the confiden-
tiality of the health service. This was explicitly recognised by Lord Hunt in debates:
The breadth of the power sought has been the root of concerns expressed in this House. I fully 
accept that if  such a power did not operate with effective safeguards the potential for misuse 
might well undermine the trust between patients and the NHS. (625 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.), 
2001, col. 866)
The same fear was expressed more forcefully by Earl Howe:
The mere existence of this power, not to mention the exercise of it, will start the rot. Once doc-
tors and nurses have ceased to be the guardians of the most private information that any of us 
possess, and once that guardianship has been transferred to a politician in Whitehall, you no 
longer have a system that will command public trust. That is a process that we should not even 
countenance. (625 625 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.), 2001, cols. 858–859)
To appease such concerns,2 the solution was the establishment of an independ-
ent body, of broad-based membership, to advise on the purposes for which it was 
appropriate that any Regulations make provision.3As Baroness Northover said 
when introducing the relevant amendment to the Bill:
This is simply not an area in which it could ever be appropriate to give such wide powers to the 
Secretary of State. That is why we propose in the amendment to establish a statutory advisory 
committee to advise and assist the Secretary of State in this matter … which does not have to 
sit muzzled in the background as an earlier incarnation, proposed in the other place, just might 
have done. It consists of representatives of patients’ groups, clinicians, medical researchers, 
health service researchers and others. (625 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.), 2001, cols. 409–410)
The body was known as the Patient Information Advisory Group (PIAG). 
The resulting Regulations were known as the Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002.
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Subsequently, PIAG became an authoritative voice in the control structure 
around data sharing law in health, including recommending on the content and 
scope of Regulations laid under the Parent Act. With the benefit of PIAG’s 
advice, under Reg. 3 (1), provision was made for the processing of confidential 
patient information for the surveillance of communicable diseases and other risks 
to public health:
(a) diagnosing communicable diseases and other risks to public health;
(b) recognising trends in such diseases and risks;
(c) controlling and preventing the spread of such diseases and risks;
(d) monitoring and managing –
(i) outbreaks of communicable disease;
(ii) incidents of exposure to communicable disease;
(iii) the delivery, efficacy, and safety of immunisation programmes;
(iv) adverse reactions to vaccines and medicines;
(v) risks of infection acquired from food or the environment (including 
water supplies);
(vi) the giving of information to persons about the diagnosis of communica-
ble disease and risks of acquiring such disease (Health Service  
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, Reg. 3(1)).
The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 thus 
provided a lawful basis for health care professionals to disclose confidential 
patient information for the purposes of surveilling communicable disease and 
other risks to public health. The processing of confidential patient information 
for such purposes can only be undertaken by one of a number of specified bodies 
(specified in Reg. 3(3)). There are additional controls built into permitted data 
flows by the Regulations.
Additional Requirements
As well as being limited to a specific range of bodies, any processing under Reg. 3 
is subject to the more general requirements of Reg. 7. These include that:
(2) No person shall process confidential patient information under these Regulations unless 
he is a health professional or a person who in the circumstances owes a duty of confidentiality 
which is equivalent to that which would arise if  that person were a health professional. (Health 
Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, Reg. 7(2)4
It is important to note that the Regulations permit processing that would oth-
erwise be unlawful but do not usually require bodies to disclose information for 
this purpose. There is the possibility for the Secretary of State to require the 
processing of confidential patient information for specified purposes under Reg. 
3(4) but, to the authors’ knowledge, the only occasion on which 3(4) has been 
relied on is in response to the Coronavirus. In 2021, the Secretary of State issued 
a number of notices under Reg. 3(4) requiring organisations to process confiden-
tial patient information in the manner set out in the notice for purposes set out in 
Health Data, Public Interest, and Surveillance 99
Reg. 3(1). This is currently time-limited (at the time of writing to 30 September 
2021) and when the Coronavirus notices expire all relevant information should 
be deleted.5
The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, there-
fore, establish a specific legal basis for the disclosure of health data for ‘public 
health’ surveillance purposes. This sits within a broader legal landscape. There 
are other longstanding legal requirements associated with the disclosure of con-
fidential patient information for public health and indeed for other surveillance.
Other Statutory Disclosures: Health Protection
Since the nineteenth century, under several pieces of legislation, there has been a 
statutory responsibility to notify certain authorities where infectious diseases are 
concerned. A distinguishing feature of these responsibilities is that they are heav-
ily constrained by legislation in terms of the scope in which they can be applied, 
for example, The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations 2013. They do not represent the same ‘breadth of power’ that was a 
cause for concern in relation to the more expansively defined ‘medical purposes’ 
in S. 251 of the National Health Service Act 2006.
Perhaps the leading example is the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 
2010 (see also Health Protection (Notification) (Wales) Regulations 2010), which 
extends the previous responsibility and now adopts an ‘all hazards’ approach. 
There is now a responsibility upon a registered medical practitioner (R) to notify 
the proper officer of a local authority where they have ‘reasonable grounds for 
suspecting’ that a patient (P) has (or has died from):
(a) a notifiable disease;
(b) an infection6 which, in the view of R, presents or could present significant 
harm to human health; or has (having) been
(c) contaminated7 in a manner which, in the view of R, presents or could 
present significant harm to human health. (Health Protection (Notification) 
Regulations 2010, Reg. 2(1))8
A crucial distinction with the powers as typically exercised under the Health 
Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 is that the Health 
Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010 power is not discretionary. The dis-
closure power is a requirement. Where a local authority has been so notified that 
there is a responsibility upon them to disclose the fact and content of that noti-
fication to Public Health England, the proper officer in the local authority in 
which P usually resides, and also the proper officer in the Port Authority or local 
authority in which P has disembarked (from ship, hovercraft, aircraft, or interna-
tional train) if  known (Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010, Reg. 
6). Diagnostic laboratories also have a duty to notify Public Health England if  
they identify any ‘causative agent’ listed within sch. 2 of the Regulations or evi-
dence of any infection caused by such an agent (Health Protection (Notification) 
Regulations 2010, Reg. 4).
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What is noticeable about these Regulations, besides the clear description of 
mandatory data flow, is that the Confidential Patient Information disclosed is 
to be either of a particularly restricted nature (relating to a finite list of noti-
fiable diseases) (Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010, sch. 1) or 
associated with infection or contamination that could present significant harm 
to human health. If  a health professional were to disclose information in circum-
stances where they had no reasonable grounds to consider there to be a risk of 
significant harm, they would not be able to avoid liability for a breach of a duty of 
confidence.9 There is no such restriction on the Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002 (Taylor, 2015).
Unlike the Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, 
PIAG did not advise on the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010, 
but the legal framework of the parent legislation, the Public Health (Control of 
Disease) Act (1984), provided significant constraint on the scope of potential 
Regulations. Where Regulations can plough only a narrow furrow, as estab-
lished by parent legislation debated in Parliament, the concerns associated with 
the opaque exercise of power in furtherance of a particular political or narrow 
institutional agenda are blunted; at least that is, if  the Parliamentary process is 
doing its job through effective opposition and robust debate of legislative pro-
posals in both Houses. It is where statute appears to offer a subsequent oppor-
tunity for the exercise of unconstrained discretion that a check and balance on a 
conception of the public interest in disclosure is most valuable. It was the concern 
attached to the broad sweep of ‘medical purpose’ that was contained in the rel-
evant provisions of the Health and Social Care Act 2001 (re-enacted as National 
Health Service Act 2006, S. 251) that motivated calls for an independent voice on 
the appropriate breadth and operation of subsequent Regulations.
To summarise: where health-related data are concerned, in UK law two key 
control devices have emerged. First, legislation has been drafted in such a way 
to restrict the circumstances in which data can be shared. On this point, there 
is variability in the extent to which Parent legislation restricts the permissible 
scope of Regulations. In particular, the breadth of ‘medical purpose’ in the 
National Health Service Act 2006 is more permissive than other legislation. To 
tackle this broader discretionary power, however, a second control device has 
been attached to the process: namely the establishment of an independent gate-
keeper to patient data and an advisor on regulatory and policy reform. Within 
the parameters established by the National Health Service Act 2006, the role 
of the advisory group can be seen to vary according to the specificity of the 
data flows anticipated by individual Regulations. In particular, there is a sig-
nificant distinction in the operation of Reg. 3 – which permits processing only as 
described for purposes related to communicable disease such as coronavirus and 
other risks to public health – and Reg. 5 – which permits processing for a rela-
tively broad range of purposes.9 It is Reg. 5 that is most open ended in scope. In 
relation to the former (Reg. 3), the advice of PIAG was sought on the appropri-
ate wording of the Regulation. In relation to the latter, the advisory group was 
further invited to advise on the interpretation and application (of Reg. 5) on a 
case-by-case basis.
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Surveillance/Research Distinction
The different approach taken towards surveillance (under Reg. 3) and medical 
research (under Reg. 5) under the Health Service (Control of Patient Information) 
Regulations 2002 may be explainable by the extent to which it was considered pos-
sible, at the point in time that the Regulations were being debated, to evaluate the 
mix and significance of private and public interests engaged. With Reg. 3, the pur-
pose of the surveillance, the nature of the data needed, and the relative importance 
of the public interest served by such surveillance when compared with the public 
interest in a confidential health care service could all be taken into consideration 
during parliamentary debate even if specific public health risks, such as COVID-19, 
were unknown at the time. As a result, Parliament felt able to say – in the light of 
independent advice – that so far as communicable diseases and other risks to public 
health to be disclosed under Reg. 3 were concerned, the public interest in disclosure 
trumped the public interest in confidentiality. Parliament did not feel in a position 
to make the same sweeping statement in relation to all medical research potentially 
supportable under Reg. 5. Here it was felt more appropriate to put in place a process 
to enable ongoing, granular, independent scrutiny, and advice.
Before support was given to an activity in pursuit of a medical purpose under 
Reg. 5, the opinion of PIAG would be sought. PIAG was disbanded in 2008 but 
at that time the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (ECC) of the National 
Information Governance Board took over this advisory function (Health and 
Social Care Act 2008, S. 157). When the NIGB was itself abolished in 2013, then 
the advisory role of the ECC transferred to a newly established Confidentiality 
Advisory Group (CAG). CAG, as part of the Health Research Authority (HRA), 
continues to offer advice on the use of Reg. 5. In fact, CAG’s role in relation to indi-
vidual decisions on the use of Reg. 5 was put on a statutory footing for the first time 
by the Care Act 2014 (sch. 7(8)). At that time, the authority for decisions on medical 
research (as opposed to other non-research-related medical purposes) was passed 
from the Secretary of State to the HRA. The Secretary of State retains responsibil-
ity for making decisions in relation to non-research-related medical purposes.
There are three reasons to draw attention to the Reg. 5 requirement for the 
scrutiny of applications for the disclosure of confidential information by an inde-
pendent body, made up of a broad representation, extending to include signifi-
cant lay membership. First, to highlight the process that has been put in place in 
the health research context, where there would otherwise be a broad discretion 
to set aside the duty of confidence and permit disclosure of confidential informa-
tion without independent advice. Second, to recognise that the advisory group 
(currently CAG) follows a regular and systematic practice of transparent advice 
on individual cases of disclosure where the Regulations are most open ended. All 
minutes, recording advice and reasoning, are published. (The relevance of this 
will become clear shortly.) Third, to distinguish the process that would need to 
be undertaken – and the safeguards associated with that process – if  a researcher 
wanted access to confidential patient information (without explicit patient con-
sent) in order to challenge the validity of claims being made in support of a par-
ticular use of data for surveillance purposes.
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Non-health Surveillance Using Health Data
Up to this point, the focus of the chapter has been on the use of confidential 
health data for health-related purposes, including what might be described as 
health surveillance. We will argue shortly that the legal structure put in place is 
broadly robust, consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme, and nor-
matively defensible. By contrast, the use of health data for non-health surveil-
lance purposes is less satisfactory.
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 established NHS Digital (originally 
known as the Health and Social Care Information Centre). The Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 also established a new legal framework for the flow of confidential 
information within England and Wales. Under the 2012 Act, NHS Digital not 
only has the power to require confidential patient information, and other infor-
mation, from health and social care bodies but also has power to disclose data 
for both health and non-health related purposes. Although the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 impacted significantly upon the legal basis and operational flow of 
much NHS Data, one thing it did not change was the importance of the Health 
Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 for those seeking 
access to confidential patient information for secondary ‘medical purposes’ (as 
defined by the National Health Service Act 2006, S. 251) without patient consent. 
If  data are disclosed by NHS Digital on the basis of Reg. 5 of the Health Service 
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, whether for medical research 
or health-related surveillance purposes, then independent advice is injected into 
the process by operation of the arrangements described above. Further to this, 
due to a change in legislation introduced by the Care Act 2014, CAG now also 
has a role advising NHS Digital directly on its data dissemination policy. This is 
further discussed below and is additional to CAG’s involvement in the processes 
associated with operation of the Health Service (Control of Patient Information) 
Regulations 2002. As we will see though, the operation of this advisory role in 
practice is quite different from the role of CAG in relation to the Health Service 
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002. The governance model does 
not operationally provide equivalent intensity of independent scrutiny prior to a 
disclosure for non-health-related surveillance purposes.10
NHS Digital has the power to require information where it is considered 
‘necessary or expedient’ (Health and Social Care Act 2012, S. 259(1)(a)) for the 
purposes of any of its statutory functions. As a public body, NHS Digital may 
only disseminate or publish information where it has specific power to do so. Its 
powers are set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (S. 261, 262). This 
includes a range of circumstances set out in S. 261(5)(e). The power of disclosure 
under S. 261(5)(e) does not set aside the common law duty of confidence and 
so, where no other legal basis is available, disclosure must be in the public inter-
est. NHS Digital is, as the non-executive public body responsible for collecting, 
processing, and disseminating significant volumes of confidential patient infor-
mation across the NHS, accountable for ensuring those data flows are not only 
lawful but also consistent with its own data publication and dissemination policy. 
NHS Digital is responsible for any operational decision on disclosure and thus 
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must determine, in cases where disclosure is only lawful if  in the public interest, 
whether the relevant public interest test is satisfied.
As indicated above, in exercising any function of publishing or otherwise dis-
seminating information, NHS Digital must have regard to any advice given to it 
by the CAG as the committee appointed by the HRA under sch. 7 Para. 8(1) of 
the Care Act 2014 to give such advice (Health and Social Care Act 2012, S. 262A 
(as amended)). However, there is no established process – as there is under the 
Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 – for NHS 
Digital to routinely seek advice in relation to dissemination for specific purposes, 
and this includes in relation to dissemination for non-health-related surveillance. 
There is facility for issues to be raised unilaterally by the CAG but, in order to do 
so, it is necessary for the CAG to be aware that there is an issue to raise (Health 
Research Authority, 2018). In other words, therefore, issues can be raised with 
the CAG for advice at the discretion of NHS Digital but there is no requirement 
to do so; and even though the CAG can raise an issue with NHS Digital, it is pos-
sible it will not do so due to its lack of prior notification.
There are a number of non-health disclosures that have been made by NHS 
Digital since its establishment. By way of illustration, this chapter considers disclo-
sures made under a now withdrawn MoU with the Home Office. Consideration of 
this example demonstrates the variability in oversight and independent advice that 
accompanies disclosure for different purposes. In relation to secondary medical 
purposes, discretion is exercised following prior independent advice on the public 
interest in permitting health professionals to disclose, for example, health research 
(e.g., Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, Reg. 5) 
or communicable disease surveillance (e.g., Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002, Reg. 3). In relation to non-health-related purposes 
(e.g., served by disclosure under Health and Social Care Act 2012, S. 261(5)(e)) 
discretion may be exercised with no independent advice11 or equivalent consulta-
tion on the public interests and yet health professionals may be required to provide 
the information that is disclosed. It also demonstrates the imbalance in regulatory 
burden felt by those who would use patient data for non-health-related surveil-
lance and those who would access the same data for research purposes (including, 
potentially, research that might challenge the health impacts of the surveillance).
Disclosure to Home Office Under MOU
NHS Digital entered into a MoU for the purpose of processing information requests 
from the Home Office to NHS Digital to (re)establish contact between the Home 
Office and immigrants. This included tracing those suspected of immigration offences 
and where re-contact would enable their removal from the UK. The MoU was pub-
lished late in 2016 and came into effect on 1 January 2017, although the practice of 
providing information to the Home Office had been undertaken before that (House 
of Commons, Health and Social Care Committee, 2018a, pp. 3–4).
The data requested by the Home Office were limited to demographic/adminis-
trative details covering name (or change of name), date of birth, gender, address, 
and the date of NHS registration. It did not include any clinical information or 
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information relating to the health, care, or treatment of the individual (Gordon, 
2017), but NHS Digital processes still, appropriately in our view (although more 
on this later), treated the information as confidential (House of Commons, 
Health and Social Care Committee, 2018a).12 NHS Digital is empowered to dis-
close confidential information under S. 261(5)(e) where
[…] the disclosure is made in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence (whether or 
not in the United Kingdom). (Health and Social Care Act 2012, S. 261(5)(e))
In a letter from Noel Gordon (2017), Chair of NHS Digital, to Dr Sarah 
Wollaston, Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, NHS Digital asserted 
that it was the understanding of NHS Digital that:
The s261 gateways do not constrain [NHS Digital] to considering only serious offences or harm 
to the person.
Thus, although NHS Digital acknowledged that where information is confi-
dential and is to be disclosed under S. 261(5)(e), the duty of confidence in such 
information must still be considered, it suggested a lower threshold may be 
applied than for other uses of health data. Here, the distinction with the 2010 
Regulations (see also Health Protection (Notification) (Wales) Regulations 2010) 
discussed above is telling, where it is only where there are grounds to consider 
there to be a risk of serious harm that disclosure is required.
According to the letter to the Health and Social Care Committee, the policy of 
NHS Digital (at the time) was that prior to exercising the power to disclose confi-
dential information under S. 261(5)(e), NHS Digital carried out an assessment which 
‘weighed the public interest in favour and/or against a disclosure’ (Gordon, 2017) 
in order to avoid an unjustifiable breach of confidence. It was asserted by NHS 
Digital that ‘a public interest test is carried out in each individual case’ (Gordon, 
2017). The process by which such a test was carried out appears, however, to have 
been an entirely internal assessment, opaque, and without the benefit of external 
or independent advice. This individual case consideration was also apparently car-
ried out in the context of not inconsiderable numbers. The Health and Social Care 
Committee report on the policy noted that there were 10,275 requests for disclo-
sure across the period 2014–2016 (House of Commons, Health and Social Care 
Committee, 2018a, p. 6).
In terms of retaining the integrity of the overall legal approach towards 
handling patient data there are several problematic features to this policy. 
Fundamentally, our concern is with the systemic failure it demonstrates to require 
equivalent checks and balances on the operative conception of public interest. 
The lack of independent contribution to an understanding of how the public 
interest test might operate was strongly criticised by the Health and Social Care 
Committee (House of Commons, Health and Social Care Committee, 2018a, 
pp. 9, 18). Following scrutiny by the Health and Social Care Committee, the 
MoU between NHS Digital and the Home Office was withdrawn (NHS Digital, 
2018c).13 According to NHS Digital’s (2018b) website:
The Home Office can still request non-medical information to locate an individual where this is 
in the interests of safeguarding an individual and necessary to protect a person’s welfare. Any 
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such request would be considered by NHS Digital’s Welfare Assessment Panel. As at 31 March 
2021, NHS Digital has not released any information to the Home Office on these grounds since 
the MOU was suspended in May 2018.
On the face of it, this may seem to be a success story. An unduly one-sided inter-
pretation of ‘public interest’ was course-corrected following parliamentary scrutiny. 
However, our argument is that the need for the ex post facto adjustment of the con-
ditions under which the public interest test was understood to be met illustrates the 
weakness of the process. It is a weakness that persists for so long as decisions on dis-
closure for non-health surveillance can be made without robust, open, and independ-
ent, scrutiny prior to a decision on disclosure being made. The situation is illustrative 
of the varying intensity of independent challenges to a conception of public inter-
est across the context of health- and non-health-related surveillance due to systemic 
inconsistencies in review processes across the two contexts.
PROTECTING THE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY OF HEALTH 
DATA SHARING THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The example of the MoU and the discussion around health research and sur-
veillance illustrates the potential for the sharing of health data to be managed 
through very different processes and according to the application of variable, and 
unevenly applied, law and principle. Of particular concern, is that this example 
illustrates that in relation to non-health surveillance, there is the potential for wide-
ranging and discretionary release of confidential information on the basis of an 
internal assessment of ‘public interest’ without independent input or review; at 
least, not prior to a disclosure decision. There is, of course, the possibility of 
recourse to the courts after sharing, and we consider this further below.
One way to defend a more ‘relaxed’ policy towards the sharing of health data 
for the purposes of non-health-related surveillance might be to argue that the 
data that are being shared, such as basic demographic information about the indi-
vidual, are not health data for the purposes of the law – and hence not covered by 
the duty of confidence. To be clear, NHS Digital did state in their evidence to the 
Health and Social Care Committee that it treated the demographic information 
as confidential (Gordon, 2017). Nevertheless, at the same time, there is a sugges-
tion in the published material that NHS Digital were of the view that they did not 
need to treat the information as confidential. In a letter to Dr Sarah Wollaston 
(Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee) the Chair of NHS Digital, 
Noel Gordon (2017), remarked that:
It should be noted that the [NHS Digital] treats the administrative information as subject to 
the duty of confidentiality, notwithstanding that [the Department of Health] considers that 
such purely demographic/administrative information does not attract the duty of confidence.
Can Demographic Information Be Subject to a Duty of Confidence?
There is good reason to consider demographic/administrative information 
obtained or generated through the delivery of health care to be covered by the 
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duty of confidence. In R (W) v. Sec’y of State for Health (2016), the Court of 
Appeal found even data that ‘falls at the least intrusive end of the spectrum of 
medical information’ may be ‘private’ (p. 707 [27]). When deciding whether pri-
vacy rights are engaged it is necessary to have regard to the ‘reasonable expecta-
tions’ of the subject of the data in question (Campbell v. MGN Ltd., 2004). In 
R (W) v. Sec’y of State for Health (2016), the Court noted the tendency in all 
authoritative guidance published to
[…] articulate the same approach to the issue of confidentiality: all identifiable patient data held 
by a doctor or a hospital must be treated as confidential. The documents have been drafted in 
expansive terms so as to reflect the reasonable expectations of patients that all of their data will 
be treated as private and confidential. These publicly available documents inform the expecta-
tions of patients being treated in the NHS. (p. 710 [39])
This is consistent with other developments in law which support taking all 
factors into account as part of a broader contextual consideration of whether 
a reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to the use and disclosure of infor-
mation in all the circumstances. This points against taking any single factor as 
determinative, including whether data are purely demographic, even if  – such as 
an individual’s name – it is already in the public domain. As Lord Nicholls put it 
in OBG Ltd. v. Allan (2008):
As the law has developed breach of confidence, or misuse of confidential information, now 
covers two distinct causes of action, protecting two different interests: privacy, and secret (“con-
fidential”) information …. In some instances information may be in the public domain, and not 
qualify for protection as confidential, and yet qualify for protection on the grounds of privacy. 
(p. 72 [255])
Where the courts find that an individual has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, taking all circumstances into account – including expectations attached spe-
cifically to the health care context, then duties will follow even if  the information 
is entirely demographic or administrative and has no clinical detail attached. This 
may be considered necessary if  public trust in the confidentiality of the informa-
tion provided to a health service is to be protected.
Legislative Purpose and (Social) Legitimacy
If  the above argument is correct, then the disclosure of demographic data needs 
to be considered through the same legal regimes that deal with other categories of 
health data. On the detail of those legal regimes, evidently Parliament possesses 
the legal authority to enable discretionary disclosure for the purposes it sees fit. 
Even so, both a legal and a normative claim can be made about the principles 
of law that should underpin the design of the processes that manage the control 
of the sharing of health data. First, processes that manage health data should 
continue to respect the concerns that motivated Parliamentary debate of S. 251 
of the National Health Service Act 2006 (originally enacted as S. 60 of the Health 
and Social Care Act 2001) and the subsequent Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002. This means that where there is a broad discretion 
to disclose for purposes beyond individual care, it is necessary to design institu-
tions for health data sharing that will protect public confidence in a confidential 
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healthcare system. In relation to the processes attached to Regulations laid under 
S. 251, it was accepted that there needs to be a check on the conception of public 
interest employed to ensure that it does not slip the moorings of public trust. 
Whilst the Health and Social Care Act 2012 has established new reasons, and 
powers through which, to share health data, it does not adjust the importance 
of preserving public trust as an underpinning purpose of this area of law. If  any-
thing, it reiterates that purpose, with NHS Digital being placed under a duty, 
under S. 253(1) (ca) of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to have regard to 
‘the need to respect and promote the privacy of recipients of health services’.
Additionally, there is a deeper normative claim to be made in favour of incor-
porating a strong public interest element into the legal system where individual 
rights and collective interests overlap, as they clearly do with health data. This 
concerns the importance of promoting and protecting the social legitimacy of 
a process that permits confidential patient information to be used for purposes 
beyond individual care. As Curtin and Meijer (2006) remark, legitimacy, as a 
concept, has been variously defined and described:
First of all purely formal (legal) legitimacy in the sense of the manner in which a particular 
structure of authority was constituted and acts according to accepted legal rules and proce-
dures. Although many political scientists and lawyers focus on formal legitimacy, some stress 
the primordial importance of what is termed social (empirical) legitimacy. Social legitimacy 
refers to the affective loyalty of those who are bound by it, on the basis of deep common inter-
est and/or strong sense of shared identity. (p. 112)
Here it is the latter sense of legitimacy that is considered: social (empirical) 
legitimacy. We are associating the concept of social legitimacy with ‘the capac-
ity of the system to engender and maintain the belief  that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’ (Lipset, 1981). This 
approach mirrors thicker accounts of procedural fairness which strive not only to 
secure in decision-making processes what is formally necessary for lawful public 
authority, but additionally integrate within them either effective opportunities for 
participation (Mashaw, 1985) or safeguards which protect the regulated commu-
nities involved (Rosanvallon, 2011).
Ultimately, what drives shifts and re-designs to a decision-making process is the 
need to maintain qualities ‘that provide arguments for the acceptability of its deci-
sions’ (Mashaw, 1983, p. 24; see also Taylor & Whitton, 2020). This may be a politi-
cal decision but it is not just the backdrop to the Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002 that suggests that the social legitimacy of the pub-
lic use of health data should not be taken for granted. In her foreword to the 2016 
Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-outs Dame Fiona Caldicott, National Data 
Guardian for Health and Social Care (2016), remarked that:
People should be assured that those involved in their care, and in running and improving services, 
are using such information appropriately and only when absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, 
trust in the use of personal confidential data has been eroded and steps need to be taken to dem-
onstrated trustworthiness and ensure that the public can have confidence in the system. (p. 2)
This statement was made even before the media reports were released of NHS 
patient data being handed to the Home Office in an ‘immigration crackdown’ 
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(Forster, 2017). The central contention of this chapter is that institutional design 
of a process that incorporates transparent and open debate of the relative merits 
of disclosure for surveillance purposes prior to a decision being taken is better 
suited to form a conception of public interest that will meet the demands of social 
legitimacy. It will promote the principle that data are only released under condi-
tions where this is acceptable to those whose data are being used.14 This is less 
likely to be achieved through reliance upon the courts to intervene after the fact.
THE LAW AND JUDICIAL CONTROL
One response to demands for social legitimacy and securing the integrity of patient 
data might be to argue that the strength of the law that surrounds administrative dis-
cretion in this area is sufficient to prevent abuse. Indeed, the grounds of administrative 
law (e.g., Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv., 1985) have gradu-
ally evolved over the years to the point where it is widely accepted that a series of good 
administration standards are expected of decision-makers, albeit the exact parameters 
of those standards are a matter of some contention and highly context-specific in 
application. However, on a number of levels, the saga of the MoU and NHS Digital’s 
subsequent decision making cautions against assuming that by themselves legal safe-
guards are, or could be, sufficient.
Room for Conflicting Legislative Purposes to Broaden the Use of Disclosure 
Powers
A first shortfall in the protective value of judicial review is that the lack of spec-
ificity within legislation that confers discretionary power can, without further 
checks and balances, reduce the scope for judicial scrutiny of administrative deci-
sion making. To address this problem, a basic test of administrative power is that 
even if  a body possesses a broad power, it needs to be conducted in accordance 
with the purposes of legislation (Roberts v. Hopwood, 1925). On this point, the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 (S. 261(5)) clearly envisages that NHS Digital 
has the power to release information for non-health purposes in the following 
circumstances:
(a) the information has previously been lawfully disclosed to the public,
(b) the disclosure is made in accordance with any court order,
(c) the disclosure is necessary or expedient for the purposes of protecting the welfare of any 
individual,
(d) the disclosure is made to any person in circumstances where it is necessary or expedient 
for the person to have the information for the purpose of exercising functions of that person 
conferred under or by virtue of any provision of this or any other Act,
(e) the disclosure is made in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence (whether or 
not in the United Kingdom), or
(f) the disclosure is made for the purpose of criminal proceedings (whether or not in the United 
Kingdom).
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Even where the legislator provides a purpose for discretionary action, how-
ever, in a context where strong individual interests are impacted, that power is 
constrained by a further limiting principle of administrative law, that of ‘legality’.
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there 
is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unno-
ticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to 
the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to 
be subject to the basic rights of the individual. (R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Ex parte  
Simms, 2000, p. 131)
The test of legality has become an increasingly powerful tool within the judi-
cial armoury when interpreting the scope of primary legislation and case law has 
confirmed that this obligation for clarity in legislation for rights-infringing pow-
ers goes beyond those rights that are squarely captured by Convention rights.15 
With regard to S. 261(5), some of the listed circumstances are specific and would 
appear to meet the test of legality but it is at the very least arguable that, in 
their specificity, none of these criteria unambiguously sanction a general policy 
of releasing a whole class of data, as opposed to specifically individualised data 
requests as might be necessary, for instance, to pursue criminal proceedings. The 
closest we get to a general power to disclose patient data is contained in S. 261(5)
(d), but this section appears to possess all the ambiguity of open discretion that 
the ‘legality’ test is designed to block.
The argument of legality, therefore, is a powerful weapon against an unchecked 
general discretionary power to share patient data. Our concern, however, is that 
there is sufficient specificity to allow for a certain degree of discretionary disclo-
sure in individual cases in circumstances where the legislation is otherwise silent 
on any subsidiary checks that might be used to control or limit that discretion’s 
operation.
Limits to the Ability to Scrutinise the Merits of Individual Decisions
A second shortfall with relying upon legal rectification of errors in the disclosure 
of information is that the room for the courts to scrutinise individual decisions is 
narrow. Through the common law, when considering whether a public body was 
justified in introducing a policy, such as a policy of surveillance, the courts may 
be invited to consider the quality of the reasoning or evidence underlying or sup-
porting the decision:
Courts, under judicial review, rather than appeal, will not normally interfere with a public 
authority’s assessment of the evidence or facts of a case. However, interference has been per-
mitted where the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, sometimes called a perverse 
decision. Recently the courts have been prepared also to intervene where there has been a mis-
direction, disregard or mistake of a material fact. (Jowell, 2015, pp. 51–52)
Nevertheless, albeit a limited form of rationality review of the substance of 
decisions may be available, where the duties owed towards affected individuals 
are left undetailed in legislation the intensity of review will be light. Further, even 
if  the process by which such standards is made is left underdeveloped, the com-
mon law only partially fills the void. Ideally, if  an individual is to be deprived of 
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a benefit, such as control over their personal data, then as well as notice of the 
decision they should have opportunity to make representation and have individ-
ualised reasons provided. The 2012 Act, though, does not require NHS Digital to 
notify individuals that their health data have been shared or to provide reasons 
for the sharing of information. Plausibly, the strength of interest involved might 
establish a ground for arguing that common law procedural fairness requires 
some input of individuals before decisions are made (McInnes v. Onslow-Fane, 
1978), or that reasons should be provided (R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
Ex parte Doody, 1994). Along these lines, one of us has previously argued that a 
respect for human rights will require an organisation to consult prior to adopt-
ing a policy that impacts negatively upon an individual’s fundamental rights and 
freedoms (Grace & Taylor, 2013). This may be as close as a court would be will-
ing to get to requiring the kind of input into a decision-making process that has 
taken place in the context of health surveillance and in the exercise of discretion 
in relation to health research. It is also highly likely that the intensity of the scru-
tiny of the substance of the decision would be restricted by the deferential nature 
of the Wednesbury reasonableness test, particularly where a powerful competing 
public interest, such as security, can be appealed to.
Stronger tests through which to challenge individual decisions are available 
under the Human Rights Act 1998. Under the Human Rights Act 1998 decisions 
must be compatible with Convention rights and tested against a more intensive 
test of proportionality review. The most obvious human right that surveillance 
will engage is the right to respect for a private and family life. The Human 
Rights Act 1998 makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is 
incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life, home and cor-
respondence, protected by art. 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, 
or ECHR). Under Art. 8(2):
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950)
Disclosure of confidential patient information, for the surveillance purposes, 
will constitute a prima facie interference with Article 8 unless disclosure was 
authorised by the patient. The Human Rights Act 1998 does then provide an 
action by which the necessity of  an interference, even if  in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim, may be challenged.
In the case of de Freitas v. Permanent Sec’y of Ministry of Agric., Fisheries, 
Lands and Hous. (1999), the Privy Council considered the meaning of the phrase 
‘reasonably necessary’ and adopted a three-stage test:
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental 
right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; 
and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accom-
plish the objective. (p. 80, citing Nyambirai v. Nat’l Soc. Sec. Auth,., 1996, p. 75)
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This test has been subsequently adopted by British Courts when determining 
if  an interference with a convention right is necessary, with recognition that anal-
ysis of these three elements introduces questions of proportionality (Huang v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2007; R (Daly) v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t, 2001, p. 547). It is through the concept of necessity, and the associated 
concept of proportionality, that the courts could subject a policy of surveillance 
to – what might approach –merit based review:16 determining whether the objec-
tive of the surveillance was ‘sufficiently important’, whether surveillance was a 
rational approach to achieving the objective, and whether the interference that 
the surveillance represents is necessary (read ‘proportionate’) to achievement of 
that objective.
Although there is the possibility, through the concept of proportionality, for 
a closer review of the merits of a decision than would ordinarily be associated 
with judicial review, there is still classically, a ‘margin of appreciation’ afforded 
national authorities when it comes to reasonable disagreement regarding what is 
understood be ‘necessary’ (Handyside v. U.K., 1976, p. 754). A domestic equiva-
lent, affording the executive a margin of appreciation relative to the court’s own 
assessment, must be understood to operate at least consistently with respect for 
the separation of powers.17
Judicial Review Is a Retrospective Solution Only
A third risk with relying upon judicial oversight is that judicial review is a remedy 
of last resort. Certainly, judicial review is a potentially powerful process, and the 
latent prospect of judicial review should discourage arbitrary decision making 
and encourage a public body to ensure a decision-making process will bring rel-
evant issues into consideration. But, there is now a wealth of literature that dem-
onstrates that it operates very much as a reserve remedial route and is informally 
set up to filter out many more cases than it filters in (Bondy & Sunkin, 2009). It 
is, in other words, a process that can provide some assurance as to the quality of 
decision making in NHS Digital but only an intermittent assurance check, and 
arguably a disproportionately legal form of assurance at that. For most decision-
making processes alternative safeguards are often better equipped either to pro-
vide efficient redress or in preventing administrative error before it occurs. More 
importantly, judicial review is a process that need not promote the social legiti-
macy discussed earlier, nor challenge the relative value attached to the interests 
of a confidential health care system and identification of immigration offenders.
THE WAY FORWARD: EXPANDING THE REMIT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT ADVISORY BOARD
The context of state sponsored surveillance of data collected by the health ser-
vice for the purposes of supporting immigration policy is one that well-illustrates 
the risks of non-health-related use of health data. This policy demonstrates an 
embedded inconsistency in the manner in which health data are currently being 
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managed, which in turn risks undermining the integrity of the system and user 
confidence in the health sector.
The above section has argued that there are grounds upon which the legality 
of the use of health data for non-health-related surveillance may be challenged. 
However, neither the prospect of challenge for unjustified interference with 
human rights, nor judicial review, are likely to provide the long-term fix to the 
risks that the former use of the MoU gave rise to. A further solution might be for 
Regulations to be introduced, or better still the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
to be amended, to stipulate more detailed restrictions on the sharing of health 
data by NHS Digital for non-health-related purposes. Within such legislation, 
the process of balancing competing interests could be made transparent and con-
sultative, and the relevant factors upon which such balancing exercises are based 
(such as seriousness of offences for which data are sought) could be outlined.
However, although more guidance on the relevant factors for developing poli-
cies on disclosure would be a step forward in terms of clarifying the legal author-
ity of NHS Digital and the lawfulness of such administrative practices as the 
MoU, it would not address many of our wider concerns. Judicial review would 
continue to operate as a safeguard, but almost certainly an insufficient one which 
could only intermittently introduce into the decision-making process the kinds 
of challenge, independent advice, or transparency that can be offered by the pro-
cesses associated with a specialised independent advisory body, such as CAG or 
the National Data Guardian (Health and Social Care (National Data Guardian) 
Act 2018). To provide this ongoing scrutiny there needs to be an additional pro-
cess put in place prior to a decision on release of data, either on a case-by-case 
basis (e.g., Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, 
Reg. 5) or before new policies are struck.
The institutional solution of an independent advisory body, or watchdog, is 
one that has been adopted across governance in circumstances where, for a vari-
ety of reasons, an element of independence is seen as necessary to ensure that 
the decision-making process retains loyalty to the full set of values underpinning 
the scheme (Vibert, 2007). Independence is promoted as a safeguard needed to 
establish trust in the use of public power by facilitating a process through which 
certain exercises of public power can be either blocked or ‘fire-alarms’ raised as 
to potentially arbitrary or otherwise undesirable decision making (McCubbins & 
Schwartz, 1984). Reasons for the advisory body solution might also include the 
lack of time, knowledge, skill, and possibly inclination of other options (in par-
ticular, the courts or Parliament) for performing a monitoring role.
Taking all this together, in the context of considering whether a request for 
surveillance is justified prior to a decision being made, extending the requirement 
for independent review prior to disclosure would have five clear advantages to 
relying upon judicial oversight alone:
1. Method: A body offering independent advice on public interest prior to a deci-
sion being taken can adopt an inquisitorial approach and reflect the results 
of broad consultation within its advice. It can request evidence on relative 
 effectiveness prior to implementation or alongside implementation as part of 
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an evaluation of implementation. A court is more constrained by the adversar-
ial nature of the judicial process and the limited range of opportunities it has 
to instigate independent investigation, revisit a position over time, or request 
evidence of impact be gathered after its decision.
2. Skill-set: Independent advice can draw on a range of relevant expertise to the 
function on hand, including but not exclusively so, legal expertise. Such input 
is unlikely to be incorporated into standard judicial review proceedings.
3. Operability: A claim for unlawful interference with an individual’s interests or 
rights is subject to an individual’s disposable resource (in terms of both time 
and money) and motivation. An independent body established for the purpose 
and part of an established process is subject to no such constraint. Independ-
ent bodies can also operate in circumstances where the affected individuals 
may not be well aware of their loss of rights.
4. Timeliness: Judicial determination can only follow sometime after a decision 
has been made – and a policy has been implemented. The harm to public trust 
and confidence may already be done. Advisory bodies can operate more flex-
ibly both before and after decisions are made.
5. Challenging: Those invited to provide independent advice, as opposed to mak-
ing a decision, on the merits of an issue need not worry – in the same way that 
a court might – about inappropriately overstepping the separation of powers. 
Its accountability function is as much one of providing transparency and mor-
al suasion, as it is determining outcomes. Advisory bodies can also operate as 
‘disrupters’, challenging institutional biases.
Many of these advantages are also possessed by Parliamentary select com-
mittees but, as in the case of the MoU discussed in this chapter, Parliament is a 
powerful but generally reactive and randomly triggered safeguard. Parliament 
can work well for crisis moments in administrative malpractice but is less likely to 
be effective, or as prompt, as a regular monitor of administrative policy making 
(Flinders, 2008, pp. 184–189).
CONCLUSION
Decisions taken by those with the authority to interfere with fundamental rights 
and freedoms ought to be based on evidence. For this reason, one might expect a 
policy of surveillance which interferes with the fundamental right to a private life, 
to require credible justification and an evidence base. It should also be one that 
is clearly detailed in law and not left to the vagaries of administrative discretion. 
If  a state surveils those it governs and claims the interference to be in the public 
interest, then the evidence base on which that claim stands should be subject to 
critical examination.
This volume explores many aspects of the rapidly changing and evolving sur-
veillance landscape. This chapter has considered just one aspect of this: the regu-
latory framework relevant to public policy decisions on surveillance, the efficacy 
of which may be informed by health research in England and Wales. The chapter 
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has addressed just two questions in this context: (1) Is any inconsistency in regu-
latory burden associated with access to confidential patient information for non-
health-related surveillance purposes and access for health-related surveillance 
purposes justified? (2) Is any inconsistency in regulatory burden associated with 
surveillance and the research necessary to inform, or challenge, that policy of 
surveillance consistent with the promotion of evidence-based decision making?
The suggestion is that the regulatory framework is deficient in this regard: there 
is an uneven playing field occupied by those seeking access to data for health- or 
non-health-related surveillance purposes and also policymakers and researchers 
when it comes to accessing the data needed to evaluate the efficacy of public 
policy. Unless we are able to independently interrogate the quality of the data on 
which public policy decisions on surveillance are based, we cannot challenge any 
justification for a surveillance policy. Further, a failure to allow researchers access 
to the data under the same conditions as policymakers is a failure to promote 
evidence-based decisions, as the decision-makers are not readily challenged.
Clinicians see themselves as gatekeepers, fiercely protective of the sensitive 
data entrusted to them. Without a patient’s explicit consent there will be only 
a very limited range of circumstances under which health professionals will dis-
close confidential health information for purposes beyond individual care. Health 
researchers have long complained of the difficulties they face in obtaining con-
fidential health information for research purposes. Besides the legal constraints, 
there are systems of approval and a culture of caution to be navigated. Where 
pursuit of statutory purposes involves surveillance of health data, the process by 
which such data can be lawfully accessed is different from those processes that 
health researchers must navigate. This results in a different regulatory burden. 
This is not consistent with promotion of social legitimacy and public trust in a 
confidential healthcare service.
If  society is to be able to challenge the quality of a decision to surveil the 
population, then there must be independent research access to the data under-
pinning a decision to surveil. Such access should bear an equivalent regulatory 
burden to the access for surveillance purposes. Otherwise, we introduce systemic 
obstruction to access the data necessary to hold government action to account. 
Put simply, it should not be easier to get the data for surveillance purposes than to 
get the data to carry out research on the impacts of such surveillance.
NOTES
1. The Home Office is one of the largest government departments in the UK, with a 
wide range of security-related responsibilities, including border control, immigration, citi-
zenship, policing, prisons, law and order, and tackling terrorism.
2. It should be recognised that the suggestion of a statutory committee did not in 
fact satisfy Earl Howe, who thought the risk to public confidence by the breadth of the 
power insufficiently contained. It was enough, however, to enable the Bill to make progress 
through both Houses.
3. The responsibility to consult the Patient Information Advisory Group (PIAG) was 
originally contained in S. 61 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001. The responsibility 
to consult its successor body, the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (ECC) (as part of 
the National Information Governance Board (NIGB)) was under S. 252 of the National 
Health Data, Public Interest, and Surveillance 115
Health Service Act 2006 prior to amendment. When the NIGB was abolished, the relevant 
body to consult became the Care Quality Commission (see Health and Social Care Act 
2012, S. 280(5)).
4. For the purposes of Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 
2002, art. 7 ¶ 2, ‘health professional’ has the same meaning as in S. 69(1) of the Data Pro-
tection Act 1998.
5. Coronavirus (COVID-19): Notification to organisation to share information. Depart-
ment of Health and Social Care. (Last updated 10 February 2021.)
6. Any reference to infection or contamination is ‘a reference to infection or contami-
nation which presents or could present significant harm to human health’ (Public Health 
(Control of Disease) Act 1984, S. 45A(2)).
7. Contamination includes radiation (Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, 
S. 45A(2).
8. The duty in relation to the living is contained within art. 2 (Health Protection (Noti-
fication) Regulations 2010). The duty in relation to the dead is within art. 3 (Health Protec-
tion (Notification) Regulations 2010)).
9. Subject to art. 7, confidential patient information may be processed for medical pur-
poses in the circumstances set out in the Schedule to these Regulations provided that the 
processing has been approved –
(a)  in the case of medical research, by both the Secretary of State and a research ethics 
committee, and
(b)  in any other case, by the Secretary of State.
10. NHS Digital has an internal committee, established for the purpose of  inde-
pendent advice, known as the committee on Independent Group Advising on the 
Release of  Data (IGARD) (NHS Digital, 2018a). There is no mention in the minutes 
of  IGARD of  any request to comment on dissemination in relation to the Home Office 
for immigration offender tracing. A matter commented upon by the Health and Social 
Care Committee: ‘We also find it disturbing that the matter has not been considered 
by NHS Digital’s own Independent Group Advising on the Release of  Data (IGARD)’ 
(House of  Commons, Health and Social Care Committee, 2018, p. 23). For NHS Digi-
tal’s explanation on non-consultation with IGARD, see Health and Social Care Com-
mittee (2018, Q116–Q118).
11. NHS Digital hosts an independent advisory board, known as IGARD (Independent 
Group Advising (NHS Digital) on the Release of Data), but the Health Select Committee 
found that data sharing with the Home Office under the MoU had not been considered by 
IGARD. A fact that the Chair of the Committee described as ‘disturbing’. House of Com-
mons, Health and Social Care Committee (2018c, January 29).
12. Note that the continued operation of the duty of confidence led the National Data 
Guardian to comment that NHS Digital may have drawn too much from the fact that 
S261(5)(e) does not constrain disclosure to only serious offence or harm (House of Com-
mons, Health and Social Care Committee, 2018, p. 14).
13. For discussion of announcement see blog post by Understanding Patient Data 
(2018).
14. On the difference between acceptable and preferable see Taylor and Taylor (2014). 
On the significance of acceptability to public interest decision making, see Taylor and 
Whitton (2020). For an interesting discussion of the significance of public engagement to 
public interest decision making see Sorbie (2020).
15. This test goes beyond the Human Rights Act 1998. See, for example, the use of the 
test in R v. Hughes (2013) and R (UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor (Equal. and Human Rights 
Comm’n) (Nos. 1 and 2) (2017).
16. For discussion of the extent to which the intensity of such review may vary in dif-
ference ways, according to the exigencies of judicial deference and judicial restraint, see 
Rivers (2006).
17. For more on why assessment of proportionality must respect separation of powers 
see Rivers (2006).
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CHAPTER 8
PRIVACY AND SECURITY: 
GERMAN PERSPECTIVES, 




Since the European Union’s (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights became 
binding in 2009, data protection has attained the status of a fundamental right 
(Article 8) throughout the EU. This chapter discusses the relevance of data 
protection in the context of security. It shows that data protection has been of 
particular relevance in the German context – not only against the backdrop of 
rapidly evolving information technology, but also of the historical experiences 
with political regimes collecting information in order to oppress citizens.
Keywords: Germany; security; surveillance; transparency; privacy; social 
movements
INTRODUCTION – THE RELEVANCE OF PRIVACY IN 
GERMANY AND IN EUROPE
Over the past few decades, privacy has become an important issue in many coun-
tries, evolving in parallel with the rapid development of information technologies 
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and the internet. This chapter discusses how historically unique and specifically 
German perspectives on privacy and data protection have shaped the relation-
ship between privacy and security, and how privacy and data protection have 
gained relevance as fundamental rights and as ethical requirements in Europe. 
The chapter shows that the European Union’s (EU) Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) and the recently introduced EU framework for data protection 
have contributed to the growing importance of data protection in everyday life, 
as well as for security agencies.
The EU’s CFR became binding with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. In 2016, 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/6791 and the Directive 
(EU) 2016/6802 on data protection in the area of law enforcement (policing and 
criminal justice) laid down detailed rules on the implementation of data protec-
tion. When the CFR and the GDPR became directly binding, they established 
a solid legal framework for privacy and data protection everywhere in Europe. 
This includes binding rules for companies from outside the EU processing the 
personal data of individuals who are physically in the EU zone, as long as the 
processing activities are related to the monitoring of the individuals’ behaviour 
or to the offering of goods or services (Art. 3(2) GDPR).
This chapter takes a trans-disciplinary historical-institutionalist perspective in 
discussing path dependencies between the misuse of knowledge about citizens by 
former German regimes, and the importance that many German citizens attribute 
to privacy in relation to the state’s security agencies. These issues are related to 
the broader question about to what extent specific characteristics of a political 
system influence the relationship between security, ethics, and privacy.
The chapter uses the terms data protection and privacy not as synonyms, but 
rather as complementary aspects of the same right (see Tzanou, 2017, pp. 21–24 
on the relationship between these terms). The term privacy is laid down in newer 
fundamental rights catalogues such as the EU’s CFR. Privacy guarantees that 
private life is protected against attempts by state agencies and private parties to 
obtain and retain information related to an individual’s private sphere. Data pro-
tection (guaranteed as a fundamental right by Article 8 CFR) is somewhat more 
broad. Data protection includes self-determination with respect to any informa-
tion on individuals. Since privacy and data protection are complementary in rela-
tion to each other, courts tend to refer to both of them in conjunction.
GERMAN EXPERIENCES OF SECURITY AGENCIES 
COLLECTING EXCESSIVE INFORMATION ON CITIZENS
Over the last 90 years, German citizens have been confronted with two political 
regimes that based and enforced their abuse of power on information collected 
about their own citizens and, particularly, about their political opponents. The 
first of these was the Geheime Staatspolizei (commonly known as the Gestapo – 
Secret State Police) during the Nazi regime. The second was the Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit (the ‘Stasi’ – Ministry for State Security) in Eastern Germany. 
It is always a delicate exercise to compare these political regimes – they both 
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oppressed sections of their citizenry, however, they did so for very different rea-
sons and to different extents. With this in mind, in the context of this chapter, it is 
relevant that both political regimes misused information collected by the Gestapo 
and the Stasi for further surveillance purposes. From a security ethics perspec-
tive, it is clear that these historical cases demonstrate the risks related to (mass) 
surveillance by powerful security agencies.
The Gestapo, established in 1933, quickly developed into one of the backbones 
of the Nazi’s racist prosecution strategies. At that time, modern technological 
surveillance, as it is known today in the era of information technology, did not 
yet exist. The information collected about Jewish citizens, political opponents, 
and members of other groups targeted by racist prosecution mostly stemmed 
from denunciation – citizens providing evidence to security agencies for a variety 
of reasons knowing well that this would lead to prosecution, imprisonment and 
even murder – and other information provided by citizens (see Gellately, 1992).
The Stasi was established in early 1950 soon after the eastern zone of Germany, 
occupied by the Soviet Union’s forces at the end of World War II, became the 
German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, the DDR) in 
1949. Until the end of the DDR regime in 1989, the Stasi employed more than 
91,000 full time staff  and a large number of informants in order to conduct sur-
veillance of the country’s 16 million inhabitants, with a particular focus on citi-
zens suspected of being opposed to the DDR regime (see Macrakis, 2008).
Inferring a relationship between the Gestapo and the Staatssicherheit (Stasi) 
on one hand, and the specific sensitivity of German citizens towards privacy on 
the other, seems plausible; however, is difficult to prove based on the available 
empirical data. More than in most other countries, data collection by public 
administration and security agencies and more recently also by private companies 
has triggered powerful social movements in Germany that forced policy-makers 
to take privacy seriously. For example, a social movement successfully stopped 
the 1983 census before the German Constitutional Court (see Section 2). In 2008, 
more than 34,000 citizens signed a constitutional complaint against the retention 
of telecommunication meta data by security agencies for future criminal investi-
gation – what was a step towards the annulment of the relevant EU Directive by 
the Court of Justice of the EU a few years later (cf. Aden, 2016, p. 56f.).
It should not be overlooked that, in any society, significant differences in the 
attitudes towards privacy exist and persist. Some citizens are worried about state 
agencies and private companies collecting their personal data, while others look 
at these practices in a more favourable manner. However, in all countries, oppo-
sition to excessive data collection by state agencies and private companies goes 
beyond specific small groups of civil liberties activists.
These issues, resituated to the current state of technology, are pertinent to the 
currently very high level of information on individuals now accessible to public 
security agencies as well as some private companies. In the cases of the Gestapo and 
the Stasi, this level of information would have made them incalculably more power-
ful; the abuse of state power would have become even more effective and broad.
With online communication and mobile devices such as smartphones and 
laptop computers becoming parts of everyday life, state agencies nowadays can 
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easily track current and past movements and communication. The mass-data col-
lection practices of the US National Security Agency (NSA), disclosed by whistle-
blower Edward Snowden in 2013, and the surveillance system that the Chinese 
government established in order to supervise the behaviour of Chinese citizens, 
demonstrate that states are already able and willing to submit their citizens to a 
regime of mass surveillance and 24/7 monitoring if  no solid ethical culture and 
rule of law framework prevent them from doing so.
DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: THE 1983 GERMAN 
CENSUS CASE
In the specific German variant of a continental rule-of-law system, the recogni-
tion of privacy as a fundamental right means that any kind of data processing by 
a public authority needs an explicit and proportionate legal basis. Since the 1980s, 
this has significantly impacted the legal framework for data processing, initially 
by the former West German security agencies, and now for a united Germany.
The specific privacy regime that characterises the relationship between privacy 
and security in Germany goes back to a landmark judgement by the German 
constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG). The BVerfG enjoys a 
strong position in the German political system, including the power to annul laws 
disproportionally encroaching upon the citizens’ fundamental rights.
In 1983, the then West German government planned to renew the basis for sta-
tistical data collection in a general population census. The government intended 
to combine this census data collection with a renewal of the citizens’ registers, in 
order to verify whether all citizens had correctly declared their residence to the 
local authorities – a legal obligation (Meldepflicht) under German law. However, 
West German civil liberties groups raised concerns, claiming that the combination 
of the census with updating the citizens’ registers would lead to the existence of 
the ‘transparent citizen’ in West Germany. These concerns quickly spread outside 
the civil liberties groups. Protests developed into a social movement, and some 
lawyers involved in the growing movement brought a case before the BVerfG. 
This was possible because, similar to applications before the European Court 
of Human Rights, German citizens are able to bring fundamental rights cases 
directly before the BVerfG as constitutional complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerden). 
In exceptional cases, if  serious harm to fundamental rights is seen as directly 
derived from a German law, citizens do not even have to go to the ordinary courts 
and through the stages of appeal before bringing a case to the BVerfG.
In response to the constitutional complaints brought before it, the BVerfG, 
in its judgement, annulled the 1983 census law. The reasons given by the court at 
that time now sound somewhat prophetic at a distance of almost 40 years, and 
several rounds of technological innovations later.
1. In the context of modern data processing, the general right of personality [Allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht] under Article 2.1 in conjunction with Article 1.1 [Human Dignity – 
Menschenwürde] of  the Basic Law encompasses the protection of the individual against unlim-
ited collection, storage, use and sharing of personal data. The fundamental right guarantees the 
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authority conferred on the individual to, in principle, decide themselves on the disclosure and 
use of their personal data.
2. Limitations of this right to ‘informational self-determination’ are only permissible if  there is 
an overriding public interest. They require a statutory basis that must be constitutional itself  
and comply with the principle of legal clarity under the rule of law. The legislator must fur-
thermore observe the principle of proportionality. It must also put in place organisational and 
procedural safeguards that counter the risk of violating the general right of personality.3
Essentially, the BVerfG judgement established a new fundamental right 
through the interpretation of two already existing rights. Since then, this new 
fundamental right has had a significant impact upon the way in which public 
authorities and private entities process personal data. In the security sector, fed-
eral laws governing criminal procedure, the federal police agencies, and the fed-
eral intelligence services had to be adapted to this new fundamental right. As 
policing is one of the core tasks of the 16 States (Länder) in the German federal 
system, the Länder had to include data processing rules in their policing laws (cf. 
Aden & Fährmann, 2019).
In 2008, the BVerfG even established an additional fundamental right: the 
guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems,4 
again, equally deduced from Articles 2.1 and 1.1 of the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz). The establishment of this new fundamental right in Germany rec-
ognises the relevance of the essential role of personal electronic devices as they 
are used today and the potential threat to privacy if  state surveillance is not effec-
tively limited through legislation. This has become even more relevant since then. 
People use their smartphones and computers all day long, and therefore these 
devices ‘know’ much about their users, in many cases including information on 
the core of private life, such as communication between family members.
PRIVACY AND THE CURRENT STATE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The rapid development of information technology during the past decades (cf. 
Aden, 2019; Nogala, 1989, 2019) creates additional challenges for the relationship 
between privacy and security as well as for security ethics.
The Internet, since the 1990s, has facilitated information sharing and communica-
tion worldwide – it has also enabled security agencies to intercept and retain detailed 
information on every citizen. In one sense, this approach is understandable from the 
perspective of requirements of state agencies to protect their citizens, and, indeed, to 
avoid criticisms of not doing so. Accordingly, in reaction to the terrorist attacks in 
New York City and Washington DC on 11 September 2001, many state security agen-
cies developed mass surveillance strategies. In 2013, whistleblower Edward Snowden 
revealed the extent to which the US NSA retained huge quantities of data, not justifi-
ably related to any specific security purpose. Although Snowden’s revelations led to a 
controversial debate on the legitimacy of mass surveillance, and, in some jurisdictions, 
to certain legal limitations, untargeted surveillance by security agencies was not sub-
stantially restricted (see Lyon, 2015).
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Rapid technological advances have contributed to making mass surveillance 
even more intrusive and in contention with fundamental rights. Carrying a smart-
phone in everyday life means that users produce passive data that security agen-
cies and private parties, such as providers of smartphone applications, can easily 
access. Smartphones therefore have become auto-surveillance tools enabling secu-
rity agencies to monitor individuals and to track their movements. German secu-
rity agencies frequently use stealth pings (‘stille SMS’) in order to secretly detect 
the location of a device and its user. They also use their legal authority to claim 
data on all mobile devices (and their owners) present in a specific area at a given 
time from mobile communication providers in order to find potential suspects 
following a crime (see Fährmann, Aden, & Bosch, 2020, p. 141; Monroy, 2019).
The growing relevance of other devices connected to the internet in everyday 
life (‘internet of things’ or IoT) is likely to make mass surveillance even easier for 
security agencies. Security research is developing new search and identification 
technology, mostly based on the use of biometric data such as fingerprints and 
facial recognition, often combined with automated searches of large quantities of 
data (see Kühne & Schlepper, 2018 for a critique).
During police stops, biometric data stored in ID cards and passports enable 
police officers to use newly introduced mobile devices to compare the personal 
data of the legitimate holder to the data of the individual present at the stop – in 
order to be sure that the passport is not counterfeit or stolen. In German state 
and federal police laws, the legal requirements for background checks in police 
databases tend to be low – mostly the only requirement is that the information is 
necessary to carry out a police task. German police officers therefore routinely 
carry out background checks in police databases: mobile devices enable them to 
collect fingerprints or photographs – they can use this biometric data to check if  
the stopped individual has entries in police databases (cf. Fährmann et al., 2020, 
p. 142f.). The quantity of data accessible in police databases is rapidly grow-
ing, accelerated not only by a new generation of technology, but also by recent 
initiatives to make the EU’s policing and migration databases interoperable: the 
Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System, Eurodac, the newly 
established EU Entry Exit System, and other databases (cf. Aden, 2020 for a 
critique).
In the German rule of  law system, state action that restricts the citizens’ 
use of  their fundamental rights requires a legal basis and proportionate 
safeguards in order to prevent excessive restrictions. Therefore, if  German 
security agencies wish to use new technologies, for example, body-worn cam-
eras or facial recognition, this requires a specific legal basis, defining the 
extent to which these technologies may restrict the right to data protection. 
Technological development can also lead to more performant technologies 
that make already existing legal bases more intrusive to fundamental rights. 
For example, video technology has rapidly become more performant over the 
past decades. With older video cameras, it was often impossible to identify 
individuals in a crowd on video footage. Recent technological development 
allows a comparatively high level of  resolution, and individuals can be more 
easily detected. Therefore, laws authorising video surveillance (Closed Circuit 
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Television, CCTV) have become much more intrusive upon the citizens’ right 
to data protection, even if  the relevant laws have not been amended in their 
wording (see Fährmann et al., 2020, p. 143ff.).
The use of machine learning and artificial intelligence tools by security agen-
cies is also likely to trigger further mass surveillance in the future (cf. Golla, 2020). 
As a result, the fast development of information technology that enables security 
agencies to potentially collect detailed information about all citizens including 
core aspects of their private life will require clear ethical standards and legal limi-
tations that protect the individuals’ fundamental rights.
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DATA 
PROTECTION
Data protection can only be effective if  it is integrated into a solid accountabil-
ity framework. The obligation to explain and justify conduct is a core element 
of accountability (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). As major parts of electronic data pro-
cessing are invisible for the individuals concerned, independent data protection 
authorities play a crucial role as accountability forums (cf. Aden, 2021, p. 35f.).
In addition to independent oversight, transparency is another key fac-
tor involved in the accountability of data processing (cf. Raab, 2012, p. 24ff.). 
Transparency means, in this case, that only if  citizens understand the purposes 
for which security agencies will use and process their data, they are able to decide 
if  these purposes are acceptable to them. Article 5(1) GDPR mentions transpar-
ency as one of the core principles for data protection, along with principles such 
as the legality and fairness of data processing and purpose limitation. Directive 
2016/680 on data protection for policing and criminal justice purposes does not 
explicitly mention transparency as a data protection principle (Article 4(1)). 
However, transparency is referenced as part of the fairness principle laid down 
in Article 4(1) (cf. Johannes & Weinhold, 2018, p. 65; Tzanou, 2017, p. 26). 
Transparency and fairness are closely connected. Only if  the use and application 
of a technology is transparent, and therefore understandable for the citizens, may 
they perceive it as fair and legitimate – and therefore accept it.
In the digital era, the accountability of data processing and principles of fair-
ness and transparency are confronted by new challenges. Even if  citizens wish to 
understand how state agencies and private companies process their personal data, 
mounting quantities of data and complex technologies make this increasingly dif-
ficult. Both security agencies and private companies are not necessarily interested 
in making data processing transparent. In their eyes, transparency may lead to 
critical questions and unwanted monitoring and oversight. More generally, the 
availability of information leads to an asymmetric power relationship (cf. Aden, 
2004, 2018). Power is based on access to and understanding of information and 
knowledge; power can be more easily exerted upon someone who does not under-
stand the data landscape. In this respect, accountability of operators and trans-
parency for citizens are crucial elements of lawful and ethical data processing.
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PRIVACY AND SECURITY – NEW SYNERGIES?
In political debates, privacy and security are often framed in opposition to 
each other, with data protection preventing enforcement agencies from collect-
ing, retaining, and analysing data necessary for combating criminal behaviour 
effectively.
However, political debates, and sometimes also arguments by security practi-
tioners, tend to overestimate this conflict and to underestimate synergies between 
data protection and effective law enforcement. Collecting large quantities of data 
alone does not guarantee effective law enforcement. With increasing quantities 
and types of ‘big data’, quality management, in order to turn it into effective 
intelligence, becomes an ever more demanding task. False or outdated informa-
tion may misguide law enforcement and lead to a loss of precious investigative 
time. Therefore, keeping databases and other information used by security agen-
cies up-to-date is a major issue. In contrast to paper archives, electronic informa-
tion nowadays needs very little space to be stored. Searches in databases have 
become easy and fast, even with vast quantities of data. Therefore, the instances 
of paper files or stacks being full and difficult to manage that forced security 
agencies to trash outdated information in the analogue world are not applicable 
in the digital age.
Thus, one impact and result of privacy regulation can be more effective inves-
tigation and enforcement. Data protection laws prohibit the use of false or out-
dated personal data, in the interest of the individuals concerned, but also in the 
interest of the quality of investigations and effective management of resources. 
According to CFR Article 8 (2), ‘everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified’. False 
or outdated data may have far-reaching consequences for the individuals con-
cerned; for example, an unjustified arrest. Therefore, developing effective tools 
to assure high quality data used for security purposes creates synergies between 
privacy and security. It follows that when privacy laws prevent security agencies 
from collecting a wide swath of data, they are forced to create and use a more 
focussed investigative strategy.
Privacy by design and by default, required by EU data protection law (Article 25 
GDPR and Article 21 Directive 2016/680), also aims to ensure effective con-
sideration of privacy issues at the development and implementation stages of 
new technologies. This is a strategy to prevent the dependency of effective data 
protection on the ‘human factor’ at the end user stage. Data protection solu-
tions that depend upon their application by individual users are likely to be cir-
cumvented or simply forgotten by negligence. Designing technology in a way 
that only allows its use in a way that is data protection friendly is therefore a 
relevant strategy to create synergies between privacy, ethics, and security (see 
Aden & Fährmann, 2019, 2020 on the growing importance of privacy by design 
solutions). Data protection laws only define privacy by design and by default as 
a general obligation. Therefore, specific technological standards will have to be 
developed in order to implement privacy by design and by default for technology 
used by security agencies. Data protection impact assessments (as foreseen by 
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Article 35 GDPR and Article 27 Directive 2016/680) and trans-disciplinary coop-
eration between lawyers, engineers and social scientists can be adequate loci for 
the development of new technologies implementing the ideas of privacy by design 
and by default (cf. Aden & Fährmann, 2020).
TOWARDS EUROPEAN LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CITIZENS’ 
PRIVACY?
In June 2020, two years after the GDPR (EU) 2016/679 entered into force, the 
European Commission drew a generally positive picture.
In an economy increasingly based on the processing of data, including personal data, the 
GDPR is an essential tool to ensure that individuals have better control over their personal 
data and that these data are processed for a legitimate purpose, in a lawful, fair and transparent 
way. (European Commission, 2020, p. 1)
However, additional harmonisation efforts remain on the agenda with respect 
to GDPR rules requiring adaptation to specific issue areas, to opening clauses left 
to the member states’ legislators and to the transposition of the data protection 
directive (EU) 2016/680 for law enforcement into the member states’ laws.
This chapter has shown that Germany has been a forerunner for establishing 
data protection and privacy as fundamental rights. Bad experiences with politi-
cal regimes that built their power on surveillance may have contributed to make 
this topic more relevant in Germany compared to other countries. Surveillance 
strategies by public authorities repeatedly triggered social movements that suc-
cessfully forced policy-makers to take privacy seriously. Through the EU’s CFR, 
binding since 2009, the GDPR and the law enforcement data protection directive, 
similar standards now govern the relationship between security and data protec-
tion in all EU countries. While most areas are covered by the directly binding 
GDPR, data protection standards for security agencies in the area of policing 
and criminal justice have been separately regulated in the law enforcement data 
protection directive – this means that the member states have to transpose the 
directive and establish binding standards in their own laws. However, the wording 
and the substantive data protection standards tend to be similar to those covered 
by the GDPR. Further standards that the European Data Protection Board – 
a coordinating body including the member states’ Data Protection Authorities 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor – and upcoming judgments of the 
Court of Justice of the EU interpreting the GDPR and the directive are likely to 
influence data protection standards for law enforcement as well. Thus, it can be 
forecasted that even in Germany, where policing is one of the core authorities of 
the 16 Länder, improved European standards for data protection will influence 
the security sector as well.
Sociologists of law claim that law has an impact on the behaviour of most peo-
ple (Friedman, 2016). In the digital era, data protection laws that establish ethical 
rules oriented towards the protection of fundamental rights can play a crucial 
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role for security ethics. In Germany, and the EU in general, the increasingly rapid 
development of information and surveillance technology continues to make the 
relationship between security and privacy an important issue for security ethics 
and for the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights against exaggerated intru-
sion into private life for security purposes.
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CHAPTER 9




‘Dual use research’ is research with results that can potentially cause harm as 
well as benefits. Harm can be to people, animals or the environment. For most 
research, harms can be difficult to predict and quantify, so in this sense almost 
all research could be seen as having dual use potential. This chapter will present 
a framework for reviewing dual use research by justifying why the responsibil-
ity for approving and conducting research does not sit with Research Ethics 
Committees (RECs) alone. By mapping out the wider research landscape, it 
will be argued that both responsibility and accountability for dual use research 
sits on the shoulders of broader governance structures that reflect the philo-
sophical and political aspirations of society as a whole. RECs are certainly still 
important for identifying potential ‘dual use research of concern’, and perhaps 
teasing out some of the details that may be hidden within research plans or 
projects, but in a well-functioning system should never be the sole gate keepers 
that determine which research should, and should not, be allowed to proceed.
Keywords: Dual use; dual use research of concern; Research Ethics 
Committee; Institutional Review Board; research governance; research 
integrity
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INTRODUCTION
The general response that humans have to hardship is to be innovative. Nature, in 
the sense of environment and disease, has been a strong driver of innovation, but 
so too has human conflict. As research is often the foundation for innovation, it is 
no surprise to find that research agendas are often based upon addressing threats, 
be they viral pandemics or conflict between nations. While it is no bad thing that 
the narrative of scientific humanism (either secular or religious) is broadly opti-
mistic, it is naïve to think that research agendas can be separated from the context 
of conflict. Understanding and making sense of this context is an important role 
for research ethics.
Perhaps the most obvious, or at least well known, manifestation of research 
ethics comes from the activities of Research Ethics Committees (RECs), also known 
as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in US-influenced countries. These commit-
tees are made up of scientists, lawyers, philosophers and lay-members, whose role 
is to analyse research plans and come to judgements on ethical issues. Historically, 
the need for these committees (henceforth referred to as RECs) has been driven by 
the need to protect participants, especially following atrocities committed during the 
Second World War. Their establishment in the medical sciences is most famously 
described in the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA, 2013), but over the last 50 years 
or so RECs have also become well established in most other research areas. This has 
brought about challenges especially in fields where methodologies, culture and some-
times philosophy differ from the ‘medical model’ of research. However, although still 
viewed as a problem by some in the humanities (Lincoln & Tierney, 2004), the issues 
highlighted by the expansion of RECs have been broadly positive as it has helped to 
move the philosophy of research ethics beyond just considering the physical protec-
tion of research participants, to also encompass the support of researchers and good 
research practice (Trace & Kolstoe, 2018).
While this has been a broadly positive development, it has created overlap, and 
sometimes conflict, between the role and contribution of RECs and other struc-
tures within the research community (such as professional bodies, peer review, 
grant committees, etc.) (Kolstoe & Carpenter, 2019). For instance, in recent years 
concerns relating to ‘research culture’ (Wellcome Trust, 2020) and ‘research integ-
rity’ (Vitae, 2020) have become important. Likewise concerns relating to results 
reproducibility, publication practices and quality control (through peer review 
or otherwise) have increasingly been raised (Munafò et al., 2017). Is it feasible or 
desirable for RECs to play a role in governing such things? If  not who should be 
responsible?
These issues have provided a strong catalyst for attempts to plot out the social 
and institutional structures that underpin research so as to better understand 
where accountability and responsibility lie, or should be made to lie (Science 
and Technology Committee – House of Commons, 2018). This process has also 
forced greater clarity in understanding who within society is responsible for dif-
ferent aspects of research agendas, and likewise defines the limits of all groups, 
structures and organisations that are engaged with research – including RECs 
(Moore & Donnelly, 2018).
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A case in point is the development of offensive Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons (sometimes euphemistically referred 
to as ‘deterrents’ or ‘capabilities’). The indiscriminate destruction caused by such 
offensive technologies created the need for internationally enforced treaties and 
agreement prohibiting many aspects of research that might lead to the refinement 
of such weapons. These agreements are codified in law, and thus become a for-
mal, legally enforced, charter adhered to by most institutions and others involved 
in research activities (NTI, n.d.). While the socially or scientifically aware REC 
member may remain alert to the possibilities of research in these areas, it is sel-
dom the formal role of RECs to identify and form judgements on such research, 
simply because such research is limited by treaty, law or policy well before it gets 
anywhere close to a REC review.
However, CBRN research focussed on offensive weapon capabilities, and sub-
ject to international agreement, presents an overly simplistic case. There are plenty 
of other research projects that are not directly focussed on creating new weapons, 
but which may develop technologies or knowledge that could be applied in mul-
tiple ways – both helpful and harmful. Such technology may be psychological, 
biological, cyber or other types of research with the so-called ‘dual use’ capac-
ity (Kavouras & Charitidis, 2019). Who, or what structure, within the research 
landscape should be responsible for reviewing the underlying research activities 
and determining whether they should or shouldn’t be allowed to proceed? Is this 
a role for RECs?
In the following, I will argue that making judgements on so-called ‘dual use’ is 
not a role for RECs. While I will concede that REC members should remain alert 
for any potential ethical issues that may arise from a specific research protocol, 
I will present a framework that places accountability for ‘dual use’ applications 
well upstream of the REC review. In order to justify this framework, the chapter 
will first define research ethics, and then map out how RECs fit into the broader 
research approvals landscape. This is important because researchers (and often 
even REC members) find the research approvals landscape confusing and often 
repetitive, especially when it comes to identifying who has responsibility and 
accountability for different aspects of research. This is particularly pertinent for 
considering dual use issues that could be argued as representing some of the most 
harmful results of research. Following this mapping exercise, the chapter will 
provide some practical advice for RECs who may be concerned about potential 
applications of the research they review by briefly considering (using examples) 
how RECs can better expand the idea of ‘dual use research of concern’ (DURC) 
(EPA, 2016).
A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY IN RESEARCH
The term ‘research ethics’ is generally used quite broadly to encompass all ethical 
considerations pertaining to research, but the remit of RECs is often significantly 
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narrower. According to the Declaration of Helsinki, the role of a REC is to spe-
cifically consider research protocols:
The research protocol must be submitted for consideration, comment, guidance and approval 
to the concerned research ethics committee before the study begins. (WMA, 2013)
And according to the World Health Organisation (2009):
The main responsibility of a research ethics committee is to protect potential participants in the 
research, but it must also take into account potential risks and benefits for the community in 
which the research will be carried out.
These declarations make it clear that REC review is situated at a particular point 
of time within the research process: RECs consider research plans once detailed pro-
tocols have been developed, but prior to the start of data collection. This is the reason 
why RECs are referred to as IRBs in many countries, perhaps trying to distinguish 
between committees that are established specifically to review research protocols in 
this defined way, and those that are set up to discuss wider ethical issues that may 
impinge upon multiple research protocols. This distinction is important because the 
review of detailed protocols is a complex task requiring specific technical or methodo-
logical expertise (or at least insight), while the review of wider ethical issues is often 
more abstract and less immediate. For this reason, it is important to distinguish clearly 
between the role of RECs reviewing protocols and the role of other groups within the 
research landscape that have been established to consider wider ethical issues framed 
in terms of which types of research ‘should’, or ‘should not’, be allowed to occur.
Asking this latter question of what research ‘should’ or ‘should not’ occur is 
a complicated matter that touches on other areas including politics, philosophy 
and law. As research is essentially a community effort to discover more about the 
world, or address specific problems, it should be no surprise that communities 
of experts play an important role in establishing the priorities within their areas 
of interest. This may happen in a number of different ways, but primarily occurs 
through the distribution of research funds in the form of research grants. The 
effect of this is to essentially remove the ultimate accountability for the topic of 
research from the researchers themselves, in favour of placing it upon the com-
munity that commissions the research through deciding the funding allocation. 
This works in different ways in different contexts (both national and scientific), 
but does mean that the decision of what should or shouldn’t be the subject of 
research becomes heavily influenced by the wider value-forming processes that 
specific nations or cultures choose to employ when making funding allocations. 
However, it is important to note that while this ultimate accountability rests with 
society, from a pragmatic perspective the responsibility for making decisions 
about specific research projects as they are subsequently (often following fund-
ing decisions) developed and implemented lie with others in the system.
To better understand how these more detailed responsibilities are distributed 
it is helpful to consider three related, but distinct, concepts that are common to 
many research systems: (1) research integrity, (2) research governance and (3) the 
role of the REC. Understanding these three roles is key to understanding how 
dual use research should ideally be handled.
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Research Integrity
Should an individual researcher ever create something, or do something, that may 
harm others or the environment? It is helpful to consider the issues surrounding 
this question under the heading of research integrity, or more specifically the 
moral integrity of the researchers themselves.
However, in doing so, it needs to be acknowledged that the word integrity is 
often used in two senses in relation to research. Integrity of research refers to 
issues of trustworthy methods and reproducibility of results, while integrity of 
researchers refers to the character traits of the individual(s) conducting research. 
But, on reflection, these two uses can be collapsed into a single practical defini-
tion wherein a researcher, who shows the character traits of integrity, will produce 
research that also has both methodological and structural integrity. Thus, the best 
way to understand research integrity is to simply consider the attitudes and values 
of researchers themselves because if  they are appropriate, the outcome of the 
research can also be considered to have integrity. This is clearly important when 
considering dual use research because it suggests that researchers themselves, if  
showing integrity, may draw lines as to what they will, or will not, be prepared 
to do.
Surveys of researchers and research stakeholders have listed the key traits of a 
researcher as being rigorous, accurate, original, honest and transparent (Joynson 
& Leyser, 2015). Ongoing empirical work has sought to further define, refine or 
even weigh these desirable traits (Wellcome Trust, 2020), but for the purposes 
of this chapter, research integrity will be taken to mean the character traits of 
researchers that allow the production of reliable and trustworthy research results. 
Given this definition, it becomes clear that research integrity is developed through 
research training and experience. Such training commences in school science les-
sons, continues through undergraduate study, and then perhaps most critically, 
is informed by the mentorship that is provided while studying for higher research 
degrees and subsequently working within professional research teams, often 
subject to the principles and values of membership in professional research 
associations.
While such specialist experience is probably the main driver for developing 
the traits required for research integrity, wider personal experience based upon 
upbringing and other psychological factors also need to be considered as influ-
ential to the attitudes and traits shown by researchers. As a consequence, and as 
with any other population of humans, while there may well be some traits that 
are common to all or most researchers (perhaps rigorous, accurate, original, etc.), 
there are also likely to be legitimate differences of opinion between researchers 
who may equally be considered to be acting with integrity so far as their actual 
research conduct is concerned.
One area of difference concerns the reasons or motivations behind why an 
individual may be conducting research in the first place. Here, some people may 
be driven by a strong desire to create research that helps others, others may be 
driven by curiosity, others by competition or the search for novelty (Joynson & 
Leyser, 2015) and still others perhaps by a feeling of loyalty towards their society 
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or way of life. Such differences are to be expected, but do mean that they may 
manifest as different opinions as to what research is, and is not, acceptable. In 
this sense, for any given researcher to act with integrity, they must also act in line 
with their wider values, thus creating a legitimate difference between researchers.
Given this definition of research integrity, it is entirely reasonable for research-
ers to disagree with each other as to the appropriateness of different research 
projects. But, the important thing to note, is that it is not ‘research integrity’ 
itself  that prohibits certain types of research, but rather how research integrity is 
manifest in different individuals due to the complex interaction between specific 
research values and then wider personal or cultural values.
These differences are broadly positive because healthy debate protects against 
extremism. In general, researchers and scientific communities are particularly 
strong at convening conferences, forums and other fora to discuss (often heatedly) 
differences of opinion. This is the reason why professional societies exist. Their 
influence is particularly important because they lead to the development of codes, 
declarations and even the laws through which research is governed.
However, one critical observation is that while such discussions are often 
referred to as ‘research ethics’, they often occur within the context of broad pro-
fessional and even political debate. Committees may well be set up to examine 
specific issues and create specific ‘ethical’ guidance, but these are not RECs in 
the sense described above. While it is entirely reasonable that REC members may 
want to get involved with such broader ideological discussions, especially if  estab-
lishing precedence based on research protocols that have been reviewed, the main 
role of RECs is to keep their focus quite narrow, focussing specifically on the spe-
cific project protocols they are given to review. Confusing this specific role with 
wider issues regarding research or researcher integrity detracts from the value 
that RECs add to the research ecosystem.
Research Governance
Distinct from research integrity that, as argued in the previous section, focusses on 
the moral values of researchers themselves, research governance is the name given 
to the processes, policies and laws that govern research programmes and projects 
(Kolstoe & Carpenter, 2019). In this broad sense, review by a REC is a necessary 
part of the research governance process, but RECs are not the whole research 
governance process, and nor do they give final ‘approval’ for research to occur. 
Although research can often not occur unless a REC favourable opinion has been 
granted, it is in actual fact the employer/research sponsoring organisation that 
gives the final go ahead or approval for activities conducted by their researchers. 
This is not well understood and causes confusion for many researchers who think 
(mistakenly) that the role of a REC is to provide overall approval for research. 
Viewing RECs in this way is inaccurate because it obscures the important point 
that in order to provide a balanced ethical opinion, RECs should have a degree 
of independence from both the researcher and the establishment that is funding/
conducting the research. While of course bias will always creep in to any decision 
making process, one of the aims for a REC is to try to acknowledge, and therefore 
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address, as many biases as possible. A helpful analogy may be that RECs should 
be to institutions as peer reviewers are to journal editors. Similarly while editors, 
not peer reviewers make the final decision as to whether a manuscript can be pub-
lished, it is research governance systems, not RECs, that make the final decision 
as to whether a research project can go ahead. This is true even if  in practice an 
unfavourable opinion from a REC will often stop most research projects from 
proceeding.
Maintaining this independence does not mean that institutions should not play 
a role in establishing and supporting RECs, but rather that this support should be 
mainly procedural and administrative. Institutions must support the REC process 
without interfering with the REC’s freedom to review and come to opinions on 
research protocols. Quite often this can be achieved by ensuring a certain propor-
tion of members are ‘independent’, meaning not otherwise employed, or subject 
to direct line management, from authority structures within the institution or 
organisation seeking to conduct the research. How independent ‘independent 
enough’ is, and how many of such members there are on a committee, is a matter 
of opinion and perhaps policy. While it would clearly be a problem if  independent 
members were directly antagonistic towards researchers or the research organisa-
tion, at the same time it would defeat the object of independent review if  REC 
members always approved every idea that came before them because of close ties 
with the sponsoring institution, company or organisation.
The next section will discuss the role of RECs in detail, but for the purpose 
of understanding research governance, the key point is that REC review may be 
mandated by governance policy, and RECs may well be supported or directed 
within governance structures specifically through guidance created for them, but 
RECs should always be one step removed from these governance structures so as 
to allow freedom in ethical decision making (Iphofen, 2017). This independence 
is critical particularly if  the subject or topic of the research is contentious.
But why have this independence? Surely it will speed up research prepara-
tion if  RECs are forced to follow the lead from the institution that they support? 
While this is undoubtedly the case, the main argument for REC independence 
comes from a ‘due diligence’ perspective. Insurers, trustees, donors and independ-
ent funders are keen to ensure that institutions, be they universities, government 
departments or private companies, are trustworthy and adhere as close as pos-
sible to their established mission, business task or objective. Where this involves 
research, given the high propensity for waste (Chalmers et al., 2014), it is very 
much within the interests of the organisation to build in as many independent 
checks as possible, one of these being independent REC review. A good research 
governance policy will therefore provide clear guidance as to how a sufficiently 
independent REC can be established, alongside perhaps the framework within 
which it is expected to function.
Establishing a governance framework coupled with guidance for REC review 
is absolutely critical especially when considering potential dual use research. For 
instance, if  the REC is established within an organisation – such as the military 
– where the overall aims and objectives are defence related, this framework and 
guidance should make it absolutely clear to the REC that they should expect 
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to review military related research. Likewise, RECs in organisations that have a 
stated non-military aim should not expect to receive research that has direct mili-
tary application. While projects may, from time to time, slip through, it is actually 
a governance responsibility upstream of the REC review to decide what projects 
are broadly within the remit of the specific organisation. RECs can then be free 
to focus on the details of the research protocol itself, rather than worry about 
whether or not the organisation should be carrying out this type of research in 
the first place.
Role of RECs/IRBs
So far in this chapter, I have argued that the ethical and moral debates surround-
ing dual use research belong upstream of the REC review – primarily as part 
of the discussions surrounding funding allocation, broader subject level research 
integrity considerations (often at a funding or professional society level), but then 
supported by governance processes and guidance that should be screening out, 
or making decisions about, which potential research projects should not proceed 
well prior to review by RECs. But even with these processes in place, how should 
RECs consider or at least approach potential dual use research?
The first thing that RECs need to do is have a clear idea of the policies and 
guidance produced by their hosting organisation, along with the governance 
structures within which they are expected to operate. If, for instance, the organi-
sation hosting the REC has a remit for defence research – such as in a defence 
establishment – it would be inappropriate for the REC to object to such research 
on principle. This does not mean that the REC shouldn’t feel free to raise con-
cerns, but rather that such concerns should be pursued at a relatively high level 
perhaps as a parallel process to the review of specific research protocols, with the 
aim of creating or modifying guidance so as to deal with future occurrences of 
the situation at hand (more details of how this might work are provided in the 
final section). While policy level decisions are under consideration, RECs need to 
ensure they comply with extant policy and guidance as a matter of due process. If  
individual members of RECs find this difficult from an integrity perspective they 
should discuss this with the committee, and potentially abstain from decisions 
or even resign their positions if  they feel morally unable to agree with the overall 
governance structure and guidance within which the REC is expected to operate. 
To summarise, it is not the RECs role to determine the governance structures 
within which they operate, although they can feedback their views on whether 
current policy is effective and thus hopefully engage constructively to review and 
improve policy over time.
Secondly, the REC role is not to judge the personal integrity of the research-
ers. Whereas the competency of researchers to conduct the proposed study is 
clearly an issue for the REC, wider judgements on the integrity of the research-
ers themselves are not a matter for the REC. This is because, and as mentioned 
above, research integrity is a complex mix of personal, professional, societal 
and even political values. RECs need to understand that researchers may hold 
a wide range of views as to the types of research that should (or should not) be 
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conducted. If  the REC is concerned by these broader opinions or attitudes (in 
contrast to specific concerns regarding the protocol under review) these should 
again be raised parallel to the reviewing of research protocols with professional 
bodies, or by pursuing dialogue with specific research communities or govern-
ance structures.
This distinction between making a decision on a protocol using extant govern-
ance policy and guidance, and raising broader integrity or governance concerns at 
a higher level can feel like a very limiting compromise imposed upon REC mem-
bers especially if they have specific concerns about the application of research pro-
grammes or ideas. However, it must be acknowledged that predicting the ultimate 
use of research findings, and also making character/integrity judgements about 
specific researchers, is a very difficult task. If RECs were expected to do this for 
every project that they reviewed it is unlikely that they would come to any decision 
or have time to consider other important aspects within their remit (such as the 
protection of research participants). As a consequence, the REC must make the 
pragmatic decision to focus on the concerns raised by the specific project at hand 
so as to come to an expedient decision and then, if REC members still feel strongly 
inclined, pursue any wider concerns about issues of dual use or similar with those 
who can influence or change both governance policy and/or professional guidelines.
In this respect the membership, and attitude of the members of RECs is 
critically important. Alongside having the requisite (as defined by the relevant 
governance policy) mix of expert and lay members, the members also need to 
understand that their role is not to create new policy directly, or influence the 
values of research communities on the fly as they review specific projects. While 
of course REC members will pick up key experience that will be valuable in the 
subsequent creation or modification of policies, guidelines and in some cases even 
laws, this input should be saved for the correct time, which is seldom during the 
REC review of a specific project protocol.
The only exception may be when REC members, due to their experience, note 
a legal issue. While the responsibility for ensuring legality and obtaining legal 
opinions is a research governance issue (as this is where the accountability ulti-
mately sits), it can be helpful for a REC to flag to the research team that they 
may need to look into the legality of some aspects of the proposed work. A good 
example of this comes from data protection legislation (and particularly confu-
sions cause by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation) wherein RECs may 
be more familiar than the researchers as to the best ways for the required informa-
tion to be presented.
DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN
The complexities of trying to determine the potential for research specifically 
within the biological sciences in relation to the creation of potentially weapon-
isable biological organisms has recently led to the term Dual Use Research of 
Concern or `DURC' being used (EPA, 2016). Although the term has primarily 
come from the life sciences, it is useful more broadly as it distinguishes between a 
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set of research that may potentially have more than one use which, as mentioned 
in the introduction, could include almost any research, and the set of research 
that causes specific concerns due to this dual use. Since some research may move 
in and out of the category of DURC depending on the way that it is governed, 
or alternatively it may not be clear until after the protocol has been developed 
exactly what the concerns might be, it is not unreasonable for RECs to play 
a legitimate role in highlighting DURC to both the governing institution and 
more widely if  necessary. However, while playing an important role in initiating 
such conversations (with individuals from RECs perhaps legitimately becoming 
involved in subsequent debates) it must be reiterated that the REC role is very 
much to initiate these discussions, not develop ad hoc policy or guidance. The 
REC will therefore often need to accept that there is no policy reason why a 
specific project under consideration should not go ahead at that time, even if  the 
REC has broader concerns that the extant policy environment is not suitably 
dealing with the specific DURC. The REC does, however, have an important 
subsequent duty to flag the issue so as to initiate policy change.
One, perhaps fairly straightforward, example where a REC might play an 
important role in identifying DURC would be the situation where, when review-
ing a protocol, the REC considers that some of the information being gathered 
by the researchers (if  put in the public domain) might be useful for planning or 
implementing a terrorist attack. In this situation, the REC would be acting well 
within its remit to ask the research team whether they had considered this possi-
bility, and perhaps ask for a written response detailing how the research team will 
mitigate against this risk in much the same way as the REC would ask for details 
of the mitigation of any other risk. If  the REC is not satisfied with the subsequent 
response it could provide an unfavourable opinion (again in the same way as when 
unsatisfied by responses on any other topic) and then feed its reasoning back to 
the organisation responsible for the research. While not directly proposing solu-
tions, by serving as a blocker to the research the REC would be flagging the issue 
as a serious, research stopping, concern that requires further thought by others 
within the research system and perhaps the development of new guidance/policy.
A second, more complex, example of DURC might be in the development 
and testing of a novel technology (such as a radar system) that alongside civilian 
applications may also be used to increase the lethality of a weapons system. Here, 
the REC would initially need to consider whether the support for such research 
was allowed under the governance framework within which both the REC and 
the research team operated. If, for instance, the REC was situated within a uni-
versity that had a clear commitment not to engage with research that has a clear 
lethal potential, the REC would be acting well within its remit to provide an 
unfavourable opinion for such a project on the grounds of governance policy. 
In this case, the REC would also need to flag to its appointing authority that 
this research should not have been allowed to reach the REC in the first place. 
Conversely, if  the REC was instead situated within a governance structure and 
organisation/institution with a clear military or defence remit, it would be unrea-
sonable for the REC to provide an unfavourable decision on the same grounds. 
This is not to say that REC members should not express specific concerns about 
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how the research may be conducted and/or applied, but rather that such con-
cerns should be based upon the premise that there was no reason, per se, that 
lethal research should not be conducted due to it being acceptable under cur-
rent policy/governance arrangements. The REC may well still decide to provide 
an unfavourable opinion on other grounds such as risk to participants, or even 
concerns that the resulting technology may cause unacceptable injuries to enemy 
combatants, but the justification for this unfavourable opinion would need to be 
specific to the protocol/application rather than based upon a blanket disapproval 
for research of this kind.
In these examples, presuming unfavourable opinions from the REC, what hap-
pens next would be down to the actions of the research or governance team. 
While these teams may well be frustrated by the REC decision, they are in a much 
better position to initiate further discussions within the research integrity and 
governance realms, simply because as researchers in the field they are both mem-
bers of the relevant communities and also (hopefully) experts in the scientific/
methodological area. As a consequence, they are far better positioned to raise 
the issue, participate in discussions, and hopefully come up with an acceptable 
solution that could subsequently be supplied to the REC in the form of guidance 
should another, similar, protocol be presented for review. The solution could, for 
instance, take the form of a new policy, process or procedure endorsed by the 
field (or at least sponsoring institution), demonstrating how they acknowledge 
the original issue flagged by the REC, and detailing an agreed course of action. 
While individual members of the REC may still feel uneasy, and of course the 
REC would still be able to ask further questions if  needed, demonstrating that the 
research fits within formal guidance endorsed by the sponsoring organisations, 
and even potentially the field of research, should go at least some way to allaying 
the RECs concerns.
If, however, a REC continued to feel strongly about certain types of research 
(either methodologies or programmes), and the solution did not seem to evolve 
through the process outlined above, the onus would then be on the chair of the 
REC to raise the issue with the authority appointing the REC, perhaps directly 
asking for guidance for how to deal with the issue should/when it occurs in future 
protocols. As a consequence, the solution for both the REC and the researchers 
would be improved guidance ideally agreed by both researchers and the authority 
governing the REC.
CONCLUSION
Almost all research has the possibility for dual use, some of which may also cause 
legitimate concern. Considering this potential is primarily a role for research 
communities, or at least the communities that are responsible for commission-
ing, funding and governing the research in the first place. Arrangements can 
then be made through the use of guidance in the form of professional (integrity) 
standards, and more explicit governance policies or arrangements. Ideally any 
potential for DURC would be identified and dealt with long before a research 
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protocol was presented to a REC. However, should a REC have concerns regard-
ing DURC in a protocol under review, they should first look to see whether this 
DURC was considered acceptable under the committee’s terms of reference. If  
not, the REC should seek clarification with the researchers as they would any 
other concern before providing an unfavourable opinion. As with any other unfa-
vourable ethics opinion this should give the researcher cause to discuss the con-
cern within their research field and governance contacts. If  the research field or 
governing institution/sponsor disagreed with the REC, such discussions should 
lead to new or better guidance that could be presented to the REC alongside any 
future applications of a similar nature. Although the REC should not formally 
take part in these discussions (as such discussions are not within the remit of the 
REC reviewing specific protocols) it would be well within the responsibility of the 
REC chair and other members to take part in subsequent debates in a personal 
capacity, so as to help provide new guidance on the DURC in question that could 
be then be applied during future REC reviews.
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CHAPTER 10
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS: 
COMMUNITY-BASED AND 
SYSTEMS-BASED APPROACHES
Daniel Paul and Alex Stedmon
ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been a growing dialogue around community-based 
and systems-based approaches to security risk management through the intro-
duction of top-down and bottom-up knowledge acquisition. In essence, this 
relates to knowledge elicited from academic experts, or security subject-matter 
experts, practitioner experts, or field workers themselves and how much these 
disparate sources of knowledge may converge or diverge. In many ways, this 
represents a classic tension between organisational and procedural perspectives 
of knowledge management (i.e. top-down) versus more pragmatic and experi-
ence focussed perspectives (i.e. bottom-up).
This chapter considers these approaches and argues that a more consistent 
approach needs to address the conflict between procedures and experience, 
help convert field experience into knowledge, and ultimately provide effective 
training that is relevant to those heading out into demanding work situations. 
Ultimately, ethics and method are intricately bound together in whichever 
approach is taken and the security of both staff and at-risk populations depends 
upon correctly managing the balance between systems and communities.
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INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen a rise in security issues around the world. In the wake 
of growing insecurity, organisations have looked to improve their security risk man-
agement frameworks, developing concepts which originated in the health and safety 
field to deal with more pressing risks such as terrorist acts, abduction, and piracy. 
Risks that were previously exclusive to the battlefield are now prevalent in situations 
affecting a range of overseas workers, from frontline humanitarian workers, oil and 
gas executives, media reporters and journalists, government officials, business travel-
lers, and even regular tourists. For example, research indicates that one in five human-
itarian workers experienced intentional violence (Buchanan & Muggah, 2005) and 
that this high rate supported Claus’s (2011, 2015) observations that humanitarian 
organisations face more risks than other sectors.
The literature on security studies has traditionally focussed on states as the 
main actors (Browning & McDonald, 2011). Security studies as an academic field 
have neglected the individual as a viewpoint, attempting to understand broader 
security issues on why states go to war and how military power is projected (Buzan 
& Hansen, 2009). A shift in this approach occurred at the end of the Cold War 
in 1991 with the emergence of critical security studies, which shifted the focus to 
individuals, considering human rights, effects of non-state conflict (such as ter-
rorism), and the effects of criminal activity (Williams, 2013).
Early academic sources in humanitarian security began to appear in the late 
1990s when three articles were published in the journal Humanitäres Völkerrecht 
(International Humanitarian Law), discussing security practices within the United 
Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and humanitarian non-
governmental organisations in general (Connelly, 1998; Dind, 1998; Van Brabant, 
1998a, respectively). The articles addressed the changing nature of what they 
termed the ‘humanitarian space’, or the environments in which humanitarian 
programmes occur, stating that there was an increase in attacks against humani-
tarian workers.
This prompted the first statistical review into humanitarian worker deaths 
(Bolton et al., 2000). The study concluded that attacks against humanitarian 
workers were on the rise caused by an increase in conflicts between non-state 
actors, such as rival militias, and lawlessness as the main driver (Bolton et al., 
2000). However, there was a greater range of risks that workers were exposed to, 
such as being caught in the crossfire between warring groups, landmines, abduc-
tion and kidnapping, and crime related to lawlessness, such as muggings and car-
jacking (Bolton et al., 2000; Martin, 1999).
An important document was released in 2000 titled Good Practice Review 8: 
Operational Security in Violent Environments (Van Brabant, 2000). This built on 
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earlier work by Van Brabant (1998a), Martin (1999), and through consultation 
with a range of humanitarian sector staff, to pose a new model for security man-
agement. This document was the first true work to draw together thinking in 
the sector (Harmer & Schreter, 2013). It emphasised the need for humanitarian 
organisations to take more responsibility for staff  security, provide training to 
ensure staff  are prepared, as well as foster the acceptance of the organisation’s 
presence and work with the communities they help (Van Brabant, 2000). This 
created the community-based approach as a school of thought within the sector 
(Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006).
APPROACHES TO SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT
The impetus to change security management in the sector led to the development 
of community-based and systems-based approaches (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 
2006). The community-based approach views security from the bottom-up, with 
the individual humanitarian worker and their unique perspective as the focal 
point, while the systems-based approach is top-down, which puts security advi-
sors and their procedures at the centre of design and implementation (Schneiker, 
2015).
Community-based, Bottom-up Approach
The community-based approach began to gain traction around the turn of 
the twenty-first century (Martin, 1999; Van Brabant, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). The 
approach relies on local communities to trust and support the organisation and 
their work, thus reducing risks to humanitarian workers (Martin, 1999). As it 
relies on the community to accept the presence of the humanitarian organisa-
tion, it is also referred to as the ‘acceptance’ approach (Van Brabant, 1998a). In 
this approach, security is effectively cultivated at the field level (Schneiker, 2015), 
with the organisational level providing support and resources (Van Brabant, 
2000). Successful acceptance also required organisations to gain acceptance from 
potentially aggressive actors (Van Brabant, 1998b), with organisations needing 
to ‘obtain credible security guarantees’ (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006, p. 71). 
Where strong acceptance exists, the community is likely to protect humanitarian 
workers if  possible or warn them of potential danger (Van Brabant, 2000).
With this approach it is necessary for workers to meet with local community 
members, though doing this they are exposed to possible risks (Van Brabant, 
2001). The approach emphasises the need for workers’ training, such as on mine 
awareness, communications, and how to survive an abduction (Bollentino, 2006).
Brunderlein and Grassmann (2006) identified four weaknesses with the com-
munity-based approach:
•	 The approach relies on the community trusting the humanitarian workers.
•	 Communities can be unaccepting of organisations because of their resentment 
to the country they are from.
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•	 Communities need to provide security for the humanitarian workers, but in 
some circumstances cannot provide their own security.
•	 Relies on individuals who have the necessary experience to build relationships 
with key stakeholders.
The approach is also reliant on humanitarian workers who can develop rela-
tionships with others and build trust (Van Brabant, 2001). The approach requires 
humanitarian workers to have close relationships with the community and face 
the same risks they face (Martin, 1999; Schneiker, 2015). This promotes ‘emo-
tional decision making’ where risks may not be assessed realistically (Daudin & 
Merkelbach, 2011, p. 7), resulting in workers staying with the community when 
they should leave (Neuman & Weissman, 2016, p. 16). The context of decision 
making is therefore extremely complex and humanitarian staff  represent a large 
area of risk themselves, who can take a ‘negligent attitude towards their own secu-
rity’ (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006, p. 67). The wealth of literature in the field 
of anthropology, ethnography, and indigenous studies points up the diverse ethi-
cal and methodological challenges that can arise when taking such an approach 
(George, MacDonald, & Tauri, 2020; Iphofen, 2011–2013).
Systems-based, Top-down Approach
The systems-based approach emerged from a review of the 2003 attacks in Iraq, which 
emphasised the need for more organisational oversight of field security (Ahtisaari, 
2003). This approach favours ‘top-down’ management of security (Schneiker, 2015), 
focussing on enforcing standardised procedures (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006), 
including manuals, guidelines, and rules (Harmer, Haver, & Stoddard, 2010). Danger 
is seen as a quantitative measure, relying on mathematics to determine risk levels so 
that it can be avoided altogether (Neuman & Weissman, 2016). In this way, it replaces 
the subjective nature of awareness with more scientific methods (i.e. based on empiri-
cal approaches) to elicit knowledge from security experts who are used to decide and 
design procedures (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006), and attempting to move away 
from the gut-feeling responses which were often of importance in the community-
based approach (Harmer et al., 2010). Training focusses on following these proce-
dures, rather than helping staff develop risk awareness (Barnett, 2004).
Unlike the community-based approach, the systems-based approach views 
security as a functional entity that can be modelled, predicted, and controlled 
(Collinson & Duffield, 2013; Neuman & Weissman, 2016). In this way, the influ-
ence of the individual humanitarian worker is minimised or eliminated (Beerli & 
Weissman, 2016), as individual decision making is seen as too unpredictable to 
manage effectively (Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011).
Brunderlein and Grassmann (2006) identified four weaknesses to the systems-
based approach:
•	 It relies on the quality of risk assessments and therefore the security intelligence.
•	 It is reactive and based on generic risks and responses, which oversimplifies the 
complex nature of political, social, and economic risks.
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•	 To be effective, it needs an effective response capability, such as that provided 
by the military.
•	 It skews the long-term outlook for programmes, instead of putting more 
emphasis on immediate security.
This rigid nature of security systems, where experts are relied on to provide 
advice and staff  are given rules and procedures to follow, can create a false sense 
of security where individual responsibility for security awareness is removed 
(Barnett, 2004; Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011). The role of security experts may 
give other staff  a belief  that the experts alone are responsible for security, thus 
‘everybody’s business becomes nobody’s business’ and overall security capabil-
ity is reduced (Fast, Freeman, O’Neill, & Rowley, 2013, p. 236). Furthermore, 
quantifying risk can answer where, when, and how questions, but does not pro-
vide answers on why risks occur which further reduces general understanding and 
awareness (Brooks, 2016).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOP-DOWN AND  
BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES
The community-based and systems-based approaches should, in theory, be 
complementary to each other (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006): effective risk-
analysis can inform when community-based approaches are safe to implement, 
which allows staff  to build acceptance which in turn provides greater access to 
information to inform risk-analysis (Bollentino, 2008). However, the community-
based approach has not been largely adopted by many organisations (Brunderlein 
& Grassmann, 2006) and is poorly supported by literature or studies of how it 
works in practice (Bollentino, 2008; Grassmann, 2005). Not long after it was 
proposed, the attacks in Iraq occurred, which prompted many organisations to 
believe that the community-based approach did not work (Grassmann, 2005).
The attacks revealed the difficulty in building acceptance, which is critical 
for the community-based approach, as it is required from all parties, including 
those who are potential aggressors (Van Brabant, 2001). There are some countries 
where this is not possible however (Collinson & Duffield, 2013) since in some 
contexts there are groups that promote anarchy and do not want humanitarian 
organisations helping the local community (Childs, 2013; Egeland, Harmer, & 
Stoddard, 2011). As with the ongoing conflict in Syria, extremist groups explicitly 
seek a lack of stability and promote violence. Such conflicts are likely to continue 
worldwide, which are typified by guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and a rise in law-
lessness, meaning the groups from whom acceptance is needed are likely to be 
opposed to humanitarian goals (Burkle, 2005; Fast & Wille, 2010; Kaldor, 2012). 
This presents a considerable challenge to the ethical demands of ethnographic 
and indigenous research.
Arguably the community-based approach cannot be effective with humanitar-
ian work, which has become increasingly politicised (Bollentino, 2008; Brunderlein 
& Grassmann, 2006; Duffield, 2014; Fast et al., 2013). Duffield (2014) discusses 
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how many humanitarian organisations have started to move away from impartial 
approaches, in which assistance is given to all based on their need, even where 
such groups could be partial to and fuelling conflicts. Organisations instead 
become peacebuilders, planning programmes to bring about an end to conflict 
(Duffield, 2014). Programmes with such aims are often better funded by donors, 
which also include government institutions, which limits what community groups 
the funding can support and ultimately makes humanitarian aid political in 
nature (Egeland et al., 2011; Fast et al., 2013), therefore limiting how effective the 
community-based approach can be.
Considering both the politicisation of aid as well as the perceived need to pro-
fessionalise security, the sector has largely adopted systems-based approach over 
a community-based approach (Claus, 2011; Collinson & Duffield, 2013; Daudin 
& Merkelbach, 2011; Egeland et al., 2011).
The systems-based approach allows investment in a central system which can 
be implemented in other communities, while the community-based approach 
means investment is in one local area (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; Childs, 
2013). Investment into local acceptance is seen as financially risky as the approach 
does not always ensure security (Collinson & Duffield, 2013). Furthermore, the 
systems-based approach also allows an organisation to document how it meets 
its legal Duty of Care obligations; or their obligations to take necessary meas-
ures to protect staff  (Kemp & Merkelbach, 2011). Organisations are becoming 
more aware of their legal obligations in comparison to before the 2003 attacks 
(Kemp & Merkelbach, 2011; Klamp, 2007) and implement systems to protect 
their staff  and reputation, which in turn allows them to compete for further fund-
ing (Bollentino, 2008).
Lastly, the systems-based approach is easier to achieve as a strategy (Neuman 
& Weissman, 2016), where management can mark progress by identifying what 
measures have been implemented and how many staff  have received training 
(Barnett, 2004). The measures implemented are also more objective at keeping 
staff  safe (Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011; Schneiker, 2015), whereas community-
based approaches are subjective in their effect on improving security (Brunderlein 
& Grassmann, 2006). Therefore, the systems-based approach is preferred to the 
community-based approach in terms of finance, documenting legal obligations as 
well as management oversight.
Though the systems-based approach seeks to replace individual judgement 
with standardised procedures (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; Collinson 
& Duffield, 2013; Neuman & Weissman, 2016), intuitive decision making still 
occurs with field workers who undervalue the need to collect and analyse data 
on security (Buchanan & Muggah, 2005). Several authors note that field staff  
often resist standards imposed from the top-down (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 
2006; Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011; Neuman & Weissman, 2016). One explana-
tion is that security objectives are prioritised over programme activities, therefore 
hindering field staff  completing their work (Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011; Fast, 
Freeman, O’Neill, & Rowley, 2014; Schneiker, 2015).
Another explanation is that a disparity exists between what field workers and 
security experts believe is necessary to ensure operational security (Adams, 2003; 
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Barnett, 2004; Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; Collinson & Duffield, 2013; 
Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011). Where this conflict in knowledge management 
exists, staff  are likely to follow their own understandings and beliefs over the 
instruction of security experts, either passed through training or through pro-
cedures (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011). Issues 
in knowledge mismanagement can mean that systems implemented to keep staff  
safe are not followed, staff  are ill-prepared for the environments they deploy to 
and the organisation is unable to achieve its goal. This conflict highlights an area 
of significance not yet fully explored in the literature.
CONFLICT OF KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN TOP-DOWN AND 
BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES
The top-down systems-based approach emphasises the role of the security expert 
as the knowledge creator, responsible for designing the system and the supporting 
material for its implementation (Barnett, 2004; Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; 
Burns, Burnham, & Rowley, 2013). In doing so, the knowledge and experience of 
field workers is neglected (Bollentino, 2008; Buchanan & Muggah, 2005; Neuman 
& Weissman, 2016). There are three areas where the literature outlines how this 
conflict in knowledge has a negative impact: a conflict between procedures and 
what field workers know to be true, the inability to convert experience into knowl-
edge to improve security systems and training being ineffective at improving staff  
security.
Conflict between Procedures and Experience
Multiple authors note the disregard many field workers have for the security 
procedures imposed on them to keep them safe (Ahtisaari, 2003; Collinson & 
Duffield, 2013; Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011; Neuman & Weissman, 2016; Van 
Brabant, 2000). Daudin and Merkelbach (2011) state that there is a tendency 
for field staff  to only follow rules that reflect their own beliefs and experience. 
Adams (2003) makes the point that this is a natural behaviour of people, using 
the everyday example of crossing the road to frame the issue: though the experts 
designed the system so that people wait until the red light shows before crossing, 
many people will use their own judgement to see if  it is clear and cross even when 
the light is not red. Adams (2003) used this example to frame his discussion on 
how people ignore systems where they believe they have a better understanding 
of the solution ‘in context’.
Security procedures lose even more buy-in from staff  when they do not directly 
reflect the situation field workers find themselves in (Barnett, 2004; Collinson & 
Duffield, 2013). One example of this is a rule commonly imposed that prevents 
those with weapons using organisation vehicles (e.g. People in Aid, 2008, p. 17), 
so the organisation remains neutral. In reality, if  an armed person wants to get 
into the vehicle the humanitarian workers have no way of refusing them carriage. 
Though such a rule ignores the local context (Barnett, 2004; Collinson & Duffield, 
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2013), Beerli and Weissman (2016) state that humanitarian workers are likely to 
face disciplinary action if  rules are broken, rather than be commended for their 
individual judgement. In one study, such an approach was documented to reduce 
the reporting of incidents by field staff  for fear of losing their jobs (Donnelly & 
Mazurana, 2017). This reduces the ground-truth-reality of how many incidents 
occur, weakening a systems approach which is reliant on statistics for risk assess-
ments (Bollentino, 2008).
Field Experience is Not Converted into Knowledge
Underlying the disparity between procedures and experience is the inability for 
organisations to utilise staff  experience effectively (Bollentino, 2008; Buchanan 
& Muggah, 2005). The systems-based approach downplays the role of individual 
knowledge, which is seen as too diverse and incoherent to be of use (Daudin 
& Merkelbach, 2011). However, those workers who have amassed experience 
of working in high-risk environments are likely to be able to rectify procedural 
and training issues and help review the security systems in use (Barnett, 2004; 
Bollentino, 2008; Buchanan & Muggah, 2005; Collinson & Duffield, 2013; Darby 
& Williamson, 2012).
Nonetheless, there is an ‘inability to institutionalise staff  experience’ 
(Bollentino, 2008, p. 265) and a largely ad hoc approach to its use (Burns et al., 
2013; Persaud, 2014). Where staff  experience has been utilised to improve secu-
rity, it has been at the expense of formal training: a study conducted on security 
issues in Darfur found that new workers had not been given basic training and 
experienced staff  had been expected to guide and look after novice workers, even 
though their experience was from other countries and not necessarily appropriate 
(Eckroth, 2010).
The need to capture this knowledge is important for humanitarian organi-
sations, which suffer a high staff  turnover compared to other lines of work 
(Richardson, 2006). This has been identified as a general weakness in knowl-
edge sharing across multiple areas in the sector, including security (Darby & 
Williamson, 2012; Emmens, Hammersley, & Loquercio, 2006; Richardson, 2006). 
In a study conducted on reasons staff  leave, one of the reasons highlighted was 
not the risk itself  but the lack of training and inappropriate preparations to face 
such dangers (Emmens et al., 2006). Therefore, if  experience is not effectively 
converted into knowledge it cannot be used by humanitarian organisations to 
improve security training and preparations, which will itself  continue causing a 
high staff  turnover and loss of knowledge.
Training is Ineffective at Improving Staff Security
The systems-based approach has reduced training so that it focusses more on how 
to follow the procedures, rather than how staff  can effectively assess and respond 
to risks themselves (Barnett, 2004; Burns et al., 2013; Persaud, 2014). As such, 
field-based training is largely replaced with classroom activities (Barnett, 2004; 
Persaud, 2014) and many staff  deploy into the field unprepared (Barnett, 2004), 
with many not receiving any training at all (Egeland et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
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training has generally become focussed on hard measures, such as how to respond 
to gunfire, grenades, or minefields (Bollentino, 2006; Daudin & Merkelbach, 
2011) at the expense of ‘soft’ measures, such as communication skills, situation 
awareness, and leadership which are likely to be more effective in some settings 
(George et al., 2020; Persaud, 2014). This results in staff  being unable to assess 
the likelihood and risk of harm themselves, nor elicit information from local 
communities, therefore becoming reliant on their organisation’s security experts 
(Barnett, 2004). This further reduces the ability of those in the field to be able to 
think dynamically about risk themselves, instead being reliant on the system to 
protect or guide them (Bollentino, 2008; Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011). In this 
sense, security becomes seen as a technical problem which can only be solved with 
technical expertise (Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011) and training becomes introduc-
tory in nature (Bollentino, 2006; Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006).
The difference in view is often made worse when organisations use exter-
nal suppliers for training, which is increasingly common (Burns et al., 2013; 
Collinson & Duffield, 2013; Persaud, 2014). These external providers are only 
able to give generic training which does not draw upon and incorporate staff  
experience (Barnett, 2004; Persaud, 2014), and the training often excludes any 
focus on the specific risks workers may face (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; 
Eastman, Evert, & Mishori, 2016). There has also been a critique of how effective 
such training is, with security experts varying in experience level, many of whom 
have experience from military or police roles that do not necessarily translate into 
the humanitarian context (Persaud, 2014).
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN SECURITY
The triad of conflict areas highlight fundamental aspects surrounding the mis-
management in knowledge within the two approaches. The shift to the top-down 
approach has minimised the role of the individual (Beerli & Weissman, 2016) 
and has made field workers dependent on the security systems, rather than able 
to think flexibly and independently (Barnett, 2004; Bollentino, 2008; Daudin & 
Merkelbach, 2011). However, a lack of focus on the knowledge of humanitarian 
workers has had three marked impacts:
•	 There is a conflict between what workers know to be effective and the pro-
cedures in place (Adams, 2003; Collinson & Duffield, 2013; Daudin & 
Merkelbach, 2011).
•	 Field experience is not converted into knowledge for use within the organisation 
(Bollentino, 2008; Buchanan & Muggah, 2005; Darby & Williamson, 2012).
•	 Training is introductory in nature and does not effectively improve security 
(Barnett, 2004; Burns et al., 2013; Persaud, 2014).
This inability to utilise experience and knowledge of field workers weakens the 
overall system (Bollentino, 2008; Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; Buchanan & 
Muggah, 2005).
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When top-down and bottom-up knowledge does not align, the systems in place 
to support users are weakened (Wilson, 2005). Daudin and Merkelbach (2011) 
stated that this is the case in the humanitarian sector where there is little input 
from the field level. They discussed issues around security procedures, stating that 
there was little input from those on the ground, and therefore the content of the 
procedures diverges. However, from recent research (Paul, 2018) there is evidence 
that knowledge, in the form of requirements, converges more than it diverges.
This seems to contradict what has been observed in previous research, in which 
several authors found a misalignment between the organisational and field levels 
in terms of security thinking (Barnett, 2004; Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006; 
Egeland et al., 2011; Martin, 1999; Persaud, 2014; Van Brabant, 2001). Field 
workers classed as practitioner experts (Burton & Shadbolt, 1995) will have had 
the opportunity to internalise knowledge, through repeated exposure and experi-
ence of utilising security in practical situations (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).
The argument posed in the literature that top-down and bottom-up knowl-
edge does not align may be more relevant for less experienced workers. This is 
potentially supported through studies on humanitarian worker deaths that show 
inexperienced workers are more at risk (Bolton et al., 2000; Buchanan & Muggah, 
2005; Burnham & Rowley, 2005). Bolton et al.’s (2000) study, which is the only 
one accounting for length of service, concluded that out of the 382 deaths stud-
ied, 31% occurred within the first three months of service, with 17% occurring 
within the first month, with a median of eight months. This is also backed up by 
observations and reflections of experienced field workers (Paul, 2018). Further 
study is needed to identify at what stage field workers adopt and demonstrate 
more expert skill levels and stop showing qualities identified as those demon-
strated by novice workers.
Further research using simulated training scenarios has demonstrated that 
training in itself  was not effective in ensuring novice workers are able to effec-
tively operate in high-risk environments (Paul, 2018). Those who were classed 
as inexperienced (i.e. less than five years’ experience) were not able to effectively 
apply the explicit knowledge learnt on the day to the scenarios encountered. This 
largely reflects what is stated in the literature, that training is only introductory, 
generic, and cannot fully prepare staff  for high-risk environments (Brunderlein 
& Grassmann, 2006; Darby & Williamson, 2012; Egeland et al., 2011; Persaud, 
2014).
Organisations sometimes view training as a means of meeting their ‘Duty 
of Care’ requirements (Barnett, 2004; Daudin & Merkelbach, 2011; Kemp 
& Merkelbach, 2011). However, training itself  cannot be the end state. This is 
supported by Claus (2015), an expert on Duty of Care and legal obligations of 
organisations, who states that organisations are responsible to ensure not only 
the systems in place but also that staff  are effectively trained for the environments 
they deploy into. Addressing these concerns will allow a better understanding 
of where knowledge diverges, which in turn would allow organisations to ensure 
that staff  receive the right training to ensure they are prepared for high-risk envi-
ronments (Claus, 2015). Furthermore, this would allow organisations’ Human 
Resources departments to ensure that only those who are able to demonstrate 
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the required skills are selected for projects in high-risk environments (Darby & 
Williamson, 2012).
The lack of engaging field workers in developing solutions (Barnett, 2004; 
Collinson & Duffield, 2013) means that ‘bottom-up’ community-based knowl-
edge is rarely elicited. Organisations that fail to do this lose knowledge which 
could improve systems and give them a competitive advantage, either over others 
or more pertinently for this domain over the problem (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka 
& Takeuchi, 1995). This mission-critical information is lost over time in many 
sectors due to an ageing workforce (Dzekashu & McCollum, 2014). This is even 
more prevalent in the humanitarian sector due to an above average rate of staff  
turnover (Balbo, Heyse, Korff, & Wittek, 2015; Darby & Williamson, 2012; 
Emmens et al., 2006; Richardson, 2006). There is a need to continually capture 
this knowledge so that it can be passed on through explicit means to other, less 
experienced workers, who in turn are able to internalise the knowledge and refine 
it in relation to the problems they might face.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented a discussion and critical comparison of community-
based and systems-based approaches to security risk management through the 
introduction of top-down and bottom-up knowledge acquisition. There is still 
some debate about how much knowledge elicited from academic experts, or secu-
rity subject-matter experts, and practitioner experts, or the field workers them-
selves may converge or diverge. However, it is apparent that a more consistent 
approach needs to address the conflict between procedures and experience, help 
convert field experience into knowledge, and ultimately provide effective training 
that is relevant to those heading out into demanding work situations. Evidently it 
is not enough to argue for the ‘ethical’ strength of community-based approaches 
as promoted by ethnographers and indigenous researchers – ethics and method 
are intricately bound together in such an approach. It is equally unethical to 
neglect the organisational responsibilities and the duties of care organisations 
hold towards staff  being placed in critical and risky situations. The security of 
both staff  and at-risk populations depends upon correctly managing the balance 
between systems and communities.
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RESEARCH IN SENSITIVE 
SECURITY DOMAINS: 
UNDERSTANDING THREATS AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING 
TRUST
Alex Stedmon and Daniel Paul
ABSTRACT
In many security domains, the ‘human in the system’ is often a critical line of 
defence in identifying, preventing and responding to any threats (Saikayasit, 
Stedmon, & Lawson, 2015). Traditionally, such security domains are often 
focussed on mainstream public safety within crowded spaces and border controls, 
through to identifying suspicious behaviours, hostile reconnaissance and imple-
menting counter-terrorism initiatives. More recently, with growing insecurity 
around the world, organisations have looked to improve their security risk man-
agement frameworks, developing concepts which originated in the health and 
safety field to deal with more pressing risks such as terrorist acts, abduction and 
piracy (Paul, 2018). In these instances, security is usually the specific respon-
sibility of frontline personnel with defined roles and responsibilities operating 
in accordance with organisational protocols (Saikayasit, Stedmon, Lawson, & 
Fussey, 2012; Stedmon, Saikayasit, Lawson, & Fussey, 2013). However, 
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understanding the knowledge that frontline security workers might possess and 
use requires sensitive investigation in equally sensitive security domains.
This chapter considers how to investigate knowledge elicitation in these sensi-
tive security domains and underlying ethics in research design that supports 
and protects the nature of investigation and end-users alike. This chapter also 
discusses the criteria used for ensuring trustworthiness as well as assessing the 
relative merits of the range of methods adopted.
Keywords: Ethical research; sensitive security domains; establishing 
trust; knowledge elicitation methods; deductive and inductive reasoning; 
stakeholders and end-users
INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH IN SENSITIVE DOMAINS
The lack of literature on security is not only down to the relative youth of the field 
as an academic discipline (‘critical security studies’ only really becoming a field in the 
1990s, Buzan & Hansen, 2009), but also due to the way organisations protect such 
information and the difficulties in openly sharing it (Williams & McDonald, 2018). 
Organisations working in the security sector will carefully protect what data and infor-
mation are publicly available both to ensure the safety of their staff and operations, 
and also because the reality is that processes are often far from optimal and could 
reveal potential shortcomings in management and practice (Harmer & Schreter, 
2013). Such issues underpin research in sensitive domains by impacting the quality of 
data that can be collected in primary research and limiting the information available 
for meta-analyses (Barnard, Geber, & McCosker, 2001).
Though sensitive domains are often associated with health and safety research 
or specific investigations with vulnerable populations (Cowles, 1988; Sieber & 
Stanley, 1988), Lee (1993) uses an extended definition to include any domain that 
possesses three specific characteristics:
•	 An intrusive threat – where the research may cause strong emotional responses 
from participants. An intrusive threat is any subject which is highly personal 
to participants and has the potential to cause a negative emotional response 
(Cowles, 1988). Such typology is fitting to topics in which death and trau-
matic experiences are discussed, especially if  the participant has been directly 
involved or has emotional links to those involved (Lee, 1993). To highlight the 
prevalence of death and trauma, between 2007 and 2016 there was a mean of 
104 deaths a year in the humanitarian sector (Czwarno, Harmer, & Stoddard, 
2017). It is not just death itself  or major attack against a field worker, but 
the experience of being in a developing country, hostile environment or post-
disaster setting that can have a negative emotional effect (Brewer, 2017). Such 
emotions can be re-experienced during the conduct of research and likely to 
pose an intrinsic threat as it may deal with concepts such as death and trauma 
by nature of the subject.
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•	 The threat of sanctions – where participants fear that in revealing informa-
tion there will be repercussions on them. For example, this may include situ-
ations where participants may have broken rules or committed wrongdoings 
and with the threat of sanctions this can limit what participants might want 
to openly say or admit to (Lee, 1993). As the security management has moved 
to a systems-based approach, a greater number of rules have been imposed 
on workers (Brunderlein & Grassmann, 2006). These rules give managers the 
power to impose disciplinary procedures on staff  who go against the secu-
rity measures (Harmer, Haver, & Stoddard, 2010). However, these remove the 
human aspect of decision making, meaning staff  could face discipline for tak-
ing actions that were appropriate for the time and place but were contrary 
to the established rules (Beerli & Weissman, 2016). This is even more likely, 
where those in the field have little input into the rules imposed (Daudin & 
Merkelbach, 2011). Therefore, where participants admit to situations where 
they went against rules, there can be the underlying threat of sanction in the 
form of disciplinary action.
•	 Political threat – in the broadest sense where data collected might be used 
for negative purposes by powerful people or organisations (Lee, 1993). This 
is particularly the case where the research may reveal flaws in security meas-
ures which can then be exploited by aggressive actors (Brewers, 1990). For 
example, with the rise in the kidnapping threat, where aggressive actors con-
duct surveillance against targets to identify weaknesses (Harmer, Stoddard, & 
Toth, 2013) and any useful intelligence gleaned from research could be used 
against security workers themselves. Another aspect of political threat is the 
loss of funding from donors, for which many humanitarian organisations are 
critically dependent (Martin, Metcalfe, & Pantuliano, 2011). Humanitarian 
organisations may limit the information they share about their capabilities 
and weaknesses, so that donors are more likely to support them (Bollentino, 
2008). Such competition for funding means that organisations often obscure 
the risks they are exposed to and may be reluctant to be fully transparent in 
the information they do share. Revealing information on security weaknesses 
can therefore cause a political threat, limiting transparency and producing a 
culture where participants are less likely to reveal information on operational 
weaknesses (Lee, 1993).
These characteristics help keep researchers aware of key issues associated with 
accessing and collecting data within sensitive domains. In doing so, it provides criti-
cal reflection on acceptability and ethics – whether the methods are acceptable to the 
participants and fit for the purpose of the research, and how the methods limit any 
potential negative effects on those involved in the research (Wilson, 2005).
DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE REASONING
Research in this domain usually takes an inductive, rather than a deductive, 
approach. Whilst there are merits to choosing a deductive approach, it suffers 
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from the assumption that the solution lies within the problem and therefore the 
problem statement must be known to all involved in some way (Wilson, 2010). In 
simple terms, if  a statement cannot be known, then it is seen to be ‘deductively’ 
untrue. This is based on ‘closed-world assumptions’ where any statement which 
is true is there to be discovered and known to be true, and vice versa (Fox, 2008; 
Kelly, 2014).
Deductive research can produce strong and reliable conclusions, best suited to 
quantitative research methods where theories, hypotheses and specific variables 
can be tested and investigated (Lewis, Saunders, & Thornhill, 2009). However, 
it is problematic employing deductive reasoning when there are many unknowns 
(Babbie, 2011). This is often the case in security investigations, especially when 
investigating the effects of knowledge management on operational security 
(where established theories and foundational assumptions are lacking).
Inductive research is more suited to new or unexplored fields, as its great-
est strength is that it can ‘generate theory’ where little data exist (Babbie, 2011). 
Inductive reasoning allows for, and helps to foster, emergent designs and grounded 
theory approaches (Given, 2008a; Pailthorpe, 2017). Although a theory may be 
disproven later, it can stimulate discussion and provide a basis for new theories 
to arise, or for the original theory to be refined through future deductive rea-
soning (Kelly, 2014). It is therefore important that inductive reasoning remains 
flexible and open to re-interpretation so that emergent themes can develop freely 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Inductive research often begins with a specific focus and through data gath-
ering identifies patterns and generates new understandings for why particular 
patterns exist (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In this way, general principles are devel-
oped from specific observations (Babbie, 2011). The starting point for inductive 
research often lies in collecting relevant data, employing mixed methods such as 
interviews or observations (Fox, 2008). Mixed methods allow the phenomenon to 
be viewed and tackled from multiple, complementary, angles and triangulated for 
greater scientific rigour (Milton, 2012).
Inductive reasoning is often employed within the discipline of human factors, 
which seeks to understand the interactions between humans and the systems they 
operate within (Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Baber, & Jenkins, 2005; Wilson, 2005). 
Human factors takes a user-centred perspective when investigating complex 
socio-technical systems that are typical of security settings (Stanton et al., 2013; 
Stedmon et al., 2013). By focussing on the individual, and employing knowledge 
elicitation methodologies, it is possible to identify and capture knowledge neces-
sary for systems to work more effectively (Hoffman, 1987).
DEVELOPING AN ETHICAL RESEARCH APPROACH
Safeguarding those involved in research is paramount in any investigation. It 
is crucial that critical reflection of the methodologies to be used is applied to 
the research in order to help identify the inherent risks and how complementary 
methods can be used (Wilson, 2005). It can also help identify, at an early stage, 
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how the inductive approach can be developed to provide better results (Stanton 
et al., 2005). A primary concern in sensitive security domains is gaining access 
and promoting open and transparent data collection processes. This improves 
the critical reflection on the dependability, and therefore trustworthiness, of the 
approach and data collected in any investigation (Shenton, 2004). Several tech-
niques can be applied to gain access to sensitive security domains and promote 
openness from participants:
•	 Relationships and building rapport – it is common for researchers to act as 
external observers, staying separated and not divulging personal lives to par-
ticipants (Creswell, 2003). This builds into the concept of non-reactivity in 
that the researcher has as small an impact as possible on participants and 
the research (Wilson, 2005). Sensitive domain research requires an alterna-
tive approach where researchers develop trusting relationships and a trusted 
rapport with participants (Clark & Kotulic, 2004). This is often done by dem-
onstrating a shared identity and purpose (Cowles, 1988) and sharing personal 
accounts relevant to the area of inquiry (Lee & Renzetti, 1990). In doing so, 
participants can identify the researcher who can promote more open and hon-
est exchanges (Barton, 2015; Dickenson-Swift, James, & Liamputtong, 2007).
•	 Recording data and alternatives to recording/transcribing – both Clark and 
Kotulic (2004) and Cowles (1988) state that the use of digital recording can 
often deter participants from feeling open to answer sensitive questions. 
Therefore, alternative methods of recording data are necessary (Clark & 
Kotulic, 2004). Cowles (1988) suggests that whilst alternatives may be avail-
able, fully explaining the use of any data recorder, and making it known that 
the recorder can be turned off  at any point allows the data to be captured for 
analysis, but also for the participant to maintain control of the exchange and 
to state things ‘off  the record’ where appropriate (Cowles, 1988). Where this 
might occur, for accuracy and ethical reassurance, close written transcripts 
should be written at the time, reflecting both what is said as well as the context 
in which it was said.
•	 Ensuring confidentiality and non-reactivity – in any research, it is ethically vital 
that issues of confidentiality are dealt with sympathetically. It is important 
to take steps to remove the possibility of deductive-disclosure (i.e. identifica-
tion of any data and/or individuals from what participants say or through 
job details) (Kaiser, 2009). In order for data to keep its rich description whilst 
ensuring privacy to those involved, techniques such as paraphrasing over ver-
batim transcribing may be necessary. In this way, researchers have a duty and 
participants have control in the way data are interpreted. Before data are col-
lected, the protocols need to be explained to participants in order to allow 
them to decide what data can be used, and ensuring they are fully aware of 
how their data will be used, who will have access to it and how identities may 
be kept confidential (Adams & Cox, 2008). For a more detailed discussion of 
privacy in research see Chapter 3 in this volume.
•	 Purposive sampling – Clark and Kotulic (2004) suggest that limiting the number 
of participants involved in research allows greater time to be spent developing 
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relationships and trust. Purposive sampling is a common technique in quali-
tative inquiry, where the quantity of participants is secondary to the quality 
of data they can provide (Cochran & Quinn-Patton, 2007). To a degree, all 
sampling should have a purpose and should be representative of the wider 
population under investigation. Within the sensitive domain, participants are 
identified based on their relevance to the investigation rather than employing 
random sampling techniques (Bryman & Bell, 2011).
•	 Recruitment of participants through professional networks – in sensitive or 
in hard-to-reach domains, snowball or chain referral sampling methods are 
particularly successful in engaging with a target audience (Atkinson & Flint, 
2004). This approach relies on cumulative referrals made by those who share 
knowledge or interact with others at an operational level or share specific 
interests for the investigation (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). Each succes-
sive referral further expands the possible number of people reached by the 
researcher (Atkinson & Flint, 2004). In this way, snowball sampling increases 
the possible sample size and accesses participants that other techniques may 
not allow (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). This method is predicted to be particu-
larly effective in the humanitarian domain where there are strong informal 
networks (Kuhanendran & Micheni, 2010; Schneiker, 2015). This sampling 
method is useful where security agencies and organisations might be reluctant 
to share confidential and sensitive information with those they perceive to be 
‘outsiders’. This method has been used in the areas of drug use and addiction 
research (see Sims & Iphofen, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) where information is lim-
ited and where the snowball approach can be initiated with a personal contact 
or through an informant (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). However, one of the 
problems with such a method of sampling is that the eligibility of participants 
can be difficult to verify as investigators rely on the referral process, and the 
sample includes only one sub-set of the relevant user population (Biernacki & 
Waldorf, 1981).
•	 Safeguarding participants and researchers – perhaps one of the most obvious 
concerns arising from ethics in research is safeguarding participants. Whilst 
this is seen as a critical element of the ethics appraisal or review process, it 
also serves to safeguard the researcher. In this way, a robust ethics applica-
tion process and a knowledgeable and facilitative ethics review committee can 
make informed judgements on the methodological approach being fit for pur-
pose and the procedure being appropriate to investigate the research question. 
It is also important to assess any risks of the research for all those involved 
so that suitable measures and contingencies are in place. In order to protect 
the safety of the researcher, protocols for researcher safety should be used, in 
which the potential safety risks are assessed prior to any in-person activities 
(i.e. interviews) being conducted (Gregory, Paterson, & Thorne, 1999). This 
also extends to the safety of the researcher after the research, where the sen-
sitive data they hold might be sought after by hostile actors. The process of 
conducting research on sensitive issues can also have an emotional effect on 
participants or researchers (Clark & Kotulic, 2004; Lee, 1993). Support net-
works and training in psychological first aid can be of benefit in these instances. 
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Discussing sensitive issues can elicit emotional responses, that participants 
have not previously recounted (Cowles, 1988). Therefore, it is important that 
researchers are prepared to deal with these situations and can assist partici-
pants in finding any further support they might require (Clarke & Johnson, 
2003). Such training may allow the researcher to sensitively approach difficult 
topics and provide access to information that participants may not otherwise 
disclose (Cowles, 1988).
Ultimately, the responsibility of ethics review in research is to protect research-
ers and participants alike (Cowles, 1988). As Wilson (1995) states, research 
should be based on non-reactivity principles, such that the research should not 
negatively impact those involved in collecting or providing data. Whilst research 
activities should ensure no one is put in any danger, this limits some applica-
tions and research settings (Gregory et al., 1999). For instance, research might be 
extremely challenging in high-risk environments with a very real threat to life or 
where participants may become vulnerable simply through the activity of provid-
ing data. Extreme care is needed to safeguard those providing what might be the 
richest data, without compromising their safety.
Core to this, issues of privacy and confidentiality underpin many of the ethical 
challenges of knowledge elicitation, where investigators must ensure that:
•	 end-users and stakeholders are comfortable with the type of information they 
are sharing and how the information might be used and
•	 end-users are not required to breach any agreements and obligations with their 
employers or associated organisations.
In many ways, these ethical concerns are governed by professional codes of 
conduct (in the UK this would be regulated by professional bodies such as the 
British Psychological Society) but it is important that investigators clearly iden-
tify the purpose of an investigation and set clear and legitimate boundaries for 
intended usage and communication of collected data.
CONDUCTING KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION
Whilst methods exist for knowledge elicitation in the security domain, they are 
relatively underdeveloped (Paul, 2018). It is only recently that security aspects of 
interactive systems have begun to be systematically analysed (Cerone & Shaikh, 
2008, chapter 25). However, little research has been published on understanding 
the work of security personnel and systems, which leads to the lack of case stud-
ies or guidance on how methods can be adopted or have been used in different 
security settings (Hancock & Hart, 2002; Kraemer, Carayon, & Sanquist, 2009). 
As a result, it is necessary to re-visit the fundamental issues of conducting knowl-
edge elicitation that can then be applied to security research.
Knowledge elicitation presents several challenges to investigators, not least in 
recruiting representative end-users and other stakeholders upon which the whole 
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process depends (Lawson & D’Cruz, 2011). Equally important, it is necessary to 
elicit and categorise/prioritise the relevant expertise and knowledge, and com-
municate this forward to designers and policy makers, as well as back to the end-
users and other stakeholders.
One of the first steps in conducting knowledge elicitation is to understand 
that there can be different levels of end-users or stakeholders. Whilst the terms 
‘end-user’ and ‘stakeholder’ are often confused, stakeholders are not always the 
end-users of a product or process, but have a particular investment or inter-
est in the outcome and its effect on users or wider community (Mitchell, Agle, 
& Wood, 1997). The term ‘end-user’ or ‘primary user’ is commonly defined as 
someone who will make use of a particular product or process (Eason, 1987). 
In many cases, users and stakeholders will have different needs and often their 
goals or expectations of the product or process can be conflicting (Nuseibeh & 
Easterbrook, 2000). These distinctions and background information about users, 
stakeholders and specific contexts of use allow researchers to arrive at informed 
outcomes (Maguire & Bevan, 2002).
Whilst knowledge elicitation tends to be conducted amongst a wide range 
of users and stakeholders some of these domains are more restricted and chal-
lenging than others in terms of confidentiality, anonymity and privacy. These 
sensitive domains can include those involving children, elderly or disabled users, 
healthcare systems, staff/patient environments, commerce and other domains 
where information is often beyond public access (Gaver, Dunne, & Pacenti, 
1999). In addition, some organisations restrict how much information employees 
can share with regard to their tasks, roles, strategies, technology use and future 
visions with external parties to protect commercial or competitive standpoints 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Security organisations may be particularly sensi-
tive of any vulnerabilities that could then be perceived by the public as a lack of 
security awareness or exploited by competitors or aggressors for their own ben-
efit. Security domains can also add further complications in reporting findings to 
support the wider understanding of user needs across this sector (Crabtree et al., 
2003; Lawson, Sharples, Cobb, & Clarke, 2009), or where there are information 
sharing hurdles across agencies or countries (Williams & McDonald, 2018).
KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION METHODS
The human factors approach has made extensive and effective use of established 
social science methods such as questionnaires, surveys, interviews, focus groups, 
observations and ethnographic reviews and formal task or link analyses that can 
be used as the foundations to knowledge elicitation (Crabtree et al., 2003; Preece, 
Rogers, & Sharp, 2007). These methods provide different opportunities for inter-
action between the investigator and target audience, and hence provide differ-
ent types and levels of data (Saikayasit et al., 2012). A range of complementary 
methods are often selected to enhance the detail of the issues explored. For exam-
ple, interviews and focus groups might be employed to gain further insights or 
highlight problems that have been initially identified in questionnaires or surveys. 
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In comparison to direct interaction between the investigator and participant (e.g. 
interviews) indirect methods (e.g. questionnaires) can reach a larger number of 
respondents and are cheaper to administer but are not efficient for probing com-
plicated issues or experience-based knowledge (Sinclair, 2005).
Focus groups can also be used, where the interviewer acts as a group organiser 
and facilitator to encourage discussion across several issues around pre-defined 
themes (Sinclair, 2005). However, focus groups can be resource intensive and dif-
ficult to arrange depending on the degree of anonymity required for the research. 
They are also notoriously ‘hit and miss’ depending on the availability of par-
ticipants for particular sessions (Stedmon et al., 2013). In addition, they need 
effective management so that all participants have an opportunity to contribute 
without specific individuals dominating the interaction or people being affected 
by peer pressure to not voice particular issues (Friedrich & van der Poll, 2007). 
As with many qualitative analyses, care is also needed in how results are fed into 
the requirements capture. When using interactive methods, it is important that 
opportunities are provided for participants to express their knowledge spontane-
ously, rather than only responding to directed questions from the investigator. 
This is because there is a danger that direct questions could be biased by pre-
conceptions that may prevent investigators exploring issues they have not already 
identified. On this basis, investigators should assume the role of ‘learners’ rather 
than ‘hypothesis testers’ (McNeese, Zaff, Citera, Brown, & Whitaker, 1995).
Observational and ethnographic methods can also be used to allow investiga-
tors to gather insights into socio-technical factors such as the impact of gate-keep-
ers, moderators or more formal mechanisms in security. However, observation 
and ethnographic reviews can be intrusive, especially in sensitive domains where 
privacy and confidentially are important. In addition, the presence of observers 
can elicit behaviours that are not normal for the individual or group being viewed 
as they purposely follow formal procedures and act in a socially desirable manner 
(Crabtree et al., 2003; Stanton et al., 2005). Furthermore, this method provides 
a large amount of rich data, which can be time consuming to analyse. However, 
when used correctly, and when the investigator has a clear understanding of the 
domain being observed, this method can provide rich qualitative and quantitative 
real-world data (Sinclair, 2005).
Investigators often focus on the tasks that users perform in order to elicit tacit 
experience-based information or to understand the context of work (Nuseibeh & 
Easterbrook, 2000). Thus, the use of task analysis methods to identify problems 
and the influence of user interaction on system performance is a major approach 
within human factors (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). A task analysis is defined as 
a study of what the user/system operation is required to do, including physical 
activities and cognitive processes, in order to achieve a specified goal (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992). Scenarios are often used to illustrate or describe typical tasks 
or roles in a particular context (Sutcliffe, 1998). There are generally two types 
of scenarios: those that represent and capture aspects of real work settings so 
that investigators and users can communicate their understanding of tasks to aid 
the development process; and those used to portray how users might envisage 
using a future system that is being developed (Sutcliffe, 1998). In the latter case, 
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investigators often develop ‘user personas’ that represent how different classes of 
user might interact with the future system and/or how the system will fit into an 
intended context of use. This is sometimes communicated through story-board 
techniques either presented as scripts, link-diagrams or conceptual diagrams to 
illustrate processes and decision points of interest.
Whilst various methods are available for researchers trying to elicit knowledge, 
research methods where the researcher and participant are seen as equals trying 
to overcome a problem together, are often more effective for sensitive domain 
research (Paul, 2018). Such methods are often described as ‘contrived’ (Milton, 
2007) and expand upon methods where the participant simply describes how they 
accomplish a task, such as verbal protocol analysis (Shadbolt & Smart, 2015). 
Contrived methods, such as those highlighted in the figure above, allow the par-
ticipant and the researcher to explore the issue together, as co-investigators, help-
ing create more open conversations (Paul, 2018). They might therefore be seen as 
more appropriate for sensitive domain research.
COMMUNICATING KNOWLEDGE BACK TO END-USERS 
AND STAKEHOLDERS
Whilst various methods assist investigators in knowledge elicitation, it is impor-
tant to communicate the findings back to relevant users and stakeholders. Several 
techniques exist in user experience and user-centered design to communicate the 
vision between investigators and users. These generally include scenario-based 
modelling (e.g. tabular text narratives, user personas, sketches and informal 
media) and concept mapping (e.g. scripts, sequences of events and link and task 
analyses) including actions and objects during the design phase (Sutcliffe, 1998). 
Scenario-based modelling can be used to represent the tasks, roles, systems and 
how they interact and influence task goals, as well as identify connections and 
dependencies between the user, system and the environment (Sutcliffe, 1998). 
Concept mapping is a technique that represents the objects, actions, events (or 
even emotions and feelings) so that both the investigators and users form a com-
mon understanding in order to identify gaps in knowledge (Freeman & Jessup, 
2004; McNeese et al., 1995). The visual representations of connections between 
events and objects in a concept map or link analysis can help identify conflicting 
needs, create mutual understandings and enhance recall and memory of critical 
events (Freeman & Jessup, 2004). Use-cases can also be used to represent typical 
interactions, including profiles, interests, job descriptions and skills as part of the 
knowledge elicitation representation (Lanfranchi & Ireson, 2009). Scenarios with 
personas can be used to describe how users might behave in specific situations in 
order to provide a richer understanding of the context of use. Personas typically 
provide a profile of a specific user, stakeholder or role based on information from 
a number of sources (e.g. a typical child using a chat-room, a parent trying to 
govern the safety of their child’s on-line presence, a shopper and a person using a 
home-banking interface). What is then communicated is a composite and synthe-
sis of key features within a single profile that can then be used as a single point of 
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reference (e.g. Mary is an 8-year-old girl with no clear understanding of internet 
grooming techniques; Malcolm is a 60-year-old man with no awareness of phish-
ing tactics). In some cases, personas are given names and background informa-
tion such as age, education, recent training courses attended and even generic 
images/photos to make them more realistic or representative of a typical user. 
In other cases, personas are used anonymously in order to communicate generic 
characteristics that may be applicable to a wider demographic.
Knowledge elicitation with users working in sensitive domains also presents 
issues of personal anonymity and data confidentiality (Kavakli, Kalloniatis, & 
Gritzalis, 2005). In order to safeguard these, anonymity and pseudonymity can 
be used to disguise individuals, roles and relationships between roles (Pfitzmann 
& Hansen, 2005). In this way, identifying features of participants should not 
be associated with the data or approaches should be used that specifically use 
fictitious personas to illustrate and integrate observations across a number of 
participants. If  done correctly, these personas can then be used as an effective 
communication tool without compromising the trust that has been built during 
the elicitation process.
Using a variety of human factors methods provides investigators with a clearer 
understanding of how security, as a process, can operate based on the perspective 
of socio-technical systems. Without a range of methods to employ and without 
picking those most suitable for a specific inquiry, there is a danger that the best 
data will be missed. In addition, without using the tools for communicating the 
findings of knowledge elicitation activities, the overall process would be incom-
plete and end-users and other stakeholders will miss opportunities to learn about 
security and/or contribute further insights into their roles. Such approaches allow 
investigators to develop a much better understanding of the bigger picture such 
as the context and wider systems, as well as more detailed understandings of 
specific tasks and goals.
ESTABLISHING THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF 
QUALITATIVE DATA
Historically, the trustworthiness of qualitative research has always been chal-
lenged by positivist researchers. However, frameworks exist to improve the integ-
rity, credibility and reliability of qualitative data (Lincoln, 1995; Silverman, 2011). 
An analytical approach to research not only increases the trustworthiness of the 
inquiry (Annett, 2005; Wilson, 2005) but is also necessary and useful for human 
factors research that sits between academia and praxis (Milton, 2012; Stanton 
et al., 2005). In this way, it allows an understanding of both how research con-
tributes to the knowledge base and also its real-world application (Annett, 2005; 
Stanton et al., 2005).
Several authors have proposed principles for establishing trustworthiness in 
qualitative inquiry (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Given, 2008b; Guba, 1981; Lincoln, 
1995; Silverman, 2011). It has become a central pillar of qualitative research, and 
particularly in exploratory investigations that are not guided by previous research 
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(Lincoln, 1995). Shenton (2004) provided a synthesis to ensure trustworthiness, 
which condenses four well-accepted constructs first posed by Guba (1981) and 
developed further by Guba and Lincoln (1985).
Credibility
Credibility is concerned with ensuring the findings are a true reflection of the 
research which has been conducted (Shenton, 2004). Denzin and Lincoln (2000) 
state that credibility is central to ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research. 
Shenton (2004) proposed several constructs for credibility:
•	 Well-established research methods should be adopted. Less common methods 
may be used in conjunction to help extend the reach of the inquiry.
•	 Familiarity with the field under investigation is necessary, both through 
the researcher’s professional involvement (where possible) but also through 
analysis of previous findings and appropriate review of existing research and 
knowledge.
•	 Where possible, purposive sampling should be employed to reduce any bias in 
data collection.
•	 Triangulation of mixed methods allows the research to be understood 
from multiple angles and compensates for any weaknesses inherent to certain 
methods.
•	 Methods to promote honesty should be used, including the opportunity for 
participants to refuse to be part of the investigation as well as the ethical basis 
of the research being stressed prior to data collection. This form of preventa-
tive measure reduces the possibility of participants lying or deceiving during 
data collection and assures them that they are in control of the data collec-
tion process. This is further supported with iterative questioning, in which the 
participants are asked to confirm information provided previously, and where 
information provided is rephrased later in the data collection session. This 
necessitates training and practice in the methods used but allows more trans-
parent and honest datasets.
•	 Thick description has been used to provide detail for results and how they help 
develop knowledge and conclusions. Though this method is often lengthy, it 
allows readers to understand the way in which the data have been synthesised.
Transferability
The ability to transfer the interpretation of results to groups wider than the sam-
ple studied is an important aspect of both qualitative research (Silverman, 2011) 
as well as human factors methods, which are inherently practitioner-focussed 
(Wilson, 2005). In order to achieve this, thick descriptions of the results can be 
used that allow the reader to draw their own conclusions about how the results 
can be transferred (Shenton, 2004). It is also necessary, for research replication, 
to provide a full account of how the data were collected, and the approach taken, 
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including inclusion criteria, the methods used to collect data, the number of ses-
sions conducted and how long these took (Guba, 1981; Shenton, 2004).
Dependability
Whilst quantitative, positivist research is concerned with empirical reliability, or 
how data collection should yield the same results every time (Silverman, 2011), 
qualitative research is mindful that the phenomenon under investigation may 
change over time (Shenton, 2004). Qualitative research usually only claims to 
present a view at a given time when the data were collected or in relation to the 
context they were collected in (Shenton, 2004). Instead, qualitative research may 
provide a ‘prototype model’, allowing the same methods to be employed by other 
researchers, understanding that the same conclusions may not be drawn and that 
understandings may evolve over time (Shenton, 2004).
Confirmability
Qualitative research does not rely on objective methods used by positivists as 
the collection and processing of data revolve around the researcher (Shenton, 
2004). Researcher subjectivity and bias can be a major challenge and influence 
on the trustworthiness of qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The 
use of triangulation in data collection is an important step in reducing bias and 
allows other researchers to scrutinise how the data were collected and analysed 
(Shenton, 2004).
Using these principles, it is important that research is designed based on the 
selection and use of appropriate methods that safeguard those involved and also 
that the method of communication is equally sensitive to issues of privacy and 
confidentiality. These factors also help identify how human factors methods (bor-
rowed and developed from the social sciences) are designed to not only produce 
academically relevant data but also data can be used to tailor practical solutions 
to security threats (Stanton et al., 2005). Furthermore, by providing recommen-
dations it is possible to review the transferability and trustworthiness of research 
findings beyond the sample studied (Shenton, 2004).
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING 
OF ETHICAL RESEARCH IN SENSITIVE SECURITY 
DOMAINS
Having reviewed the concepts underpinning ethical research in sensitive security 
domains, it is possible to provide an integrated view of these factors (Fig. 1).
In this configuration, we see that ethics is bounded by a number of typical 
threats to research in relation to intrusion, sanctions and political impacts of the 
work. It is important to be aware of the potential effects of these factors before 
starting out on a particular research activity as this may later impact on the trust-
worthiness of the research, or prevent data being collected in the first place.
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With regard to knowledge elicitation as a methodological approach it is also 
important to understand who the end-users and stakeholders might be. We have 
seen already that these different actors within the problem space will have differ-
ent perspectives and levels of investment in helping to find solutions.
A range of ethical issues have been introduced in this chapter which are relevant 
to participants (both end-users and stakeholders), embodied in the development 
of trusted relationships, how data may be recorded for sensitivity, confidentiality, 
non-reactivity, purposive sampling, recruitment of participants and safeguarding 
those involved.
A range of established methods from the social sciences are readily available 
for conducting knowledge elicitation and these need to be matched with appropri-
ate communication techniques for sensitive data. Methods where the participant 
and researcher are seen as co-investigators, both exploring a solution to an issue 
(opposed to methods where information is being drawn out from the participant) 
are potentially more appropriate in sensitive domains.
Finally, the trustworthiness of the data needs to be considered prior to the 
research being conducted, so that responsible research is designed from the out-
set. This not only underpins the credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability of research, but also fundamental concepts such as validity and 
reliability of what is often qualitative research.
Many of these concepts are inter-related and relevant to both end-users and 
stakeholders. By using this framework as a general tool for assisting with the 
design, conduct and communication of research in sensitive domains, it also pro-
vides a basis for reflecting on the success of different approaches so that lessons 
can be learned about the process of ethics as much as the conduct of ethics.
CONCLUSION
Security research usually takes an inductive approach, seeking to identify new 
theoretical principles through the collection of new data. In order to conduct 
Fig. 1. Integrated Approach to Ethical Research.
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research within sensitive domains that is equally sensitive to the needs of those 
involved, a user-centred approach is important for understanding security from 
a human factors perspective. It is also important to understand the contexts in 
which investigations are situated so that ethical principles are upheld throughout 
the research process. There are many formal and established methodologies that 
are of use and it is essential that the researcher considers key issues as outlined in 
this chapter before choosing a particular approach. Whilst various methods and 
tools can indeed be helpful in gaining insight into particular aspects of knowl-
edge elicitation for security, caution must be at the forefront as a valid model for 
eliciting such data does not exist specifically for security research at present. At 
the moment, investigations rely on the experience, understanding and skill of the 
investigator in deciding which approach is best to adopt in order to collect robust 
data that can then be fed back into the system process. Alongside this, it is 
important to establish the trustworthiness of  qualitative data based on prin-
ciples of  credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. In this 
way, the ethical basis of  research in this domain reaches beyond the actual 
activity of  conducting the research but also what the research contributes 
to the wider knowledge base and understanding. Doing so allows a more 
structured approach for such research to be taken in the future and provides 
further opportunities for other researchers to access both the humanitarian 
security domain, as well as other security domains in which access to infor-
mation could be limited.
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CHAPTER 12
COVERT ASPECTS OF 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE 
ETHICAL ISSUES THEY RAISE
David J. Harper, Darren Ellis and Ian Tucker
ABSTRACT
This chapter focusses on the ethical issues raised by different types of surveil-
lance and the varied ways in which surveillance can be covert. Three case stud-
ies are presented which highlight different types of surveillance and different 
ethical concerns. The first case concerns the use of undercover police to infil-
trate political activist groups over a 40-year period in the UK. The second case 
study examines a joint operation by US and Australian law enforcement agen-
cies: the FBI’s operation Trojan Shield and the AFP’s Operation Ironside. This 
involved distributing encrypted phone handsets to serious criminal organisa-
tions which included a ‘backdoor’ secretly sending encrypted copies of all mes-
sages to law enforcement. The third case study analyses the use of emotional 
artificial intelligence systems in educational digital learning platforms for chil-
dren where technology companies collect, store and use intrusive personal data 
in an opaque manner. The authors discuss similarities and differences in the 
ethical questions raised by these cases, for example, the involvement of the 
state versus private corporations, the kinds of information gathered and how 
it is used.
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we focus on the ethical issues raised by different types of surveil-
lance and the varied ways in which surveillance can be covert. Over the last decade, 
we have examined the social and psychological aspects of a range of surveillance 
practices and technologies including how the public understand and experience 
them (Ellis, Harper, & Tucker, 2016; Harper, Ellis, & Tucker, 2014; Harper, 
Tucker, & Ellis, 2013). We have been struck by the way in which public discourse 
about the ethics of surveillance is very much shaped by the types of surveillance 
seizing the popular imagination at the time. In one of our projects, in the Summer 
of 2010, when Londoners were asked about surveillance, they tended to sponta-
neously associate it with Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in public spaces and 
some needed to be prompted about other, less visible, modes of surveillance. Over 
a decade later and the public are more aware of the way in which electronic data 
from digital devices is gathered, stored and used by governments and private cor-
porations because of media reporting about technology companies and about the 
Edward Snowden National Security Agency (NSA) disclosures. Yet many are still 
not aware of the myriad ways in which they are surveilled every day and often only 
a restricted range of issues – privacy, security and convenience – feature in public 
discourse. However, as Macnish notes in his introduction to this volume, surveil-
lance involves a range of activities, practices and technologies that often engage 
distinct types of ethical concern. In this chapter, therefore, we examine three con-
temporary examples of covert forms of surveillance – all involving the gathering, 
storage and usage of information about people in a covert or hidden manner – 
both human and technological and involving the state or private corporations. 
We discuss the specific aspects of these types of surveillance which raise ethical 
concerns. In the concluding section, we discuss commonalities and differences in 
the kinds of ethical questions engaged by the case studies and suggest potential 
avenues worthy of further exploration by researchers and in public debate.
CASE STUDY 1 – COVERT SURVEILLANCE OF ACTIVIST 
GROUPS BY UNDERCOVER POLICE: THE ‘SPYCOPS’ 
SCANDAL
Analogue Surveillance in a Digital World: Covert Surveillance by Human Beings
Technological surveillance might have captured the contemporary popular imag-
ination but surveillance by human beings – the oldest form of surveillance – is 
still with us. Although endemic in totalitarian societies, human surveillance by 
the state (as opposed to surveillance by private investigators or security compa-
nies) operates at a much smaller scale in Western liberal democracies: in the UK 
in 2019, there were 3,652 authorisations of ‘Covert Human Intelligence Sources’ 
(i.e. informants or undercover officers) and 8,049 authorisations for ‘directed 
surveillance’ (i.e. covert surveillance of a person in public by undercover sur-
veillance teams). In contrast, technological surveillance is much more prevalent 
– for example, in the same period, there were 116,171 authorisations1 for the use 
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of communications data by the Metropolitan Police Service Central Intelligence 
Unit (Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, 2020). Yet, although tech-
nology-mediated surveillance is much more common, human surveillance can 
intrude into people’s personal lives in a much more invasive and potentially 
harmful manner since it often involves deceptive relationships and betraying oth-
ers’ trust.
This case study concerns the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), which ran 
from 1968–2008, and similar units like the National Public Order Intelligence 
Unit (NPOIU2), established in 1999. In 2015, following a series of revelations 
and official inquiries, the UK government established a judge-led investigation – 
the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI3) – which began to hear evidence in 
November 2020.
Issues Raised During the UCPI
The SDS was established in 1968 within the London Metropolitan Police’s Special 
Branch,4 the policing body responsible for national security and terrorism and 
liaising with the Security Service (MI5). SDS officers often adopted cover identi-
ties by assuming the name of a real person who had died as a child.5 They would 
change their appearance to blend in with activists, had vehicles and apartments 
in their cover names and would attend meetings, befriend activists and live their 
lives using these cover identities. In contrast to undercover police investigating 
crimes, these infiltrations were unusual in that they often lasted for several years, 
and officers did not collect evidence for criminal prosecutions. Over 1,000 groups 
were infiltrated (Evans, 2017). The information collected was quite intrusive. For 
example, the UCPI heard evidence that undercover officers:
recorded the political activities of children as well as details of their parents’ domestic lives. 
On one occasion, an undercover officer sent back to his supervisors the babysitting rota that 
had been organised by leftwing campaigners …. They also recorded the births of campaigners’ 
children and made comments in their reports about the lives of politically active parents, such 
as the fact they had a child with Down’s syndrome …. Some reports recorded deeply personal 
information, such as leftwing activists experiencing mental illness and depression or having an 
abortion …. Others recorded the sexuality of activists …. The police spies regularly reported 
on the bank accounts and jobs of campaigners, along with their home addresses. (Evans, 2021c, 
12 May)
SDS officer ‘Paul Gray’ (HN126,6 1977–1982) reported extensively on young 
people, including children active in Hackney School Kids Against the Nazis, 
as well as their teachers, sending photographs to his managers (Heaven, 2021). 
Evans (2020a, 28 October) reports that undercover officers collected informa-
tion on campaigns about police injustice (e.g. the Stephen Lawrence campaign), 
caused miscarriages of justice because their presence was withheld from lawyers 
defending activists (in 26 cases officers had been arrested along with activists) and 
appear to have shared data with private companies enabling them to ‘blacklist’ 
applicants for jobs (see also Lubbers, 2015).
In contrast with technical surveillance, human intelligence can give insight 
into the plans and intentions of targets, but it generates many ethical dilemmas. 
In one of the earliest discussions of the use of human intelligence sources within 
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social movements, Marx (1974) observed that they faced a dilemma: staying on 
the fringes of the group gathering intelligence passively meant they had much less 
access to information than if  they took on leadership roles. The UCPI has heard 
how undercover officers often rose to key administrative positions in the groups 
they infiltrated, passing membership lists to their headquarters who, in turn often 
passed them onto ‘Box 500’, the Security Service (MI5). However, as Marx (1974) 
notes, being a more active and senior member of a group increases the risk that 
officers significantly affect the direction of the group’s activities and raises seri-
ous questions about whether they might be viewed as agent provocateurs. Marx 
(1974) also observes that the importance of the group and the threat is vulnerable 
to exaggeration:
Further, wishful thinking, limited exposure, and selective perception may lead the agent to 
believe a group’s own exaggerated estimates of its power and appeal and to confuse vague revo-
lutionary rhetoric with specific plans. (p. 420)
Undercover Surveillance and Human Rights
A key concern for the activists surveilled by these officers is that their human 
rights were violated. Kate Wilson, an environmental activist who lived with ‘Mark 
Stone’ (in reality, NPOIU undercover officer Mark Kennedy) was deceived into a 
sexual relationship by this undercover police officer (Evans, 2021a, 20 April). In a 
landmark judgement in 2021 the Investigatory Powers Tribunal7 upheld Wilson’s 
complaint that several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights 
had been breached in her case (Wilson, 2021; Wilson v (1) Commissioner of Police 
of The Metropolis (2) National Police Chiefs’ Council (2021, 30 September)). The 
articles breached were:
•	 Article 3: which prohibits torture and ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.
•	 Article 8: the right to respect for one’s private and family life.
•	 Article 9: the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
•	 Article 10: the right to freedom of expression.
•	 Article 11: the right to freedom of assembly and association.
•	 Article 14:  Protection from discrimination
These articles are also relevant to many of the other activists surveilled by 
these undercover units. Some of the most serious ethical issues concern the way 
in which many officers invaded activists’ personal lives. The UCPI is investi-
gating the work of at least 139 undercover officers from the SDS, NPOIU and 
other units of whom more than 20 (i.e. over 14%) had sexual relationships with 
members of the groups under their cover identities (Evans, 2020a, 28 October). 
Many had long-term intimate relationships with activists, living with them for 
long periods and four fathered children with activists (Evans, 2021b, 22 April). 
Undercover officers often feigned mental health problems at the end of their 
deployment as part of an exit strategy. In 1987, animal activist ‘Bob Robinson’ 
suddenly broke contact with a female activist with whom he had had a child 
two years earlier. In 2012, she discovered that he was an undercover SDS officer 
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called Bob Lambert. She subsequently received an apology and £425,000 com-
pensation in 2015 after taking legal action alleging assault, negligence, deceit and 
misconduct by senior officers (Kelly & Casciani, 2014). She said that it was ‘like 
being raped by the state. We feel that we were sexually abused because none of us 
gave consent’ (Lewis, Evans, & Pollak, 2013).
Seven women sued the Metropolitan Police for the emotional trauma caused 
by such deceptive intimate relationships (some lasting up to nine years) and 
the subsequent apology from Martin Hewitt, an assistant commissioner at the 
Metropolitan Police acknowledged that their human rights had been violated:
some officers, acting undercover whilst seeking to infiltrate protest groups, entered into long-
term intimate sexual relationships with women which were abusive, deceitful, manipulative and 
wrong … these relationships were a violation of the women’s human rights, an abuse of police 
power and caused significant trauma … relationships like these should never have happened. 
They were wrong and were a gross violation of personal dignity and integrity. (Evans, 2015)
Other Harms of Undercover Surveillance
Undercover work is a common policing tactic when investigating serious organ-
ised crime networks and these deployments are recognised as stressful for offic-
ers (Curran, 2021) and extreme levels of compartmentalised secrecy mean their 
families often cannot be told what they are doing and they live with a constant 
worry about getting ‘burned’ (exposed) or losing a target (Loftus, Goold, & Mac 
Giollabhuí, 2016). For those infiltrating activist groups, there are unique chal-
lenges for officers – for example, many report being violently assaulted on dem-
onstrations by uniformed police unaware that they were working undercover (see 
also Marx, 1974). In some cases, officers may experience mental health break-
downs (Casciani, 2015). Their families can experience other harms and three 
ex-wives of SDS officers said that the deployments had caused their marriages 
to break down (Evans, 2020b, 4 November). At least 42 dead children’s identi-
ties were stolen and the police have admitted this caused their families ‘hurt and 
offence’ (Evans, 2016).
Infiltration also harms the groups targeted. Marx (1974, p. 428) notes 
that the discovery of  informers or undercover officers can leave groups with 
‘feelings of  demoralization, helplessness, cynicism and immobilizing para-
noia, and can serve to disintegrate a movement’. Stephens Griffin’s (2020) 
interviews with activists who had been surveilled revealed that their concep-
tions of  a fixed and stable external reality were fundamentally challenged – as 
one participant put it ‘everyone was questioning everything’ (p. 8) with some 
being diverted from environmental activism. SDS ‘Officer A’ told a reporter 
‘[i]f  the SDS had been in existence at the time of  the Suffragettes, their cam-
paigns would never have got off  the ground and they would have been quickly 
forgotten’ (Thompson, 2020).
There are important questions then, about balancing the state’s obligation to 
preserve public order and its obligation to protect legitimate debate and to provide 
the basis for a functioning civil society. How do we weigh up the potential harms 
of undercover surveillance with its possible benefits? Macnish (2015) has argued 
that proportionality and the level of intrusiveness are important considerations.
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The Proportionality of Political Intelligence Gathering by Undercover Police
Given that the work of units like the SDS involved considerable intrusion into 
the personal lives of some activists, was it justified by the level of threat and were 
there no realistic alternatives? The SDS was formed because of rising concern 
about a wave of protests about the Vietnam War. For example, in a March 1968 
demonstration thousands of people marched on the US embassy in London, 
the police lost control and more than 200 people were arrested (Evans & Lewis, 
2013). The police and government were concerned about the threat of revolution 
posed by those it saw as subversive, especially those in anarchist and Trotskyist 
groups. In 1975, the Home Office Minister, Lord Harris of Greenwich, defined 
subversive activities as those ‘which threaten the safety or well-being of the state 
and which are intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means’ (Security Service, n.d.).
However, over the 40 years of its existence, there does not appear to have 
been any detailed and regular threat assessment conducted by the SDS nor any 
systematic consideration of potential harms and benefits. Moreover, there is evi-
dence of inequity in the types of groups targeted. Although the UCPI have not 
published a full list of groups targeted, the Guardian journalist Rob Evans and 
the Undercover Research Group have collated a list of 135 organisations (Evans, 
2019). As studies in the USA have found (Marx, 1974), the groups targeted were, 
overwhelmingly, on the political left, suggesting that target selection was inequi-
table, a key issue in deciding on the ethics of surveillance (Macnish, 2015). Out of 
the 135 groups infiltrated, only two were right-wing: the British National Party 
was infiltrated by three SDS officers and Combat-18 by one (Evans, 2019). The 
National Front, a violent racist group which was very active in the 1970s, does 
not appear to have been targeted at all.
According to evidence given by HN329, a founding member of the SDS, the 
unit focussed on ‘people who were opposed to the current political situation, or 
the current government’ (Casciani, 2020, 12 November) which seems a broader 
definition of subversion than that of Lord Harris and appears to simply involve 
opposition to the government of the day. HN329 went on to say ‘[i]t may well 
be that a particular group is completely harmless but we would be asked to find 
out what their objectives were. A file would then be opened’ (Casciani, 2020, 
12 November).
However, evidence heard by the UCPI suggests that surveillance of many 
groups deemed not to pose a threat in terms of serious crime or violence con-
tinued. For example, the Anti-apartheid Movement (AAM) was infiltrated by 
four SDS officers. In an earlier Freedom of Information Act investigation by the 
BBC, the Metropolitan Police was found to have gathered, between 1969 and 
1995, 30 inch-thick files on the AAM. These files included ‘reports of demonstra-
tions and pickets’ consisting of ‘methodical listings of the banners carried and 
slogans chanted’ but ‘the documents seen by the BBC contain no evidence of 
the movement having been involved in anything criminal’ (Rosenbaum, 2005). 
Anti-apartheid activist and ex-government minister Peter Hain argued that 
‘[t]he police, in targeting us, were putting themselves on the wrong side of history’ 
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and he asked why they were not ‘targeting the agents of apartheid bombing and 
killing’ (Casciani, 2021a, 30 April). When an SDS officer was asked whether anti-
apartheid groups had sought to overthrow democracy, he stated that ‘[i]t was 
not all about overthrowing democracy but nuisance – they caused problems and 
dangers to the public’ (Casciani, 2021b, 4 May).
The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) appears to have been a particular focus 
for the SDS. Although most groups seem to have been infiltrated by one or two 
SDS officers, the SWP was infiltrated by no fewer than 26 officers between 1970 
and 2007 (Evans, 2019). For a small organisation with a membership in the low 
thousands with relatively little national influence, the proportionality of such sur-
veillance seems questionable. Moreover, the SWP was already under heavy surveil-
lance by the Security Service – Hollingsworth and Fielding (2003) report that MI5 
had 25 informers in the organisation over a 30-year period whilst all 12 of its tel-
ephone lines were tapped. This level of infiltration of small groups has been seen in 
the USA too. Garrow (1988) reports that 17% of the Communist Party USA were 
FBI informants as were 11% of the US SWP even though it only had 480 members.
But, as the barrister for activists argued at the UCPI, the SDS did not appear 
to conduct any ‘regular and thorough risk and threat assessments which fully set 
out and consider any alleged risk to the public and the state from both public 
disorder and subversion’ (Heaven, 2021, p. 4). Indeed, a witness from the Security 
Service (MI5) was sanguine about the threat of subversion, noting that:
It appears … that the Security Service did not consider that subversive organisations posed a 
particularly high priority threat, and the pressure to investigate these organisations often came 
from the Prime Minister and Whitehall. (Witness Z, 2021)
However, despite this, the UCPI has heard evidence that the Security Service 
continued to task SDS officers with gathering information for its files.
‘Domestic Extremists’ as the New ‘Subversives’
In the twenty-first century the term ‘subversive’ has gone out of fashion and, 
instead, policy documents now refer to the similarly ambiguous term ‘domestic 
extremism’. Schlembach (2018) observes that some definitions emphasise the risk 
of violence whilst others refer to ‘serious criminal activity’, a much broader cat-
egory if  it includes damage to property and public disruption rather than violence 
towards people. The ambiguity and apparently widespread use of this term is 
likely to lead to the kinds of problems seen with the similarly ambiguous term 
‘subversive’.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that these undercover units were used less 
because of the level of threat posed by activist groups but for pragmatic rea-
sons like the fear of political embarrassment when they cause public disruption 
or the ease of surveillance by human rather than technological means. Garrow 
(1988, p. 9), for example, has argued that the FBI made extensive use of inform-
ants in political groups because human sources were more efficient than elec-
tronic surveillance ‘which consumed vast quantities of agent and clerical staff  
time while gathering, vacuum-cleaner style, far more chaff and trivia than even 
the FBI wanted’. Even if  we accept that the state has a legitimate interest in 
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surveilling such organisations, it is hard to believe that, in the era of big data and 
the extensive use of social media by campaign groups, there are not alternative, 
less intrusive forms of surveillance which would avoid the risk of the kinds of 
abuses investigated by the UCPI.
We do not know whether there is now more rigorous assessment of the threat 
posed by groups and whether there are mechanisms for weighing up the potential 
harms and benefits of such intrusive surveillance. Evidence given to the UCPI 
suggests there was previously a level of disregard for the range of potential harms 
which bordered on the reckless. Although there might be a temptation to regard 
abuses as the result of a small number of ‘rotten apples’, the number of offic-
ers involved suggests that the failings are of a systemic nature. Given that the 
vast majority of undercover officers involved in sexual relationships with activists 
were men (as were their managers), some activists have argued that the apparent 
lack of guidance about sexual relationships with activists indicates the existence 
of institutional sexism (Evans, 2014).
In contrast to undercover political intelligence gathering, infiltration of 
organised crime networks by undercover officers attracts more public support. 
However, here too, innovative policing tactics have raised ethical dilemmas. In 
the next section, we discuss Operation Trojan Shield, a recent international polic-
ing operation where criminal organisations were surveilled via ΛNØM, an appar-
ently encrypted device which, unbeknownst to the criminals, secretly sent copies 
of messages to the police.
CASE STUDY 2 – ΛNØM AND OPERATION TROJAN 
SHIELD
ANOM
In 2018, a secure messaging company called Phantom Secure was suspended and 
shut down as the CEO Vincent Ramos was arrested in Washington. The Canadian 
company had provided many international criminals, such as high-level drug traf-
fickers and other organised crime groups, with modified secure mobile phones 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018). An investigation revealed that they sold 
the devices exclusively to members of criminal organisations, particularly target-
ing transnational criminal organisations (Cheviron, 2021). Ramos was asked by 
the FBI to insert a backdoor into the device so that the criminal communications 
could be surveilled but he refused. However, with the closure of Phantom Secure, 
organised crime networks needed secure communications and the fact that its 
clientele seemed to consist only of criminals meant that law enforcement agencies, 
assessing that the general public would not be affected, saw an ideal opportunity 
to target criminal networks.
An international collaboration developed between the San Diego FBI office’s 
Operation Trojan Shield and the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) Operation 
Ironside to develop a next generation encrypted device and app known as ANOM 
(often styled as AN0M or ΛNØM).
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The FBI worked with a ‘Confidential Human Source’ (Cheviron, 2020) to 
develop and distribute the devices in exchange for a reduced sentence, $120,000, 
and travel expenses of around $60,000. Initially ANOM was beta tested with 50 
users in Australia. Cheviron suggests that this trial was a success and enabled the 
AFP to penetrate two of the most sophisticated criminal networks operating in 
Australia. Importantly, for the project’s ethical viability, he adds that ‘according 
to Australian law enforcement, 100% of Anom users in the test phase used Anom 
to engage in criminal activity’ (Cheviron, 2020, p. 8). In other words, the technol-
ogy was not being used for anything outside of crime. The operation moved on 
to the next phase and, by May 2021 there were about 9,000 devices in use. The 
devices – costing approximately £2,000 for a six-month service plan – sent and 
received encrypted electronic communications and stored data in encrypted form 
but had limited functionality. For example, users could not make normal phone 
calls or surf the internet. However, users were not aware that a master key was 
built into the device which surreptitiously attached to each message, allowing 
them to be instantly stored and decrypted by law enforcement. It was widely 
reported that over 800 people were arrested around the world, $48m in cash and 
cryptocurrencies and over 32 tonnes of drugs were seized, and more than 100 
murder plots were counteracted. Europol reported that over 27 million messages 
were collected and it is expected that there will be further arrests in the future.
Privacy advocates have welcomed the fact that the operation did not involve 
inserting backdoors into products used by the general public, but they have also 
raised concerns. For example, Ashkan Soltani, previously the Chief Technologist 
of the Federal Trade Commission in the Division of Privacy and Identity 
Protection, stated that the operation showed that ‘You can use good old-fash-
ioned detective work and operations without backdooring protocols and services 
that consumers widely use’ (Murphy, 2021). However, he went on to question 
the potential for the surveillance of innocent people. How many ‘non-targets’, 
he asked, were ‘swept up in this operation?’ (Murphy, 2021). Cheviron (2020) 
states that he believes ‘that Anom devices are used exclusively to openly discuss 
criminal schemes or to maintain relationships in furtherance of those schemes’ (p. 
11). Presently, we can only assume that ‘non-targets’ were not caught up within 
the surveillance operation.
Concerns have also been raised about the impact of such operations on the 
legitimate encryption industry and about the way in which international law 
enforcement collaborations can enable national laws to be circumvented.
‘Laundering’ Surveillance
Jennifer Lynch, the Surveillance Litigation Director at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, has stated that US law enforcement was not able to monitor 
domestic Anom users because this would violate the Fourth Amendment and 
the Wiretap Act. Therefore, the USA relied upon other countries without these 
regulations ‘to launder its surveillance’ (Murphy, 2021). To circumvent US laws, 
the devices routed BCC encryptions of the messages to an iBot server outside of 
the USA, where it was decrypted, then re-encrypted with an FBI encryption code 
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before being decrypted again for viewing (Cheviron, 2020). Around the middle 
of 2019, the investigators sought a third country to obtain an iBot server of its 
own because, although Australia’s judicial order allowed for the interception of 
Anom communications, it was unauthorised to share the information with for-
eign partners (Cheviron, 2020, p. 8, footnote 6). The mass raids and arrests took 
place on 8 June 2021, the day after the expiration of the court order allowing the 
third country to supply Anom server data to the FBI and this was probably no 
coincidence.
Greg Barns SC from the Australian Lawyers Alliance suggested that Australia 
was likely chosen as a partner in the operation because of its ‘very weak privacy 
protections’. He went on to state:
Often with these operations you go to the country with the weakest laws, as it were, so that you 
can obtain more evidence more easily and run less of a risk of evidence being obtained illegally. 
(Swanston, 2021)
Barns has argued that this is a form of entrapment wherein people are induced 
into committing a crime – entrapment is allowed in Australia but not in the USA.
Varying legal regimes mean that such international law enforcement col-
laborations provide potential societal benefits in terms of increased flexibility 
in mounting operations against well-funded targets but potential societal harms 
by undermining legal protections within each jurisdiction. This international 
operation has also reignited the debate about the legitimacy of public access to 
encryption.
The Rights and Wrongs of Encryption and Decryption
The US Department of Justice has made it clear that a goal of the operation was 
to target encryption. Randy Grossman, the acting US attorney said:
Hardened encryption devices usually provide an impenetrable shield against law enforcement 
surveillance detection. The supreme irony here is that the very devices that these criminals 
were using to hide from law enforcement were actually beacons for law enforcement. We aim 
to shatter any confidence in the hardened encrypted device industry with our indictment and 
announcement that this platform was run by the FBI. (United States Department of Justice, 
2021)
Wired reports that the US Department of Justice and other law enforcement 
agencies have long lobbied for access to ‘end-to-end’ encrypted data from, for 
example, social media and other communication platforms (Newman, 2021). 
Since data are kept scrambled by companies so that they remain undecipherable 
along their journey across the internet, law enforcement agencies do not have 
access to their content, a problem they refer to as ‘going dark’. However, Wired 
argue that the FBI and, of course other agencies, have had continued success in 
finding creative ways of developing workarounds by, for example, targeting the 
devices rather than the encryption protocols themselves.
Some might argue that, given the success of operations like this, backdoors 
should be built into all apps. For example, in 2019 the UK’s Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) proposed that communication systems 
should be designed to include a silent, unseen participant like another member 
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of the group chat, enabling government agencies to access them. However, there 
was a storm of reaction against this, not only from human rights groups but also 
from the Big Tech companies. Indeed, many of these companies introduced end-
to-end encryption in the first place because of public reaction to the activities of 
the US and UK governments. Edward Snowden disclosed that, under the NSA’s 
PRISM programme, technology companies passed internet data to the NSA and 
that, under the MUSCULAR programme, GCHQ and the NSA had hacked into 
the main communications links connecting the data centres run by Yahoo! and 
Google without their knowledge. PRISM threatened public trust in technology 
companies whereas MUSCULAR threatened the companies’ trust in the US and 
UK governments. End-to-end encryption appeared to them to provide a solution 
to both problems.
Research suggests that, whilst there is wide public support for overt surveil-
lance like CCTV, there is less support for covert and digital surveillance. The 34th 
British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey reported that, although 80% of the public 
supported the use of video surveillance in public areas, 60% supported the collec-
tion of ‘information about anyone living in Britain without their knowledge’ and 
only 50% supported the monitoring of emails and other internet activity (Clery, 
Curtice, & Harding, 2016). Although Operation Trojan Shield will in the future 
be seen as a very successful method of counteracting serious organised crime, it 
will also serve to remind us that our online lives are always in danger of being 
covertly surveilled.
Operation Trojan Shield threw up some unique challenges. For example, the 
FBI needed to ensure both that the general public was not affected and that the 
fake encrypted phone company’s cover was maintained. Andrew Young, a part-
ner in the Litigation Department in law firm Barnes and Thornburg stated ‘We 
can’t just run a good investigation; we have to run a good company’ (Cox, 2021). 
This included ensuring both that the marketing of the company was done cor-
rectly, and that the fake company was credible. In order to gain and maintain 
good customer service and satisfaction they had to provide technical support and 
deal with hackers. Importantly, they had to make sure that it did not become 
mainstream – they could not allow it to get into the hands of the public because 
of the ethical issues related to surveilling non-targets. Hence, distribution needed 
to happen within the criminal circles. A key unwitting distributor was Hakan 
Ayik who had long standing connections with Australian biker gangs and was an 
alleged drug lord. Ayik is currently an international fugitive, wanted not only by 
the authorities but, presumably, by previous customers who hold him responsible 
for their predicament (BBC News online, 2021).
Operation Trojan Shield is a good example of surveillance through data and 
digital technologies. Indeed, the capture, processing and categorisation of data 
has unsurprisingly become a significant part of surveillance studies and raises 
significant ethical challenges (Harper et al., 2013; Tucker, 2013; Van Dijck, 2014). 
Another key area, outside of law enforcement, in which data capture and process-
ing is a growing concern is in relation to children’s learning in schools, and the 
associated role of forms of education technology (so-called ‘EdTech’). The use of 
digital learning platforms, and associated technologies in schools, has risen sig-
nificantly during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, it is not clear that governance 
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structures have kept pace with their increased use, or with the new technological 
developments on the horizon (e.g. use of artificial intelligence, AI). The next sec-
tion focusses on some of the ethical concerns of EdTech, with a specific focus on 
the UK context.
CASE STUDY 3 – SURVEILLANCE, EDUCATION AND 
EMOTIONAL AI
The use of  large scale digital learning platforms, such as Google Classroom, 
has increased significantly over the past decade. Many schools have welcomed 
the possibility to use platforms that can streamline key learning processes, 
and often these are free of  charge. For instance, Google Classroom allows 
teachers to set work for children, to mark and feedback, and to communi-
cate updates via Classroom or linked Google platforms, such as via Gmail. 
The fact that Google’s digital learning platform is free to use, makes it an 
attractive option for many schools, particularly given significant pressure 
on school budgets in many countries. The use of  platforms such as Google 
Classroom has risen markedly during the Covid-19 pandemic, with registered 
users rising from 40 to 150 million worldwide during this period (Williamson, 
2021). The advantages of  using the platform in terms of  delivering learning 
mean that it is likely that many schools will continue to use it after Covid-19 
‘lockdowns’ imposed by many countries, which meant children accessed the 
learning remotely from home. Furthermore, Google, as the main provider 
of  free digital learning platforms in primary and secondary education has 
sought to further strengthen its position through integration with other of  its 
products and services, for example, providing low-cost Google Chromebooks 
to schools, that integrate seamlessly with its education ecosystem; examples 
include Classroom, Meet and Gmail.
Concerns have been raised about the increased presence of  large data 
companies in education – with reference to children’s privacy, and the 
extent of  data generation from children’s learning activity. For instance, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an official complaint with the Federal 
Trade Commission about data mining of  children’s personal information by 
Google’s Workspace for Education (Williamson, 2021). Google’s reply to 
such concerns is to stress the robustness of  its privacy policy, in terms of  not 
sharing personalised data. However, what is missing is transparency regard-
ing how Google uses the data. Concerns have been raised that education tech-
nologies effectively become surveillance technologies because of  the mass 
data processing involved in Edtech (Williamson, Potter, & Eynon, 2019). And 
furthermore, that the growing presence of  education technologies in public 
education systems ‘intensifies and normalises the surveillance of  students’ 
(Manolev, Sullivan, & Slee, 2019). We argue that the surveillance elements of 
education technologies are, in essence, covert, because (a) such technologies 
are not ‘surveillance by design’ and (b) children are highly unlikely to recog-
nise them as forms of  surveillance.
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Governance of Education Technology in Schools
Children are, by definition, classed as a vulnerable group, and yet there is sig-
nificant opacity regarding the governance of the use of education-focussed tech-
nologies such as Google Classroom in UK schools. This point is a key message 
from a recent Digital Futures Commission report (Day, 2021), which undertook 
a detailed analysis of the data-related legislation, and associated governance pro-
cesses (at government and school level), in relation to the use of what they refer 
to as ‘EdTech’. Whilst there are clear legislative frameworks for data processing, 
such as GDPR, there is no specific legislation focussing on the use of EdTech in 
schools, which given that its use, and therefore the role of the private sector, has 
increased significantly in recent years, is somewhat of a surprise. This lack of a 
legislative framework creates a governance vacuum, as schools and local edu-
cation authorities (LEAs) do not have clear legislation upon which to develop 
and implement their local governance practices. The current system also places 
significant responsibility on schools to manage governance, as policies allow and 
encourage schools to identify their own EdTech systems, meaning that differ- 
ent schools can use different platforms (although the ‘free to use’ policies of big 
players such as Google Classroom means that certain platforms are coming to 
dominate).
The fact that legislation lags behind the data generating and processing prac-
tices of EdTech makes it difficult to identify the entirety of the ethical concerns 
in relation to children’s data in schools. With children having to attend school by 
law (unless they have a home-schooling agreement with their LEA), they have no 
choice but to engage with any EdTech used by their school. This makes the use 
of EdTech such an important ethical issue, because children cannot avoid it. The 
opacity regarding the governance of data processing activity means that forms of 
covert surveillance emerge. For instance, does a child understand that if  they opt-
in to an associated product/service provided by their EdTech provider, they could 
be consenting to the company to use their data for marketing purposes – and that 
such activity involves a direct contract between child and digital platform, outside 
of any school policy (Day, 2021)?
AI and EdTech
Concerns about the potential for surveillance of children’s learning are broaden-
ing in relation to new developments involving the use of forms of AI in digital 
learning platforms. This step potentially signifies a move towards automated 
forms of learning, whereby children can ask an AI-driven conversational agent 
questions related to learning. Google CEO, Sundar Pichai, recently announced 
its foray in this area, an AI-driven system called LaMDA (Language Model 
for Dialogue Applications), which is a natural language processor-based con-
versational agent that children can ask questions of and subsequently receive 
responses in a conversational format (Williamson, 2021). We know that such 
systems rely on ‘learning’ from the data gathered from previous interactions, so 
will involve mass aggregation of data related to children’s learning, and as such, 
involve widespread surveillance of engagement with digital learning platforms. 
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Given the fact that AI and data mining are dependent on having large amounts 
of data, there is significant incentive to expand aggressively into new domains 
like education. In addition to major technologies and data companies such as 
Google moving into large scale data mining in education, there are also smaller 
technology firms drawn to education and the development of AI-driven tools to 
capture and categorise children’s learning.
One example is the use of AI-based emotion detection systems, for exam-
ple, http://www.4littletrees.com/ which has been used in secondary education in 
Hong Kong (Murgia, 2021). 4 Little Trees is an AI-driven system that is designed 
to identify and monitor children’s emotional responses and activity during online 
lessons. The aim is to provide feedback to teacher and schools about when stu-
dents lose attention, and whether this informs as to the effectiveness of teaching 
practices and allow for teachers to respond to children’s learning in ‘real time’: 
for example, if  4 Little Trees suggests a child is losing attention a teacher can 
ask a question to that child to re-engage them. 4 Little Trees is based on facial 
recognition systems that have been used by law enforcement and border control 
agencies in recent years. 4 Little Trees extends the ‘recognition’ capabilities of 
such systems through claiming to be able to identify not the person’s identity, 
but their emotions, feelings, sentiments. The growth of emotion-related facial 
recognition systems, which have been named ‘emotional-AI’ has been significant 
in recent years (McStay, 2018, 2020). The attraction to advertisers of being able 
to identify individuals’ emotional responses to adverts is a major one and is driv-
ing the industry. Its use in education is at the embryonic stage, but there is no 
reason to think that education will be naturally immune to the desire and push to 
automate that AI-driven systems offer.
There are important points to note regarding emotion-AI systems such 
as 4 Little Trees. Firstly, that the data collected from children are of an intru-
sive nature (e.g. emotional state, videos of children in their homes and so on). 
Secondly, it is not entirely transparent how the data will be used, both by the 
private sector (i.e. 4 Little Tress) and by schools. Whilst 4 Little Trees states that 
data collected by authority figures (i.e. teachers) will be used to make decisions 
about children’s engagement with learning, it is not clear how it might be used 
in the future. Finally, the universal model of emotion that such technologies are 
developed from (i.e. that a core set of emotions exist with largely universal modes 
of expression) has been extensively critiqued (Barrett, 2018; Barrett, Adolphs, 
Marsella, Martinez, & Pollak, 2019; Ellis & Tucker, 2020). The implication of 
these critiques is that the categorisation of the emotional states of children can-
not reliably be taken as accurate. If  we cannot rely on interpretations of systems 
such as 4 Little Trees, it is problematic to base elements of children’s educa-
tion on them. An expression of inattention could relate to a child reflecting on a 
problem relating to their learning, rather than inattention per se. Furthermore, 
if  a child is deemed to be inattentive and unengaged, despite previous warnings, 
would this lead to punishments?
The real time monitoring, tracking and categorising of children’s facial expres-
sions during online learning is an example of an emerging form of surveillance. 
Whilst it resonates with traditional notions of top-down power, in the form of 
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powerful organisations (such as technology companies and schools) initiating 
and undertaking the surveillance, its operation is closer to what Isin and Ruppert 
(2020) refer to as sensory power, which involves ‘data that tracks and traces people 
in their movements, sentiments, needs and desires’ (p. 2). In the case of 4 Little 
Trees, it is the tracking and categorising of facial expressions in terms of emo-
tion, mood and attention. Isin and Ruppert claim sensory power is a new form 
of power that is distinguished from traditional notions of sovereign, disciplinary 
and regulatory power. Data tracking technologies such as emotion-AI systems 
have made possible more sophisticated forms of surveillance in terms of focus-
sing down on specific psycho-physiological activity, such as with micro-facial 
expressions. Others forms of tracking have also emerged, such as fitness trackers 
that can capture and categorise heart rate, skin conductance and so on.
The ethical challenges of EdTech are only going to continue to grow as with 
increased use of AI in digital learning platforms. To date, much of the data under 
focus has involved things such as children’s IP addresses, time spent engaging 
with platforms, wider patterns of use and such like. The advent of tools such as 4 
Little Trees adds an additional layer because it generates different kinds of data 
about children. The processing of descriptive data about patterns of use (such as 
location, duration) is added to data interpreting and categorising children’s faces 
directly in relation to emotion and attentional state. This is a more sophisticated 
level of data, which is seen as attractive due to its potential to inform regarding 
the effectiveness of different forms of online learning. However, its categorising 
of facial expressions as informing of emotional states, based on problematic emo-
tion science, makes it both intrusive and potentially inaccurate due to not being 
scientifically valid.
Allowing private companies to develop and use facial recognition technologies 
in children’s learning environments presents major ethical challenges, from concerns 
regarding data protection through to allowing private companies access to videos 
of children’s engagement in ‘real time’ learning in their homes. This is an emerging 
area of concern, for which new forms of governance are required. Whilst the 4 Little 
Trees system is not currently in use in the UK, it is indicative of one direction that 
EdTech is taking, and as such it is an important example of the considerations for 
governance processes. As the Digital Futures Commission Report notes:
[G]iven the lack of data governance or data analytics expertise in schools, putting the respon-
sibility on schools to negotiate these contracts puts a large amount of power in the hands of 
EdTech companies to interpret and apply data protection laws in a way that suits their own 
commercial purposes, without any oversight. (Day, 2021, p. 46)
In relation to the current use of EdTech in UK schools, the system’s positioning 
of responsibility at the level of schools, which can often lack the detailed tech-
nical knowledge to map sophisticated data generating and processing practices 
onto existing governance, is not an optimal strategy to ensure transparent and 
ethical governance structures. Legislation and governance structures are required 
to be developed and implemented at the level of government and given the sig-
nificant increase in the use of EdTech during the Covid-19 pandemic, the need is 
significant and pressing (Day, 2021).
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DISCUSSION
The three case studies we have presented raise some common and some different 
ethical concerns. All involved the gathering of data on individuals but the nature 
of the information varied. In the ‘spycops’ and AI EdTech cases the data were 
potentially of a very personal nature whereas ΛNØM appeared to gather data 
mainly about criminal activity. Both the ‘spycops’ and ΛNØM cases involved 
intentional deception whereas, in the case of AI EdTech the nature of the data 
gathering was opaque rather than deceptive. The data in the ΛNØM case were 
gathered to support criminal prosecutions whereas, in the ‘Spycops’ and AI 
EdTech cases the future use of the data, and thus consequences for the individu-
als, was unclear. Similarly, in the latter two cases, the information was poten-
tially inaccurate. The cases differed also in respect of whether the information 
was gathered by the state or by private corporations. In the two cases of state 
surveillance, deception was also involved. Key concerns here include proportion-
ality and whether the targeting was discriminate. In the ΛNØM case, the target 
group appeared to be clearly defined but, although undercover infiltration might 
be regarded as proportionate in relation to the threat posed by serious organ-
ised crime networks, there are questions about the benefit versus harm calculus. 
For example, it is unclear whether the operation will have unintended long-term 
consequences like weakening public trust in commercial encryption products. In 
the ‘spycops’ case, there was little evidence of a rigorous threat assessment and 
deliberation of harms and benefits, the targeting seemed to lack discrimination 
and there was significant collateral intrusion and breaches of human rights.
In the case of  AI EdTech, the involvement of  large private corporations 
gathering data raises some different ethical questions not only about the 
datafication of  children who have not been able to give consent and the com-
mercialisation of  education but also about what Zuboff  (2019) has termed 
‘surveillance capitalism’. The motto of  surveillance capitalism can be summa-
rised, in Bruce Schneier’s (2015) memorable phrase, as ‘[i]f  something is free, 
you’re not the customer; you’re the product’ (p. 83). It has been argued that 
many private corporations now hold more personal information on the public 
than governments. Whilst, in principle, governments can be held accountable 
by their citizens, corporations are only accountable to their shareholders and 
the law (which is notoriously weak in this area, especially in the USA). This 
gives technology companies considerable leeway in how they use data gath-
ered from their users. An investigation by ProPublica (https://www.propublica.
org/) revealed that Facebook uses over 52,000 unique attributes – including 
categories like ‘affinity’, with different ethnic groups, ‘pretending to text in 
awkward situations’ and ‘breastfeeding in public’ – to classify its users which 
they market to advertisers (Angwin, Mattu, & Parris, 2016). ProPublica have 
reported on how some advertisers have used this information in a discrimina-
tory fashion, for instance, only advertising housing to white people. This is an 
example of  how information collected in an opaque fashion can be utilised in 
a way that users are unaware of  and thus this raises concern about how data 
collected on children might be used in the future.
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Our review of these three cases demonstrates that, although covert aspects of 
surveillance prompt some common ethical concerns (e.g. privacy, lack of trans-
parency, etc.), some questions arise from the specificity of the type of surveil-
lance, who is employing it (e.g. the state or private corporations) and for what 
purpose. As a result, it is important in public discussion of ethics not to treat 
surveillance as a set of homogenous practices.
There is clearly a need for a more informed public debate about covert aspects 
of surveillance and further research is warranted on how the public understand 
and weigh up competing moral imperatives. For example, in relation to the ‘spy-
cops’ case, what level of surveillance is publicly acceptable to prevent non-violent 
public disorder by activists compared with, say, people actively engaging in vio-
lent acts of terrorism? And, in either case, what degree of certainty do we have 
in the intelligence gathered? The 34th BSA Survey did not investigate these more 
intrusive types of surveillance though, interestingly, it found that two-thirds of 
the population supported the rights of groups to hold demonstrations and 50% 
supported this right even if  the groups wanted to overthrow the government by 
revolution (Clery et al., 2016).
One of the challenges in public discourse about the ethics of surveillance is 
that, as we have noted, only a selected number of ethical issues are discussed 
and often those associated with particular types of surveillance. For example, 
state surveillance via CCTV and collection of digital communications engages 
questions of privacy but not the kinds of deception required in undercover opera-
tions. As a result, it can be helpful to utilise frameworks which prompt us to 
consider a broad range of ethical questions. One such framework is the ‘ethical 
grid’ developed by David Seedhouse (2009). Although there is not enough space 
to discuss the grid in detail, for the present discussion it is sufficient to understand 
that Seedhouse views good ethical decision-making as involving four different 
‘layers’: a concern for individuals (which broadly engages concerns about human 
rights like respecting and creating autonomy, respecting persons equally; and 
serving needs first); a deontological layer (concerning moral duties like telling the 
truth, minimising harm, keeping promises and seeking to do the most positive 
good); a consequentialist layer (concerning the consequences of actions like what 
would deliver the most beneficial outcome for oneself, the individual, a particular 
group and/or society); and a layer of external considerations (such as laws, codes 
of practice, risks, the wishes of others, resources available, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of action, disputed facts and the degree of certainty of the evidence on 
which action is taken).
Since Seedhouse developed the ethical grid for use by healthcare professionals, 
it requires adaptation when considering the covert aspects of surveillance. But the 
notion that ethical decision-making requires attending to human rights, moral 
duties and the consequences of actions as well as a range of external considera-
tions is a useful one and could help to guide future discussions. For example, there 
are obviously tensions within and between human rights and deontological and 
consequentialist concerns. We might wish to create and respect autonomy and 
equality for children, but society is prepared to accept restrictions on the auton-
omy of members of organised crime networks to minimise the harms caused by 
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serious crime. External considerations are also important – for example, what 
degree of certainty do we have that the information gathered (such as in relation 
to children’s emotional state) is accurate? Hopefully the use of such frameworks 
might lead researchers to address a broader set of ethical questions and might 
inform a more comprehensive public debate. Given the secrecy and lack of trans-
parency inherent in covert surveillance, such public debate is important.
NOTES
1. Some of these authorisations may be ‘thematic’– that is, covering organisations.
2. This unit was subsumed into different organisations: the National Domestic Extrem-
ism Unit (2011–2013) and the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence 
Unit (2013–2016). Domestic extremism now seems to be managed, along with national 
counter terrorism, by the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s Counter Terrorism Coordina-
tion Committee through the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters.
3. The inquiry’s extensive website (https://www.ucpi.org.uk/) provides access to hearing 
transcripts and evidential documents (over 1,000 at the time of writing). When hearings 
are being held summaries of each day’s evidence can also be found on an activist website: 
http://campaignopposingpolicesurveillance.com/.
4. In 2006, the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch was subsumed under Counter 
Terrorism Command (SO15).
5. This tactic was popularised by Frederick Forsyth’s 1971 novel The Day of the Jackal.
6. Names in inverted commas are cover identities rather than officers’ real names. In the 
UCPI many officers are referred to by a code beginning with the letters ‘HN’.
7. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal was established by the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 in order to deal with complaints about their use.
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PREAMBLE
Covert research is research which has not been declared to research participants or 
subjects. Surveillance research is a form of covert research which involves undeclared 
monitoring of a subject’s actions and/or their data which may or may not be personal. 
Deceptive research is research whose nature has been misrepresented to the subject; 
it may be covert, but more usually it is not. Deception may form an element in any 
research approach. Covert, surveillance and deceptive research are often treated as 
raising similar ethical concerns, but they are different kinds of activity. Each category 
of research includes variable forms of data gathering, analysis and reporting, and 
therefore raises a variety of ethical issues, some distinct and some overlapping.
Care must be taken with a great deal of existing guidance and advice on these 
types of research. Some guidance can include misunderstandings of the nature 
of covert, surveillance and deceptive research, and should not be endorsed. For 
example, much advice suggests that these forms of enquiry are rare, have always 
been rare and that alternative methods should always be preferred. This is not the 
case. Most of the chapters in this volume contain some degree of challenge to that 
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sort of advice. A great deal of research, particularly in the humanities and social 
sciences, has benefitted from either one or a combination of these approaches. A 
lengthy tradition, going back at least to the 1940s, uses these kinds of approaches. 
Indeed, it might be said that ALL public research has some undisclosed elements.
Research proposals which include methods that do not disclose that research 
is being done, or do not obtain full informed consent from participants, often 
raise ethical concerns for reviewers. Equally policymakers and their advisors may 
have concerns about either using or commissioning evidence from surveillance, 
covert or deceptive research. The following points are provided as a concise sum-
mary of the issues addressed in greater detail throughout the open access vol-
ume within which these notes are first produced (Iphofen, R., & O’Mathúna, D., 
(Eds.). (2022). Ethical issues in covert, security and surveillance research (Advances 
in Research Ethics and Integrity, Vol. 8). Bingley: Emerald Publishing). These 
considerations were written with a broad set of reviewers in mind, including 
those reviewing proposals under consideration for funding, ethics ‘approval’, eth-
ics ‘opinion’ or publication. We do not provide simple categorisations of specific 
research methods as either ethical or unethical, but offer these considerations as 
prompts to facilitate further reflection and consideration of the details of each 
proposal that will allow more complete assessments of the proposed research.
PART A
Guidance for Reviewers on Covert, Surveillance and/or Deceptive Research
(1) Do Not Assume These Research Approaches to be Inherently Unethical 
For the reasons discussed throughout this collection and for those summarised 
below, these approaches to research cannot be assumed to be inherently unethical. 
The ethical principles by which research must be judged depend on answers to a 
range of questions such as:
(a) Who has a right to know the information that is being obtained?
(b) Who has a right to control access to that information?
(c) Whose interests must be protected and why?
It cannot be assumed that all information is the private property of the indi-
vidual from whom it is obtained. In some circumstances, the information is pub-
lic, and withholding information about it may be unethical in itself.
The use of deception in research is widely thought to be problematic. The very 
word ‘deception’ implies an intention deliberately to mislead people who are par-
ticipating in research. Many writers have supposed that covert research is intrin-
sically deceptive. Covert research is simply research which is not fully disclosed, 
and there are many situations where complete disclosure will not take place. That 
is not necessarily ‘deceptive’. Several chapters in this open access volume have 
discussed compelling ethical reasons why full disclosure is not ethically required 
for particular types of research. Those who assume covert research to be decep-
tive have generally been influenced by a particular class of sociological research, 
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covert participant observation, which has at times led into illegal, unethical or 
at least ethically questionable activities. The examples they cite have included 
participation in sexual activity in public toilets, football hooliganism, neo-fascist 
political organisations and gang culture. The researchers producing such evidence 
needed to offer compelling reasons for why some elements of deception and cov-
ert work were necessary in these situations.
(2) Do Not Treat Covert, Deceptive and/or Surveillance Research ‘Approaches’ as 
a Set of Homogeneous Practices 
Covertly observing people in private may be a breach of their rights, although there 
may be cases where this is justified. Observing people in public is less controversial, 
although still may impinge on people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Surveillance is not covert when ‘consented’ to by individuals seeking to purchase 
goods and services. And if the ‘purposes’ of surveillance are fully conveyed to those 
being surveilled it cannot be seen as deceptive. For these reasons, the details of what 
researchers plan to do and how they plan to do it have to be examined. Surveillance 
activities which are not necessary to the research should be removed, and efforts 
taken in all cases (covert, surveillance and deceptive) to mitigate potential harms 
which could arise. This may include, for example, pixelating faces of people when 
monitoring CCTV for learning about footfall patterns in public areas.
Deception has been widely used in research and in many different ways. Just as 
the term has a range of meaning in general conversation, it means different things 
in research contexts. Examples include the following:
•	 A medical treatment trial divides people into two groups, half  of which 
unknowingly receive a placebo. For example, everyone might be told that they 
are receiving an experimental drug and then one group is given a placebo.
•	 A psychologist tells research subjects that the research is being done to exam-
ine one psychological trait, when in fact it is being done to examine another 
one. Subjects might be told they are experimenters, while accomplices may 
pose as subjects.
•	 An experiment is set up in which the naïve subject is thrust into interactions 
with the researcher’s accomplices, people who are party to the deception.
•	 A journalist secures an interview with a politician on the understanding that it 
will be used for a profile, when the actual intention is to subject the politician 
to public criticism.
•	 A researcher poses as a member of the public to discover how people are 
treated by an agency.
Only in the medical case is research being undertaken in the private sphere. 
It is possible to find examples of journalism which intrude on private life – for 
example, ‘blagging’, or pretending to celebrities’ service providers that they are 
authorised to get personal information – but such practices are unquestion-
ably unethical. Furthermore, in deceptive cases, the research subjects should be 
informed of the truth after the research has taken place.
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(3) Consider the Vital Role of ‘Context’ 
The ethical considerations to be applied to covert and/or surveillance research as 
well as any research involving deception must be assessed in terms of the context 
in which the research is conducted. This refers to the concepts of ‘situated ethics’ 
(where the ethical values and principles accepted in a specific situation or 
context must be given due consideration in any overall ethical assessment) 
and what is known as ‘researcher positionality’ (where the motives, intentions 
and skills of  the individual researchers or organisations must be taken into 
consideration).
Most professional codes of guidance identify at least four main areas of ethi-
cal concern. These include:
(1) the ‘research relationship’, which is the responsibility to the research’s 
funders or sponsors;
(2) the relationship of the researcher to the research participants or to human 
subjects;
(3) responsibilities to the researcher’s profession and to other researchers; and
(4) responsibilities to the wider society.
The objections to these research approaches are mainly focussed on the second 
and third of these, but some stretch to the fourth. At the same time, justifications 
for covert research (including surveillance research) may well be given in the con-
text of the fourth. In all cases of deception in research, the consequences in these 
four domains must be considered and assessed.
(4) Engage in a Full Examination of the Approach 
Surveillance and/or covert research or any element of deception should be 
assessed in terms of: who is doing what to whom, in what situation and for what 
purpose? This is a way of expanding the context of the research actions being 
assessed. In all research, there is a possibility that the actions of the researcher 
will change the behaviour of the research subject or participant, and a process 
of full disclosure may defeat the object of the research. The effect of revealing 
one’s status as a researcher might be to alter the behaviour of the people being 
observed, and that would be self-defeating.
The presence of a researcher as participant might, for example, indicate in 
itself  a level of support for the activity being researched (whether the other par-
ticipants are aware of this researcher or not), such as acting as encouragement to 
anti-social behaviour (arising from a larger supportive group reducing inhibitions 
of the participants). None of those risks, serious as they are, is directly attribut-
able to deceit as such.
Circumstances may arise where researchers mislead people innocently: for 
example, telling them that the research will be used to examine one problem, 
when it may turn out to be used for another; that the research will be uniquely 
part of one research project, when often data are recycled into others; or that the 
research will be used to improve treatment when it turns out that it does not do 
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so. These are less ethically problematic than cases of deliberate deception, but 
proportionate efforts should be made to make the truth known to the research 
participants once the research concludes.
(5) Be Aware of the ‘Methods’ Available to Engage in Covert and/or Surveillance 
Research 
The techniques available to conduct covert research or surveillance as well as ways of 
using forms of deception are developing all the time as the technologies develop. The 
ethical considerations to be borne in mind when using new technologies must keep up 
with developments in technology. Ethics appraisal must take into account the specific 
way that data are being gathered and the nature of those data. Some covert methods 
of data gathering include: a researcher directly observing the actions of subjects; 
a researcher indirectly observing the actions of subjects (such as via CCTV or the 
use of audio recording devices); a researcher participating in a group, community 
or organisation primarily to conduct research and not disclosing their research role 
to the members of the community; a researcher deliberately concealing some or all 
elements of the research (i.e., not ‘fully informing’ the subjects/participants under 
study); automated data gathering and analysis that is controlled by an algorithm. 
While remaining aware of these methods, also be aware of their limitations and 
realistic alternatives to the proposed research methods.
(6) Consider How the Growth of Data Analytics Has Implications for the Degree 
of Covert and/or Surveillance Research Made Possible 
Assessing the ethical implications for covert actions requires reviewers to remain 
up-to-date with the rapid growth and increasing technological sophistication of Big 
Data. While making possible increasingly global coverage, the potential for drilling 
down to specific individuals and/or their communities is also enhanced. Public and 
political tolerance of such innovations will depend upon the uses to which they are 
put and that should assist with any ethics appraisal. Reviewers should consider the 
potential for misuse of any piece of research and ensure that researchers are aware 
of and have taken steps to mitigate these concerns in their work.
(7) Consider the Range of Advice and Guidance Available to Help in Assessing the 
Ethics of Any Proposal Containing Covert and/or Surveillance Research 
Both surveillance and covert study might violate a principle of ‘prior’ informed 
consent – in which case it might be possible to seek consent from observed 
subjects/participants retrospectively. This might prove difficult with surveillance 
research that is supposed to be anonymous. This would require identifying and 
finding the people surveilled, or who contributed the data. Informed consent, 
however, is only requisite when the information being obtained is private; it is 
neither ethically required, nor ethical to require it, when such information is 
neither private nor reasonably expected to be such, for example, in the evaluation 
of the conduct of government. As with all methods, every effort should be made 
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to ensure people’s dignity and autonomy are promoted, and risks to subjects, 
researchers, the research community and society in general are minimised. In all 
cases, to protect researchers and research agencies, national and international law 
should be respected.
(8) Consider in Detail How ‘Standard’ Ethical Research Principles, Such As 
Anonymity, Confidentiality and Consent, Are To Be Managed 
Anonymity and confidentiality are sometimes used as methods to protect the interests 
of research subjects. In some contexts, research subjects are not identifiable, and 
seeking informed consent would compromise the integrity of that anonymity. In cases 
where the participants are known to the researcher, researchers might not have total 
control over anonymity – especially when participants themselves engage in disclosure 
acts, or given modern data analytics technologies which enable personal identification 
to take place. Similarly, when researchers receive information about illegal acts ‘in 
confidence’, to retain that confidence might require the researcher to contravene a law 
and may violate the rights of others.
People cannot give prior informed consent if  they do not know what they are 
consenting to, and the whole point of deception is to ensure that they do not 
know what is going on at the time when it is happening. The question is whether 
the research is of such a character that prior informed consent is required. Public 
policy research includes many circumstances where the consent of the subject is 
not required: they include some actions in the public domain, actions to make 
governments accountable or aspects of organisational research.
This does not address the criticism that the absence of consent fails to treat 
people with respect. If  the person affected has no right to consent, part of the 
objection to deception falls – but the remaining part, that this is not treating 
people with respect, is difficult to avoid. Deceiving people about the purpose of 
research, and enlightening them afterwards, treats them as ‘naïve subjects’.
If  people do not know what is happening, they cannot exercise a meaningful 
choice about it which is a challenge to their autonomy. But a restriction on liberty 
is not the primary concern. It is that sometimes research inflicts costs and harms 
on research subjects, for example, by the deliberate infliction of stress or anxiety, 
and the right to consent afterwards is not much consolation.
Deception certainly betrays trust. Whenever researchers negotiate the terms 
of a contract with a research participant, they make undertakings, explicitly or 
implicitly: engaging in deception about their role is a breach of the particular 
rights and duties that are created in the process. However, reasons exist (discussed 
fully in Iphofen & O’Mathúna, 2022) to ethically justify doing so, even while such 
research remains risky and must be very carefully reviewed. Where deception has 
occurred, the correct information, and the reasons for the deception, should be 
made explicit to the participants when their involvement finishes.
(9) Consider the Public Interest 
A major justification often given for covert and/or surveillance research is that it offers 
the only way of gathering data that may be in the public interest. The reviewer’s role 
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is to assess, in as much detail as possible, whether the proposed research engagement 
can be considered truly ‘in the public interest’. Note that what is in the public interest 
is not always the same as what the public finds interesting.
Some (like Homan, R. (1991). The ethics of social research. London: 
Macmillan) argue that deception raises legitimate concerns over the professional 
responsibilities of researchers:
•	 deception may ‘pollute the research environment’, leading people to be suspi-
cious of researchers;
•	 deception is bad for the reputation of research and researchers; and
•	 use of deception may legitimate deception to be more widely used.
Additionally, there is the risk that:
•	 the habit of deception may infect the researcher’s behaviour – it could ‘become 
a way of life’ and
•	 the strain of maintaining a deception may be damaging to the researcher.
It is not in the public interest for trust in research and researchers to be under-
mined. Therefore, deception in research must be justified, carefully reviewed and 
disclosed to participants when their participation concludes.
(10) Ensure You Are as Informed as Possible by the Available Literature and 
Illustrative Case Studies So That You Can Give Careful Consideration to the 
‘Promises’ Made By Any Research That Is Covert, That Requires Surveillance and/
or Entails Significant and Ethically ‘Risky’ Deception 
Thoroughly examine any research proposal that appears (implicitly or explicitly) 
to require deceptive, covert and/or surveillance practices. Information about the 
ethical risks entailed in these research approaches is clear and easily available. 
A recommended source is the open access volume for which this guidance was 
developed and is cited in the Preamble.
PART B
Guidance for Policymakers on Covert, Deceptive and Surveillance Research
Policymakers and those who advise and directly influence them should be 
informed by evidence from research that has been conducted with rigour and 
integrity. Some research is so completely ethically tainted that widespread con-
sensus agrees it should not have been conducted and the evidence obtained 
should not be used (the classic example is experimentation conducted in Nazi 
concentration camps). Other research is so methodologically flawed that it 
should not be used in policymaking. The chapters in this open access volume 
(see below)  examined some challenging research methods in depth, and provided 
detailed discussions about when such methods can be ethically justified and 
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when they might not be. The types of  research explored involve covert, decep-
tive and/or surveillance methods. These were defined briefly in the Preamble 
to these guidance notes, and here we provide a concise summary in the form 
of  guidance notes for policymakers. These considerations were written with a 
broad set of  policymakers in mind, and those providing guidance to policymak-
ers, such as advisors and think tanks. We do not provide simple categorisations 
of  specific research methods as ethical or unethical, but offer these considera-
tions as prompts to facilitate further reflection and consideration of  the details 
of  each piece of  research to allow more complete assessments of  whether or 
not the research findings should influence policy. The following points are pro-
vided as a concise summary of  the issues addressed in greater detail throughout 
the open access volume in which these notes were first produced (Iphofen & 
O’Mathúna, 2022).
(1) Do Not Assume Covert, Deceptive and/or Surveillance Research To Be 
Inherently Unethical 
For the reasons discussed throughout this collection and for those summarised below, 
these research approaches cannot be assumed to be inherently unethical. Policies 
based on such research can be ethically justified. The ethical principles by which this 
form of research must be judged depend on answers to a range of questions such as:
(a) Who has a right to know the information that is being obtained?
(b) Who has a right to control access to that information?
(c) Whose interests must be protected and why?
These questions have been considered in greater depth throughout the open 
access volume within which this guidance is contained. It cannot be assumed that 
all information is the private property of the individual from whom it is obtained. 
In some circumstances, the information is public and should be used to inform 
public policy. Not allowing public information to inform public policy may be 
unethical in itself.
(2) Do Not Treat Covert, Deceptive and/or Surveillance Research ‘Approaches’ as 
a Set of Homogeneous Practices 
Covertly observing people in private may be a breach of their rights, although there 
may be cases where this is justified. Observing people in public is less controversial, 
although still may impinge on people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Surveillance 
is not covert when ‘consented’ to by individuals seeking to purchase goods and services. 
And if the ‘purposes’ of surveillance are fully conveyed to those being surveilled it 
cannot be seen as deceptive. For these reasons, the details of what researchers plan to 
do and how they plan to do it have to be examined. Surveillance activities which are 
not necessary to the research should be removed, and efforts taken in all cases (covert, 
surveillance and deceptive) to mitigate potential harms which could arise. This may 
include, for example, pixelating faces of people when monitoring CCTV for learning 
about footfall patterns in public areas.
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(3) Deceptive Research Practices Cover a Variety of Approaches That Must Be 
Understood before Deciding to Use or Not Use Such Results 
Deception has been widely used in research and in many different ways. Just as 
the term has a range of meaning in general conversation, it means different things 
in research contexts. Examples include:
•	 A medical treatment trial divides people into two groups, half  of which 
unknowingly receive a placebo. For example, everyone might be told they are 
receiving an experimental drug and then one group is given a placebo. 
•	 A psychologist tells research subjects that the research is being done to exam-
ine one psychological trait, when in fact it is being done to examine another 
one.
•	 An experiment is set up in which the naïve subject is thrust into interactions 
with the researcher’s accomplices, people who are party to the deception. 
Subjects might be told they are experimenters, while accomplices may pose as 
subjects.
•	 A journalist secures an interview with a politician on the understanding that it 
will be used for a profile, when the actual intention is to subject the politician 
to public criticism.
•	 A researcher poses as a member of the public to discover how people are 
treated by an agency.
Using deception in research is ‘risky’ as it can lead to various types of harms, 
and often has negative connotations, which should be taken into account by poli-
cymakers. Despite this, these approaches can be ethically justified if  the knowl-
edge gained from such research is important, especially for public policy, and if  
the harms involved are not excessive and mitigated against as much as reasonably 
possible. Research involving deception must be carefully and thoroughly exam-
ined to determine whether the deception was justified in order to decide whether 
or not to use its findings in policymaking.
(4) Policymakers Should Consider the Vital Role of ‘Context’ 
The ethical considerations to be applied to research involving covert, deceptive 
and surveillance methods must be assessed in terms of the context in which 
the research is conducted. These factors include the importance of culture and 
history, and how this impacts the assessment of research. This refers to the 
concepts of ‘situated ethics’ (where the ethical values and principles accepted in a 
specific situation or context must be given due consideration in any overall ethical 
assessment) and what is known as ‘researcher positionality’ (where the motives, 
intentions and skills of the individual researchers or organisations must be taken 
into consideration).
(5) Engage in a Full Examination of the Detailed Approach Used in the Research 
Research with covert, deceptive and surveillance methods should be assessed in 
terms of: who is doing what to whom, in what situation and for what purpose? 
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This is a way of expanding the context of the research actions being assessed. In 
all research, there is a possibility that the actions of the researcher will change the 
behaviour of the research subjects or participants, and a process of full disclosure 
may defeat the object of the research. These assessments require advisors with 
requisite skills and may take some time, which should be taken into account when 
planning policy development.
(6) Be Open and Transparent If Research Using Covert, Deceptive or Surveillance 
Methods Was Used to Inform Policy 
The use of these methods should be acknowledged when describing the studies 
that were used to inform policy. Attempts to hide or ignore dimensions of a study 
that might be seen by some as raising ethical questions are likely to generate 
further controversy beyond that of the research itself. Not disclosing such aspects 
of studies might lead some to question or even distrust the integrity of the 
policymaking process. Transparency and open discussion about the studies used 
to inform policy, along with addressing questions some might have about them, 
will help to offset such controversies.
(7) Provide a Clear Rationale to Explain How Research Using Covert, Deceptive 
or Surveillance Methods Was Determined as Suitable to Inform Policy 
If  covert, deceptive or surveillance research is used to inform policy, the process 
and criteria by which such assessments were made should be openly available. 
This both helps to inform users of the policy about how specific studies were 
included or excluded, and helps to provide information to the public on how such 
assessments can and should be made. Such a process should be determined and 
put in place ahead of time for those making and influencing policy that is likely 
to be informed by research using these methods.
(8) Data Analytics May Be Used to Inform Policy, But They Must Be Used 
Carefully and Transparently 
Big Data raises a number of relatively new ethical quandaries which are only 
just starting to be carefully and thoroughly evaluated. This open access volume 
provides some such detailed assessments. Policymakers should develop guidelines 
and regulations that ensure data are used ethically and appropriately. In turn, 
policy should be developed on the basis of ethically justified Big Data research, 
especially when they have been collected using covert, deceptive or surveillance 
methods. Much further work needs to be carried out in this area to ensure data 
are an asset and not a liability for society.
(9) Policymakers Should Seek Community Input on Acceptable Research Practices 
Communities and cultures will differ in their evaluation of the acceptability of 
covert, deceptive and surveillance methods in research. Policymakers should seek 
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input from the communities impacted by their policies (‘stakeholders’) so that 
these views are taken into account. This will also help to ensure that policies may 
be more likely to be seen as acceptable by the community. Since these views may 
change over time, especially following prominent events related to these forms of 
research, this input should be sought on a regular basis. The mechanisms used for 
gathering this input can also be used by policymakers to explain their rationale in 
using or not using such types of research.
(10) Ensure You Are as Informed as Possible by the Available Literature and Take 
Account of Illustrative Case Studies 
Information about the ethical risks entailed in these research approaches is clear 
and easily available. As recommended above, see Iphofen and O’Mathúna (2022).
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDING TO AND/OR IMPROVING THIS 
GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SENT TO: https://prores-project.eu/contact-us/
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